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Ah, the single taxers. The author mentions Decentraland. The whole point of Decentraland, which is a crypto metaverse, was to make land prices go up. They didn
by Animats 2y ago
Ah, the single taxers.
The author mentions Decentraland. The whole point of Decentraland, which is a crypto metaverse, was to make land prices go up. They didn't. Decentraland is boring and nobody goes there. But it does work, and it's up and running all the time. There are other crypto metaverses. Most of them never got beyond the hand-waving stage or the occasional demo of a small virtual world, but that didn't stop them from trying to sell overpriced land. Despite all the noise from the metaverse crowd, few of them got very far on implementation.
There's Second Life, which is a single-tax system. You pay Linden Lab a fixed fee per square meter, regardless of what you're doing with the land. Land prices vary widely. Waterfront land is usually expensive; land on rocky plateaus far from roads is cheap. The supply of land is not limited; for a standard monthly fee, you can get another server provisioned with more land for you. You can buy land and rent it as raw land or build on it and rent houses or apartments, so it works economically like real land. Despite doing things the way this author likes, Second Life has overpriced desirable land held off the market to keep prices up.
Virtual economy theory is interesting. It's discussed in various game dev books.
But this paper is too much "_ is the answer. What was the question?"
There are a few real-world cities in the US which tried a single land tax. Here's how that worked out.[1]
[1] https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2015/05/the-land-tax-what-happened-to-towns-like-fairhope-alabama-that-tried-georgism.html https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2015/05/the-land-tax-wha...
- angled 2y agoCanberra, ACT has it, too: https://www.revenue.act.gov.au/land-tax https://www.revenue.act.gov.au/land-tax
- fblp 2y agoActually all Australian states and the ACT have land taxes in lieu of property taxes https://business.gov.au/finance/taxation/taxes-on-your-property#:~:text=Land%20tax%20is%20an%20annual,comparable%2C%20but%20they%20do%20vary https://business.gov.au/finance/taxation/taxes-on-your-prope....
- langcss 2y agoI think ACT has no thresholds, whereas NSW for example you could own a $5m primary residence and rent it out and maybe 4 $1m appartments (whose land value will be low) and rent those out and pay no land tax. So you can be rich from property and pay no land tax. It would kick in for larger landlords though but they could avoid it somewhat by having a property in every state.
- larsiusprime 2y agoI'm actually not a single-taxer, for the record. > The author mentions Decentraland. The whole point of Decentraland, which is a crypto metaverse, was to make land prices go up. They didn't. Decentraland is boring and nobody goes there. But it does work, and it's up and running all the time. There are other crypto metaverses. Most of them never got beyond the hand-waving stage or the occasional demo of a small virtual world, but that didn't stop them from trying to sell overpriced land. Despite all the noise from the metaverse crowd, few of them got very far on implementation. We are in agreement. I thought the crypto metaverses were stupid and said so loudly at the time and predicted they would fail for many reasons; the point about land speculation with crypto games is that charging for the right to upload UGC is literally the dumbest idea in the world. The difference between a crypto metaverse and the real world is you can opt out of existing in any individual virtual world. This is all mentioned in the article. > The supply of land is not limited [in Second Life]. This is mentioned in the article. > Despite doing things the way this author likes > You pay Linden Lab a fixed fee per square meter, regardless of what you're doing with the land A fixed fee per square meter without regard to land use or location is literally the opposite of the system I have described. As for evidence real-world cities, you might observe from evidence real world cities that have done the opposite of an LVT -- proposition 13 in California for instance. And you might notice states with very high property taxes (an imperfect tax to be sure, but one that definitely puts a higher holding cost on land, despite the inefficient tax on buildings). Tell me, is housing more affordable in states with high property taxes, or in states with very low property taxes?
- skybrian 2y agoSince higher demand results in higher prices, you could rephrase that line as: is housing (and land) more desirable in states with higher or lower property taxes? I think it's mainly unrelated. Other things like available jobs, climate, amenities, and so on seem more important? I've never quite understood whether the land value tax advocates wanted taxes to be higher or lower on average, or how they expect economic activity to vary with tax rates. They seem to expect tax policy to have large effects all on its own, though, and I'm more skeptical that it will make much difference.
- Arch485 2y ago
- AnthonyMouse 2y ago> There are a few real-world cities in the US which tried a single land tax. Here's how that worked out. It sounds like it kinda sorta worked but not if you have external interference (other governments still levying other taxes, especially property tax on buildings), and not if you implement it poorly enough that people vote you out. The "problem" I see with it is that governments don't want it to work, because governments are always trying to maximize tax revenue. Suppose you have an area zoned so you can't build more than 1-story buildings, but to meet local demand you'd need an average of 1.2-story buildings. Institute LVT without changing the zoning and you're still screwed, because a financial incentive to build more housing does nothing when actually building it is still prohibited by law. Suppose you institute the LVT and get rid of the building height restrictions. Now people are going to build a bunch of 5 and 10-story buildings and quickly solve the housing shortage -- great. It actually works. Now the area needs an average building height of 1.2 stories and the average becomes 2.5 stories. Nobody even wants the 1-story buildings because you have to pay 5 times as much LVT per square foot as the 5-story buildings. Local land is no longer scarce because it's being used so much more efficiently. So its value goes down, and with it the tax revenue -- the sole source of tax revenue. Then the government has a few options. Option 1, raise the mil rate. But that doesn't work; if you do that people just build 50-story buildings to minimize the tax and the rest of the land becomes abandoned because no one without a 50-story building could afford the tax on it. Option 2, reintroduce artificial scarcity, e.g. ban tall buildings so land becomes artificially scarce again. But now you're back to inefficient land use and thwarting the ostensible benefit of the tax. Or Option 3, fund the government some other way. Which removes the government's perverse incentive to create artificial scarcity of land to maximize their tax revenue. But then why not just start there? Get rid of the existing perverse incentive (property tax), and the zoning regulations, let housing become affordable as people build until rents fall to construction costs, and fund the government some other way.
- jabl 2y ago> Suppose you institute the LVT and get rid of the building height restrictions. Now people are going to build a bunch of 5 and 10-story buildings and quickly solve the housing shortage -- great. It actually works. Now the area needs an average building height of 1.2 stories and the average becomes 2.5 stories. Nobody even wants the 1-story buildings because you have to pay 5 times as much LVT per square foot as the 5-story buildings. Local land is no longer scarce because it's being used so much more efficiently. There would be an equilibrium. If the need is an average of 1.2 stories, why would developers build until there is 2.5 stories? Yes, with a 10 story building you pay less LVT per apartment, but if nobody buys or rents those apartments, it's still cheaper to build a, say, 3 story building. Or whatever the developer thinks they can sell/rent. > So its value goes down, and with it the tax revenue -- the sole source of tax revenue. Then the government has a few options. Option 1, raise the mil rate. But that doesn't work; if you do that people just build 50-story buildings to minimize the tax and the rest of the land becomes abandoned because no one without a 50-story building could afford the tax on it. The way I understand it, the LVT is 'automatically' set by the land values, hence the LVT name. Of course the government can play with what percentage of the land value the tax is set to, but presumably it would be very unproductive to set it higher than the rate of return of that land in the first place. So even a 'maximal' LVT would be capped (assuming basic economic saneness on the behalf of the government). So if somebody builds a 50-story building, then there is suddenly an oversupply of housing, and as result land values drop, and thus the LVT a land owner needs to pay drops as well. So you'll find an equilibrium point where somebody maybe wants to pay a higher LVT in order to live in a single-family home on their own lot, somebody else prefers a bit roomier apartments in a 4-story building instead of shoebox apartments in that 50-story building etc. And likely the developer of the 50-story building will then make a huge loss, because building such an extremely tall building is very expensive, and tends to make sense only where land prices and demand are huge, not in a place where the requirement is an average 1.2 stories. > Or Option 3, fund the government some other way. Which removes the government's perverse incentive to create artificial scarcity of land to maximize their tax revenue. But then why not just start there? Get rid of the existing perverse incentive (property tax), and the zoning regulations, let housing become affordable as people build until rents fall to construction costs, and fund the government some other way. Well, that's the crux isn't it: What is 'some other way'? (Almost) all taxes cause economic inefficiency in some way. LVT, proponents claim, is almost unique in not causing any deadweight loss because the supply of land is fixed. So from an economic efficiency point of view, it seems LVT is the (or at least, among the) least bad tax.