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Yes, that's all well and good but assumes no mistakes and no National Security letters ordering them to describe it that way and no changes of control or busine
by SoftTalker 2y ago
Yes, that's all well and good but assumes no mistakes and no National Security letters ordering them to describe it that way and no changes of control or business strategy at some point in the future.
Once the data is out of your possession it's out of your control.
- mostlysimilar 2y agoNot everyone has nation states in their threat models. I want privacy from corporations / surveillance capitalism, not the US government. Apple's privacy promises are focused on keeping my data out of the hands of bad actors like Google etc. and that's more than enough for me.
- magicalist 2y agoA threat model of Google getting your email revision makes these statements sillier. TLS and existing privacy policies are sufficient.
- theshrike79 2y agoThere are VERY few things that can keep your information safe if a TLA wants it. You need to go full Edward Snowden with phones in faraday cages and typing passwords under a sheet -levels of paranoia to be fully safe. Drow "nation state is after me" from the threat model and you'll be a lot happier.
- transpute 2y ago> nation state ... threat model The history of tech is the history of falling costs with mass production. Expensive TLA surveillance tech for nation states can become broadly accessible, e.g. through-wall WiFi radar sensing sold to millions via IEEE 802.11bf WiFi 7 Sensing in NPU/AI PCs [1], or USB implant cables [2] with a few zeros lopped off the TLA price. Instead of adversary motives, threat models can be based on adversary costs. As adversary costs fall, threat models need to evolve. [1] https://www.technologyreview.com/2024/02/27/1088154/wifi-sensing-tracking-movements/ https://www.technologyreview.com/2024/02/27/1088154/wifi-sen... [2] https://shop.hak5.org/products/omg-cable https://shop.hak5.org/products/omg-cable
- ENGNR 2y agoTrue, but there's a difference between - TLA agency deploys scarce zero days or field ops because you're particularly interesting, vs.. - TLA agency has everything about you in a dragnet, and low level cop in small town searches your data for a laugh because they know you, and leaks it back to your social circle or uses it for commercial advantage
- Terretta 2y ago> Once the data is out of your possession it's out of your control. Actually, once your e2e key that encrypts your data is out of your possession, it's out of your control. Over the past decade it's become commercially feasible to be NSL-proof.