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Here we have an example of complexity arising from copy protection/licensing. It so happens that this complexity caused a security vulnerability which, when ex

Here we have an example of complexity arising from copy protection/licensing. It so happens that this complexity caused a security vulnerability which, when exploited on any one computer, affects close to a billion computers. Is anyone else infuriated that a vulnerability like this exists in what is analogous to copy protection code? In other words, if Microsoft had been spending more of their resources on making software work, instead of making software work only when you've proven you've paid for it, this particular issue would not exist.

y0ghur7_xxx 14y ago
The same would happen on ubuntu if someone steals the repository keys. This has nothing to do with copy protection.
- dmboyd 14y ago
  Well... No, it'd be like if ubuntu required you to sign up to corporate licensing in order to use Ubuntu. Then handing out misconfigured keys to corporate customers which could also be used to sign repos as an unfortunate side effect.
- MiguelHudnandez 14y ago
  But my point is that more teams needed access to signing keys because some of those teams were dedicated only to licensing issues. If they didn't need signing keys, those keys wouldn't have been compromised. I suppose I can break it down another way. Complexity introduces vulnerabilities. Some complexity is necessary for the software to accomplish what the customer wants. Some complexity is arguably necessary to protect the interests of the vendor. This is arguable because it varies between open source and proprietary software. To me, it is upsetting when the code to protect the vendor's interests is where a critical security vulnerability exists. I don't think this is a controversial statement.
  - exDM69 14y ago
    > But my point is that more teams needed access to signing keys because some of those teams were dedicated only to licensing issues. If they didn't need signing keys, those keys wouldn't have been compromised. Cryptographically signed binaries are not used to manage licensing issues, they are used to make sure that no-one intercepts your download and replaces it with a malicious binary. It is absolutely essential that computer programs are signed or delivered through a secure connection. Losing your signing keys will make the entire system jeopardized and new keys must be generated and securely transmitted (this is hard). > To me, it is upsetting when the code to protect the vendor's interests is where a critical security vulnerability exists. Yes, that would be upsetting if it were true. But it isn't. The whole system is in place to protect you, the customer.
    - MiguelHudnandez 14y ago
      The issue was that Microsoft left behind the ability to sign code with a Microsoft certificate by mistake. The entire reason the attackers could use the certificate was because Microsoft left behind that functionality in the suite of software that allows enterprise customers to license their instances of Terminal Servers. I am not railing against cryptographic signing as a concept -- what happened was Microsoft played fast and loose with their certificate chain in order to provide their customers with a way to prove that they had paid for software. The certificate chain could have been a lot cleaner if that licensing bit wasn't necessary.
- gaius 14y ago
  Let's not forget that kernel.org itself was hacked. Nor that Firefox et al update themselves. People who live in glass houses...
  - exDM69 14y ago
    This is why Linux kernel source code is also signed cryptographically and so is their git repository (all tags are signed). They also employ a PGP-style web of trust instead of an SSL-style centralized certificate management. The chances of someone slipping in a backdoor in kernel releases are very slim.
- rbanffy 14y ago
  Yes. But you can always get the source and build the package yourself. Can you do that with Windows?
  - rosstafarian 14y ago
    Yes but some one can break into whatever server is hosting the source and add a backdoor withought anyone noticing for quite a while, do you go through all the code you compile? Can't think of any specific examples right now but i remember this happening a few times
    - rbanffy 14y ago
      You can rather easily see the deltas. It's not perfect, but it's at least possible. That's another line of defense Windows users lack (and, usually, don't care about)
jcdrepair 14y ago
Microsoft has over 90,000 employees, and no doubt some of those people were hired specifically to protect their software licensing. They're probably not pulling their top OS developers to work on this. So the idea that they should have been "spending more of their resources on making software work..." is not really valid. In fact, there is no company or software community anywhere that writes highly complex and bug free software. It's not possible.
- MiguelHudnandez 14y ago
  I agree with you that they are not necessarily removing developers from other projects to work on licensing. However, a percentage of code in Windows is dedicated to validating licensing and preventing piracy. > In fact, there is no company or software community anywhere that writes highly complex and bug free software. It's not possible. I agree with this point. For this reason, the point I'm trying to make is that reducing complexity is a key way to make software more secure. And when reducing complexity, we should look at what is in the user's best interest. Code has bugs--that is an unescapable fact for the foreseeable future. Therefore, any code running on your computer makes you slightly less safe. Therefore, any code on your machine which is not accomplishing something in your best interests could be considered an unnecessary security risk. I am arguing that it is not in your best interest to insure that you bought a little certificate from Microsoft before your computer operates the way you have configured it to. After all that, of course it is in your best interests to have Microsoft grow its war chest and be a healthy company that can employ tens of thousands of smart developers to write good code (which we choose to keep using year after year). But, every time a product breaks because they have to make sure I'm not a criminal, and the way they do it is sloppy, I get upset, and I think it's rightfully so. Usually it is small, proprietary CMS or CRM software that drives me crazy. But today it's this issue.
  - zvrba 14y ago
    But having updates cryptographically signed and checked against a list of (presumably) trusted certificates is in my best interest. The "bug" here was in key management, not in SW that's running in my computer.
Spooky23 14y ago
This sort of thing (certificate compromise) has happened with open source projects as well. The downside of trusting certificates is that you're abstracting trust to a point that you (where you == the IT industry) stops questioning who can do what. You trust something absolutely, but that trust is based on lots of people whom you don't know doing the right thing without making mistakes.

y0ghur7_xxx 14y ago

The same would happen on ubuntu if someone steals the repository keys. This has nothing to do with copy protection.

dmboyd 14y ago
Well... No, it'd be like if ubuntu required you to sign up to corporate licensing in order to use Ubuntu. Then handing out misconfigured keys to corporate customers which could also be used to sign repos as an unfortunate side effect.
MiguelHudnandez 14y ago
But my point is that more teams needed access to signing keys because some of those teams were dedicated only to licensing issues. If they didn't need signing keys, those keys wouldn't have been compromised. I suppose I can break it down another way. Complexity introduces vulnerabilities. Some complexity is necessary for the software to accomplish what the customer wants. Some complexity is arguably necessary to protect the interests of the vendor. This is arguable because it varies between open source and proprietary software. To me, it is upsetting when the code to protect the vendor's interests is where a critical security vulnerability exists. I don't think this is a controversial statement.
- exDM69 14y ago
  > But my point is that more teams needed access to signing keys because some of those teams were dedicated only to licensing issues. If they didn't need signing keys, those keys wouldn't have been compromised. Cryptographically signed binaries are not used to manage licensing issues, they are used to make sure that no-one intercepts your download and replaces it with a malicious binary. It is absolutely essential that computer programs are signed or delivered through a secure connection. Losing your signing keys will make the entire system jeopardized and new keys must be generated and securely transmitted (this is hard). > To me, it is upsetting when the code to protect the vendor's interests is where a critical security vulnerability exists. Yes, that would be upsetting if it were true. But it isn't. The whole system is in place to protect you, the customer.
  - MiguelHudnandez 14y ago
    The issue was that Microsoft left behind the ability to sign code with a Microsoft certificate by mistake. The entire reason the attackers could use the certificate was because Microsoft left behind that functionality in the suite of software that allows enterprise customers to license their instances of Terminal Servers. I am not railing against cryptographic signing as a concept -- what happened was Microsoft played fast and loose with their certificate chain in order to provide their customers with a way to prove that they had paid for software. The certificate chain could have been a lot cleaner if that licensing bit wasn't necessary.
gaius 14y ago
Let's not forget that kernel.org itself was hacked. Nor that Firefox et al update themselves. People who live in glass houses...
- exDM69 14y ago
  This is why Linux kernel source code is also signed cryptographically and so is their git repository (all tags are signed). They also employ a PGP-style web of trust instead of an SSL-style centralized certificate management. The chances of someone slipping in a backdoor in kernel releases are very slim.
rbanffy 14y ago
Yes. But you can always get the source and build the package yourself. Can you do that with Windows?
- rosstafarian 14y ago
  Yes but some one can break into whatever server is hosting the source and add a backdoor withought anyone noticing for quite a while, do you go through all the code you compile? Can't think of any specific examples right now but i remember this happening a few times
  - rbanffy 14y ago
    You can rather easily see the deltas. It's not perfect, but it's at least possible. That's another line of defense Windows users lack (and, usually, don't care about)

jcdrepair 14y ago

Microsoft has over 90,000 employees, and no doubt some of those people were hired specifically to protect their software licensing. They're probably not pulling their top OS developers to work on this. So the idea that they should have been "spending more of their resources on making software work..." is not really valid. In fact, there is no company or software community anywhere that writes highly complex and bug free software. It's not possible.

MiguelHudnandez 14y ago
I agree with you that they are not necessarily removing developers from other projects to work on licensing. However, a percentage of code in Windows is dedicated to validating licensing and preventing piracy. > In fact, there is no company or software community anywhere that writes highly complex and bug free software. It's not possible. I agree with this point. For this reason, the point I'm trying to make is that reducing complexity is a key way to make software more secure. And when reducing complexity, we should look at what is in the user's best interest. Code has bugs--that is an unescapable fact for the foreseeable future. Therefore, any code running on your computer makes you slightly less safe. Therefore, any code on your machine which is not accomplishing something in your best interests could be considered an unnecessary security risk. I am arguing that it is not in your best interest to insure that you bought a little certificate from Microsoft before your computer operates the way you have configured it to. After all that, of course it is in your best interests to have Microsoft grow its war chest and be a healthy company that can employ tens of thousands of smart developers to write good code (which we choose to keep using year after year). But, every time a product breaks because they have to make sure I'm not a criminal, and the way they do it is sloppy, I get upset, and I think it's rightfully so. Usually it is small, proprietary CMS or CRM software that drives me crazy. But today it's this issue.
- zvrba 14y ago
  But having updates cryptographically signed and checked against a list of (presumably) trusted certificates is in my best interest. The "bug" here was in key management, not in SW that's running in my computer.

Spooky23 14y ago

This sort of thing (certificate compromise) has happened with open source projects as well. The downside of trusting certificates is that you're abstracting trust to a point that you (where you == the IT industry) stops questioning who can do what. You trust something absolutely, but that trust is based on lots of people whom you don't know doing the right thing without making mistakes.