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>Well. They're not discernible states if they are in another world. That's the very definition of "another world". Discernible in principle. Either the states
by hackinthebochs 2y ago
>Well. They're not discernible states if they are in another world. That's the very definition of "another world".
Discernible in principle. Either the states are distinguishable from within the system (e.g. two branches that disagree on the state of the world), from an outside observer, or a God's eye view. If none of this is true then there is no other world.
>Now imagine creating a particle in some state and have that machine measure that state and record it internally. Provided that the particle+machine system is isolated from the environment (and us) you'd probably agree that the particle and machine are entangled and that the state of the "log" is not in a defined state until we measure it.
Lets further imagine a large collection of these machines connected in series. Each machine can perform one of two experiments at any given trial, and which experiment they run depends on the most recent outcome of the prior machine in the series (e.g. the direction of a particle's spin). There are an exponential number of scenarios as the number of machines in series grows. If we imagine this system entangled until we observe it, and we expect that the definite state is consistent in terms of which particle the machine measured and the corresponding prior outcome in the series, then the entangled system just has to carry discernible state in proportion to the exponential state space of the system. If not, then the system isn't in an indefinite state until observed. The concerns about exponential theory cost remain. Unless the state space is bounded by collapse or some other means, the theoretical cost to MWI or any theory based on Schrodinger without additional posits is supreme.
>In that sense, it's "useful" to imagine how things look like from the "point" of view of that machine and it's possible outcomes in the many worlds, although these worlds might not really matter to us since we can describe the system that includes that machine as having been in a mixed state all along until we humans actually observe its "log"
There's a tension here that needs to be released somehow. On the one hand, you have an external observer determining the system is in a superposition of states. On the other hand, you have the perspective from within the system of everything being definite. You can't just carry both forward simultaneously without addressing the disagreement on the state of reality. Either there are really an unbounded number of branches, the branches are bounded by some mechanism, or there are no branches and the evolution of reality happens asynchronously.
- ithkuil 2y agoI'm not sure what you're actually suggesting. Are you saying that under this scenario of N such machines in series the MWI would make different predictions that just solving the Schrodinger equation?
- hackinthebochs 2y agoNo, I'm saying that under the assumption of no collapse, the scenario with N machines after a long period of entanglement requires that nature "stores" (has discernible state for) information proportional to e^N bits about this region of space. The prediction is the same, the question is what does it say about how nature is constructed and how does this relate to the credence we give the theory.
- ithkuil 2y agoI think you just highlighted the fundamental difference between a bit and a qubit