4 ms·
What you are saying is sound, and I agree it could be done. But there are multiple caveats: - How do you hide the secret so that only "legitimate" operating sy
by kukrimate 2y ago
What you are saying is sound, and I agree it could be done.
But there are multiple caveats:
- How do you hide the secret so that only "legitimate" operating systems can use it for establishing their sessions and not "Mate's bootleg totally not malware live USB"?
- And unfortunately current CPUs don't implement this.
- Additionally don't be so smug to think you need to decap a CPU to extract on-die secrets. Fault injection attacks are very effective and hard to defend against.
I agree the security of this can somewhat be somewhat improved, but if you are building a custom CPU anyhow, you might as well move the TPM on-die and avoid this problem entirely.
- logical_person 2y agobefore the popularity of ARM SoCs that contain everything on-die there were much fewer choices for vertically integrated devices. it's a different segment. if you look at apple's vertically integrated devices, they chose a cryptography coprocessor that was not on die originally. with a key accessible only by both pieces of silicon's trusted execution environments, rather than the operating system directly, encrypted comms are established in a similar fashion as the TPM2.0 proposal.