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At first I imagined that was just a gargled description of the certificates being insufficiently large to prevent a brute-force attack. Update: others say its
by willvarfar 14y ago
At first I imagined that was just a gargled description of the certificates being insufficiently large to prevent a brute-force attack.
Update: others say its that the certificate was mis-configured to allow those fetching the cert to sign themselves as MS... oops.
- dmboyd 14y agoMost info I can get on this is through a reverse engineer done in 2004 of the RDP (http://efod.se/media/thesis.pdf http://efod.se/media/thesis.pdf), it was established that when terminal services set up in Application Server Mode(i.e. corporate environments) its configured to sign requests using the x509 protocol. Wouldn't be much of a stretch to extract the certificates used if they were configured incorrectly. My guess is that due to this being engineered as a licensing issue (i.e. DRM added after the fact and not as a trust issue) corporates weren't issued with specific certs, theres very little that could be done to trace down the point where this leaked.
- willvarfar 14y agoWorth adding this new link: http://blog.cryptographyengineering.com/2012/06/flame-certificates-collisions-oh-my.html http://blog.cryptographyengineering.com/2012/06/flame-certif... So both the code-signing bit and a real life collision! Get the popcorn :)