4 ms·
There was nothing wrong with the throttle controls or the engines. The engines were at commanded thrust. What happened was the autopilot (autothrottle) failed
by kayodelycaon 2y ago
There was nothing wrong with the throttle controls or the engines. The engines were at commanded thrust.
What happened was the autopilot (autothrottle) failed to engage.
Pilots set manual thrust and rearmed the system. It didn’t engage. Then the pilots failed to verify engine performance or throttle position twice during takeoff.
This is dangerously negligent because engine performance may not match throttle setting due to mechanical fault. The computers may or may not detect this.
See: https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Air_Florida_Flight_90 https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Air_Florida_Flight_90
- K0balt 2y agoExactly. The procedure of taking off with the auto throttles rather than manually controlling the engines should be prohibited in the POH if the software governing the flow of that procedure is unreliable. Sure, double checking it is a really great and necessary step, but you don’t throw down marbles on the floor in front of the aircrew, even if they should be able to step around them. Mistakes get made. Procedures botched, steps overlooked or conditioned by habit to be checked ok when they are not. Aviation safety is the result of defense in depth, layered mechanisms and procedures that make loss of life highly improbable. An aircraft that is faulty in a way that defeats these layers of safety is by definition not airworthy. Often, it can be made airworthy by a change of procedure, a change in operational regimes, or even by a placard on the dash. In this case, prohibiting the use of autothrottle takeofff until the software is reliable is probably indicated. Something that fails once in a while but usually works is often much more dangerous than something that just doesn’t work at all or is tagged out.