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Simplicity in terms of weighing theory cost isn't about rules, but about explanatory posits. MWI posits exponential growth in discernible state about which suff

Simplicity in terms of weighing theory cost isn't about rules, but about explanatory posits. MWI posits exponential growth in discernible state about which sufficient information must be carried by whatever grounds the wavefunction. But you don't get this multiplicity of state/information for free. This is a theory cost that is as profligate as one can imagine. It is magical thinking to imagine that the universe gets this for free.

medstrom 2y ago
I don't know where the expression comes from, but "the only numbers that need no justification are zero and infinity". Think of it this way, if you found a coordinate system within the universe that goes from 0,0 to 100,100, you'd have to ask "but why exactly 100?" whereas it would be less surprising if the system had no apparent limit and just could go to infinity on any axis. The multiplicity of MWI is like that: just a maximally extended coordinate system.
- hackinthebochs 2y ago
  A coordinate system is an abstraction, whether anything has some large coordinate is irrelevant to the coordinate system itself. But my understanding of MWI is that there is discernible state being described by the Schrodinger that is taken as "real" or "concrete" by MWI. If we considered the non-actual branches as merely abstract coordinates, then there would be no problem with profligate state and its associated theory cost. But then it wouldn't be many worlds, but rather some kind of collapse theory.
  - whimsicalism 2y ago
    Wavefunction state is just as “real” in the Copenhagen interpretation. There cannot be any hidden variables, it is not merely a mathematical abstraction. You then must posit this additional process of collapse Where the MWI takes additional theory burden is where it explains how the born rule translates to our lived experience - ie. why do we only experience one path of the wavefunction
whimsicalism 2y ago
I have no clue what you mean by “theory cost” but MWI is just describing existing evolution of the wave function. I think the measurement problem is a much bigger ‘theory cost’ to Copenhagen than just assuming wavefunction mechanics continues even after measurements are made.
- hackinthebochs 2y ago
  Theory cost just means some quantity by which we compare theories and judge one to be more parsimonious. A theoretical posit has some cost associated with it. MWI posits actual discernible states, each of which is a unique posit and thus a unique contribution to the theoretical cost of the whole. This state grows exponentially which implies an exponentially growing cost. This is as profligate as one can imagine. Copenhagen does not have an exponential cost as the non-collapse branches do not have a concrete reality under Copenhagen. The cost associated with the new collapse construct pales in comparison.
  - whimsicalism 2y ago
    the occam's razor is an abstract principle, so it is hard to really quantify what counts as additional 'theory burden'. i simply don't agree that this "actual discernible states, each of which is a unique posit and thus a unique contribution to the theoretical cost of the whole" is an actual way of judging theory burden vs. just "the rules we've already discovered continue to apply at large-scale and chaotic systems" which i would say is very low theory burden Copenhagen isn't even clear on if the states have a concrete reality or not - there certainly are no hidden variables, at least.
    - hackinthebochs 2y ago
      There's a certain amount of intuition and taste involved when assigning theoretical costs, but that's no reason not to do it. We have general principles with some rational justification for preferring certain features of theories over others. Simplicity in terms of "not multiplying entities without need" is one such principle. A discernible state is an entity. More discernible states requires more entities or more discernible features of an entity. This is the only way to make the concept of discernible state intelligible. To deny this is just to engage in magical thinking. But each posit has a cost associated with it. We don't know what that cost is exactly (relative to other theories with different features). But we do know that an exponential growth in discernible states overshadows the theoretical cost of the whole regardless of how we quantify the cost of any individual posit. MWI is almost maximally profligate; any empirically adequate theory without this cost should be preferred.
ithkuil 2y ago
Well. They're not discernible states if they are in another world. That's the very definition of "another world". From an outside viewer that hasn't been entangled with you, no branching happens and they see the overall state evolve according to the Schrodinger equation. Imagine that w create very small machines that could perform some observations and record them into some internal log. Now imagine creating a particle in some state and have that machine measure that state and record it internally. Provided that the particle+machine system is isolated from the environment (and us) you'd probably agree that the particle and machine are entangled and that the state of the "log" is not in a defined state until we measure it. Now, that information processing machine is not a human but I think it may be useful to describe how the external world would look like from it's point of view. For example, if that machine performed several experiments on that test particle or other particles it would note in its log data that would confirm that it obeys the Born rule. In that sense, it's "useful" to imagine how things look like from the "point" of view of that machine and it's possible outcomes in the many worlds, although these worlds might not really matter to us since we can describe the system that includes that machine as having been in a mixed state all along until we humans actually observe its "log" The likelihood that people start to object to this though experiment gets higher and higher s as soon as one starts to imply that we humans ourselves are exactly like that machine. For me, the observation that our ability to accept or reject this interpretation is so much tied to our intuitions about our own _self_ is a strong hint that actually favours the theory. We humans have been known to be trapped by our point of view
- hackinthebochs 2y ago
  >Well. They're not discernible states if they are in another world. That's the very definition of "another world". Discernible in principle. Either the states are distinguishable from within the system (e.g. two branches that disagree on the state of the world), from an outside observer, or a God's eye view. If none of this is true then there is no other world. >Now imagine creating a particle in some state and have that machine measure that state and record it internally. Provided that the particle+machine system is isolated from the environment (and us) you'd probably agree that the particle and machine are entangled and that the state of the "log" is not in a defined state until we measure it. Lets further imagine a large collection of these machines connected in series. Each machine can perform one of two experiments at any given trial, and which experiment they run depends on the most recent outcome of the prior machine in the series (e.g. the direction of a particle's spin). There are an exponential number of scenarios as the number of machines in series grows. If we imagine this system entangled until we observe it, and we expect that the definite state is consistent in terms of which particle the machine measured and the corresponding prior outcome in the series, then the entangled system just has to carry discernible state in proportion to the exponential state space of the system. If not, then the system isn't in an indefinite state until observed. The concerns about exponential theory cost remain. Unless the state space is bounded by collapse or some other means, the theoretical cost to MWI or any theory based on Schrodinger without additional posits is supreme. >In that sense, it's "useful" to imagine how things look like from the "point" of view of that machine and it's possible outcomes in the many worlds, although these worlds might not really matter to us since we can describe the system that includes that machine as having been in a mixed state all along until we humans actually observe its "log" There's a tension here that needs to be released somehow. On the one hand, you have an external observer determining the system is in a superposition of states. On the other hand, you have the perspective from within the system of everything being definite. You can't just carry both forward simultaneously without addressing the disagreement on the state of reality. Either there are really an unbounded number of branches, the branches are bounded by some mechanism, or there are no branches and the evolution of reality happens asynchronously.

medstrom 2y ago

I don't know where the expression comes from, but "the only numbers that need no justification are zero and infinity". Think of it this way, if you found a coordinate system within the universe that goes from 0,0 to 100,100, you'd have to ask "but why exactly 100?" whereas it would be less surprising if the system had no apparent limit and just could go to infinity on any axis. The multiplicity of MWI is like that: just a maximally extended coordinate system.

hackinthebochs 2y ago
A coordinate system is an abstraction, whether anything has some large coordinate is irrelevant to the coordinate system itself. But my understanding of MWI is that there is discernible state being described by the Schrodinger that is taken as "real" or "concrete" by MWI. If we considered the non-actual branches as merely abstract coordinates, then there would be no problem with profligate state and its associated theory cost. But then it wouldn't be many worlds, but rather some kind of collapse theory.
- whimsicalism 2y ago
  Wavefunction state is just as “real” in the Copenhagen interpretation. There cannot be any hidden variables, it is not merely a mathematical abstraction. You then must posit this additional process of collapse Where the MWI takes additional theory burden is where it explains how the born rule translates to our lived experience - ie. why do we only experience one path of the wavefunction

whimsicalism 2y ago

I have no clue what you mean by “theory cost” but MWI is just describing existing evolution of the wave function. I think the measurement problem is a much bigger ‘theory cost’ to Copenhagen than just assuming wavefunction mechanics continues even after measurements are made.

hackinthebochs 2y ago
Theory cost just means some quantity by which we compare theories and judge one to be more parsimonious. A theoretical posit has some cost associated with it. MWI posits actual discernible states, each of which is a unique posit and thus a unique contribution to the theoretical cost of the whole. This state grows exponentially which implies an exponentially growing cost. This is as profligate as one can imagine. Copenhagen does not have an exponential cost as the non-collapse branches do not have a concrete reality under Copenhagen. The cost associated with the new collapse construct pales in comparison.
- whimsicalism 2y ago
  the occam's razor is an abstract principle, so it is hard to really quantify what counts as additional 'theory burden'. i simply don't agree that this "actual discernible states, each of which is a unique posit and thus a unique contribution to the theoretical cost of the whole" is an actual way of judging theory burden vs. just "the rules we've already discovered continue to apply at large-scale and chaotic systems" which i would say is very low theory burden Copenhagen isn't even clear on if the states have a concrete reality or not - there certainly are no hidden variables, at least.
  - hackinthebochs 2y ago
    There's a certain amount of intuition and taste involved when assigning theoretical costs, but that's no reason not to do it. We have general principles with some rational justification for preferring certain features of theories over others. Simplicity in terms of "not multiplying entities without need" is one such principle. A discernible state is an entity. More discernible states requires more entities or more discernible features of an entity. This is the only way to make the concept of discernible state intelligible. To deny this is just to engage in magical thinking. But each posit has a cost associated with it. We don't know what that cost is exactly (relative to other theories with different features). But we do know that an exponential growth in discernible states overshadows the theoretical cost of the whole regardless of how we quantify the cost of any individual posit. MWI is almost maximally profligate; any empirically adequate theory without this cost should be preferred.

ithkuil 2y ago

Well. They're not discernible states if they are in another world. That's the very definition of "another world". From an outside viewer that hasn't been entangled with you, no branching happens and they see the overall state evolve according to the Schrodinger equation. Imagine that w create very small machines that could perform some observations and record them into some internal log. Now imagine creating a particle in some state and have that machine measure that state and record it internally. Provided that the particle+machine system is isolated from the environment (and us) you'd probably agree that the particle and machine are entangled and that the state of the "log" is not in a defined state until we measure it. Now, that information processing machine is not a human but I think it may be useful to describe how the external world would look like from it's point of view. For example, if that machine performed several experiments on that test particle or other particles it would note in its log data that would confirm that it obeys the Born rule. In that sense, it's "useful" to imagine how things look like from the "point" of view of that machine and it's possible outcomes in the many worlds, although these worlds might not really matter to us since we can describe the system that includes that machine as having been in a mixed state all along until we humans actually observe its "log" The likelihood that people start to object to this though experiment gets higher and higher s as soon as one starts to imply that we humans ourselves are exactly like that machine. For me, the observation that our ability to accept or reject this interpretation is so much tied to our intuitions about our own _self_ is a strong hint that actually favours the theory. We humans have been known to be trapped by our point of view

hackinthebochs 2y ago
>Well. They're not discernible states if they are in another world. That's the very definition of "another world". Discernible in principle. Either the states are distinguishable from within the system (e.g. two branches that disagree on the state of the world), from an outside observer, or a God's eye view. If none of this is true then there is no other world. >Now imagine creating a particle in some state and have that machine measure that state and record it internally. Provided that the particle+machine system is isolated from the environment (and us) you'd probably agree that the particle and machine are entangled and that the state of the "log" is not in a defined state until we measure it. Lets further imagine a large collection of these machines connected in series. Each machine can perform one of two experiments at any given trial, and which experiment they run depends on the most recent outcome of the prior machine in the series (e.g. the direction of a particle's spin). There are an exponential number of scenarios as the number of machines in series grows. If we imagine this system entangled until we observe it, and we expect that the definite state is consistent in terms of which particle the machine measured and the corresponding prior outcome in the series, then the entangled system just has to carry discernible state in proportion to the exponential state space of the system. If not, then the system isn't in an indefinite state until observed. The concerns about exponential theory cost remain. Unless the state space is bounded by collapse or some other means, the theoretical cost to MWI or any theory based on Schrodinger without additional posits is supreme. >In that sense, it's "useful" to imagine how things look like from the "point" of view of that machine and it's possible outcomes in the many worlds, although these worlds might not really matter to us since we can describe the system that includes that machine as having been in a mixed state all along until we humans actually observe its "log" There's a tension here that needs to be released somehow. On the one hand, you have an external observer determining the system is in a superposition of states. On the other hand, you have the perspective from within the system of everything being definite. You can't just carry both forward simultaneously without addressing the disagreement on the state of reality. Either there are really an unbounded number of branches, the branches are bounded by some mechanism, or there are no branches and the evolution of reality happens asynchronously.