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Arrow's Theorem only applies to some voting systems and only in some situations. Yes, the theorem doesn' apply to approval voting nor does it apply to score vo
by eru 2y ago
Arrow's Theorem only applies to some voting systems and only in some situations.
Yes, the theorem doesn' apply to approval voting nor does it apply to score voting.
Arrow's theorem only applies to deterministic voting systems. So sortition (or other method based on random sampling) are not affected.
The theorem also doesn't apply to proportional representation systems. (Though they have their own problems, of course.)
Most RCV systems are very gameable with tactical voting. Though they aren't that useful, I guess.
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Arrow's theorem also doesn't guarantee that you will have problems. It just says that for some votings systems you can construct voting populations with preference that can't be captured well. It doesn't say whether these situations are likely to occur in practice.
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Arrow's theorem also doesn't apply when you allow bargaining, or people compensating each other.
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Of course, the problem with democracy in practice isn't so much that existing voting systems don't capture what voters want. Even first-past-the-post seems to be doing a reasonable job of that.
The problem is that voters want bad things like protectionism or war or price controls etc. See https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Myth_of_the_Rational_Voter https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Myth_of_the_Rational_Voter
- paganel 2y agoAnd who’s going to decide that those things you mentioned at the end are good or bad? If not (elected) leaders, that is. Take the exemple of the most famous democracy, the US, its current dominance was built on a few wars (the Civil War, to settle things domestically, and the two World Wars that allowed it to extend its dominance worldwide) and big periods of protectionism (like at the end of the 19th century).
- eru 2y agoWho's going to decide what voting system is good or bad? At some point, you have to inject some judgement calls, if you want to end up with a judgement call. Btw, the protectionism was bad for the US economy, and did not help its dominance at all. (That's assuming you like US dominance?)
- deleted 2y ago[deleted]
- dataflow 2y ago> Arrow's Theorem only applies to some voting systems Yes, but... https://politics.stackexchange.com/a/14245 https://politics.stackexchange.com/a/14245
- eru 2y agoYes, you can extend Arrow's theorem a bit. But again, it doesn't apply to people who can negotiate or compromise or who play repeatedly. And it also only applies to aggregating an ordering of preferences. It doesn't apply to eg filling up a parliament for proportional representation. (Btw, the random dictatorship doesn't sound too bad. As a slightly modified form, I think it would be a good experiment to fill up parliament with a few hundred randomly selected people amongst all who are willing.)
- dataflow 2y ago> Yes, you can extend Arrow's theorem a bit I would call it "a lot"! > But again, it doesn't apply to people who can negotiate or compromise You want hundreds of millions of people to negotiate and compromise with each other in a way that would eventually produce representatives that reflect the population's resulting preferences somehow? How would that work? > or who play repeatedly. I don't see why I should expect that to make the problem easier. > I think it would be a good experiment to fill up parliament with a few hundred randomly selected people amongst all who are willing That sounds like it could go incredibly wrong. Everyone who is willing will sell themselves out to the highest "bidder" (maybe bidding via money, maybe promises of future laws...), and the population unwilling or unable to become a member of parliament will have no say in the matter.
- eru 2y ago> You want hundreds of millions of people to negotiate and compromise with each other in a way that would eventually produce representatives that reflect the population's resulting preferences somehow? How would that work? Tacit negotiations can work. And in practice, it's often your representatives that do the negotiations with other people's representatives. See https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Logrolling https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Logrolling >> or who play repeatedly. > I don't see why I should expect that to make the problem easier. Check out the repeated Prisoner's Dilemma for some inspiration for how repeated play can breed cooperation. > That sounds like it could go incredibly wrong. Everyone who is willing will sell themselves out to the highest "bidder" (maybe bidding via money, maybe promises of future laws...), [...] How is that different from people selling their vote today? Just make sure that the legal system does not enforce these contracts, and you are good. (You can also make such contracts illegal completely, just like selling your vote today is illegal in many countries.) > [...] and the population unwilling or unable to become a member of parliament will have no say in the matter. You can cook up slightly more complicated versions: every voter nominates a (willing) candidate on their ballot. Nationwide, you collect 600 ballots and fill up parliament with the people named on them. Pick your favourite resolution method, in case the same person gets picked multiple times in your sample. (Eg you could give that person more weight in parliament, or you could pick the voter's second choice, or you could pick the ballot of the guy who got picked twice to pick a replacement, etc.)
- ClayShentrup 2y ago> Arrow's theorem also doesn't apply when you allow bargaining, or people compensating each other. that doesn't make sense. the result you get after bargaining would just _be_ one of the options.
- eru 2y agoSorry, I don't understand that. Could you explain? Arrow's Theorem applies when you have a discrete number of choices and you try to aggregate people preferences over them (in specific ways etc). If instead of discrete elections, Alice and Bob can negotiate that _today_ they go to the football match and _tomorrow_ they go to the opera, that opens up new spaces for coordination that Arrow's theorem doesn't touch. Similar, if Alice is allowed to pay Bob, or if they can do political horse-trading like 'I support your foreign policy, if you support my lowering the speed limit', that's also not covered by Arrow's theorem. The theorem really only applies to deterministically aggregating people's individual orderings of a discrete set of options into some aggregated order for the group. That's it. So it doesn't concern side-payments, or other continuous compromises. Or repeated play.
- ClayShentrup 2y agowell, yes. https://www.rangevoting.org/ArrowThm https://www.rangevoting.org/ArrowThm but technically it only applies to social welfare functions, not voting methods. i had a chance to visit kenneth arrow at his home in palo alto circa 2015 and we had a nice little chat about this.
- ClayShentrup 2y ago> Arrow's theorem also doesn't guarantee that you will have problems. It just says that for some votings systems you can construct voting populations with preference that can't be captured well. no, it has nothing to do with capturing preferences. it simply says that no ordinal social welfare function can simultaneously satisfy these criteria: There is no dictator. If every voter prefers A to B then so does the group. The relative positions of A and B in the group ranking depend on their relative positions in the individual rankings, but do not depend on the individual rankings of any irrelevant alternative C.
- eru 2y ago> If every voter prefers A to B then so does the group. [...] That's (part of) what I mean by 'capturing preferences'.
- ClayShentrup 2y ago> Even first-past-the-post seems to be doing a reasonable job of that. utterly false. https://www.rangevoting.org/PConsumer.html https://www.rangevoting.org/PConsumer.html
- eru 2y agoTo be clear: I am saying that in practice people get the _policies_ they mostly agree with, not that the candidates they prefer over other candidates get elected. That's (partially) because the candidates in order to attract voters pick policies that voters prefer.