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Sullivan said that in later speeches - have them freeze at current levels and get a forever growing lead.

alephnerd 2y ago
I've never heard of the 14nm barrier in policymaking and cannot remember of one. If you can link me a first hand source I'd appreciate it. I might be misremembering. Anyhow, this is the core of the Sullivan Principle from back in 2019 (and in development even earlier) "The United States will also have to safeguard its technological advantages in the face of China’s intellectual property theft, targeted industrial policies, and commingling of its economic and security sectors. Doing so will require some enhanced restrictions on the flow of technology investment and trade in both directions, but these efforts should be pursued selectively rather than wholesale, imposing curbs on technologies that are critical to national security and human rights and allowing regular trade and investment to continue for those that are not. Even these targeted restrictions must be undertaken in consultation with industry and other governments; failing to do so could Balkanize the global technology ecosystem by impeding flows of knowledge and talent. Such a development would neutralize a key U.S. competitive advantage relative to China: an open economy that can source the best global talent and synthesize the biggest breakthroughs from around the world. Meanwhile, overreach on technology restrictions could drive other countries toward China, especially since China is already the largest trading partner for most. In this respect, the Trump administration’s loud and largely unilateral campaign against the participation of the Chinese company Huawei in the development of 5G infrastructure may provide a cautionary lesson. Had the administration coordinated with allies and partners in advance and tried some creative policymaking—for example, establishing a multilateral lending initiative to subsidize the purchase of alternatives to Huawei’s equipment—it might have had more success in convincing states to consider other vendors. It then might have been able to make the most of the two-year delay Huawei now faces in rolling out 5G following its placement on the U.S. Department of Commerce’s list of entities that cannot be supplied with American technology. Future efforts to restrict trade with China in the technology sector will require careful deliberation, advance planning, and multilateral support if they are to be successful; otherwise, they will risk undermining U.S. innovation." - Jake Sullivan, 2019
- DiogenesKynikos 2y ago
  Sullivan changed his view, as he said in an extremely bellicose speech in September 2022.[0] The goal is no longer to have a relative lead: > On export controls, we have to revisit the longstanding premise of maintaining “relative” advantages over competitors in certain key technologies. We previously maintained a “sliding scale” approach that said we need to stay only a couple of generations ahead. > That is not the strategic environment we are in today. > Given the foundational nature of certain technologies, such as advanced logic and memory chips, we must maintain as large of a lead as possible. One month after this speech was given, the Biden administration put in place a whole series of measures aimed at preventing China from fabricating chips at or below 14nm. That's why it was a shock when Huawei began selling phones with 7nm chips, produced by SMIC. Huawei specifically timed the launch to be during the visit of US trade representative Gina Raimondo, as a kind of middle finger to the US. 0. https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/speeches-remarks/2022/09/16/remarks-by-national-security-advisor-jake-sullivan-at-the-special-competitive-studies-project-global-emerging-technologies-summit/ https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/speeches-remarks/20...

I've never heard of the 14nm barrier in policymaking and cannot remember of one. If you can link me a first hand source I'd appreciate it. I might be misremembering. Anyhow, this is the core of the Sullivan Principle from back in 2019 (and in development even earlier) "The United States will also have to safeguard its technological advantages in the face of China’s intellectual property theft, targeted industrial policies, and commingling of its economic and security sectors. Doing so will require some enhanced restrictions on the flow of technology investment and trade in both directions, but these efforts should be pursued selectively rather than wholesale, imposing curbs on technologies that are critical to national security and human rights and allowing regular trade and investment to continue for those that are not. Even these targeted restrictions must be undertaken in consultation with industry and other governments; failing to do so could Balkanize the global technology ecosystem by impeding flows of knowledge and talent. Such a development would neutralize a key U.S. competitive advantage relative to China: an open economy that can source the best global talent and synthesize the biggest breakthroughs from around the world. Meanwhile, overreach on technology restrictions could drive other countries toward China, especially since China is already the largest trading partner for most. In this respect, the Trump administration’s loud and largely unilateral campaign against the participation of the Chinese company Huawei in the development of 5G infrastructure may provide a cautionary lesson. Had the administration coordinated with allies and partners in advance and tried some creative policymaking—for example, establishing a multilateral lending initiative to subsidize the purchase of alternatives to Huawei’s equipment—it might have had more success in convincing states to consider other vendors. It then might have been able to make the most of the two-year delay Huawei now faces in rolling out 5G following its placement on the U.S. Department of Commerce’s list of entities that cannot be supplied with American technology. Future efforts to restrict trade with China in the technology sector will require careful deliberation, advance planning, and multilateral support if they are to be successful; otherwise, they will risk undermining U.S. innovation." - Jake Sullivan, 2019

DiogenesKynikos 2y ago
Sullivan changed his view, as he said in an extremely bellicose speech in September 2022.[0] The goal is no longer to have a relative lead: > On export controls, we have to revisit the longstanding premise of maintaining “relative” advantages over competitors in certain key technologies. We previously maintained a “sliding scale” approach that said we need to stay only a couple of generations ahead. > That is not the strategic environment we are in today. > Given the foundational nature of certain technologies, such as advanced logic and memory chips, we must maintain as large of a lead as possible. One month after this speech was given, the Biden administration put in place a whole series of measures aimed at preventing China from fabricating chips at or below 14nm. That's why it was a shock when Huawei began selling phones with 7nm chips, produced by SMIC. Huawei specifically timed the launch to be during the visit of US trade representative Gina Raimondo, as a kind of middle finger to the US. 0. https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/speeches-remarks/2022/09/16/remarks-by-national-security-advisor-jake-sullivan-at-the-special-competitive-studies-project-global-emerging-technologies-summit/ https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/speeches-remarks/20...