4 ms·
Attestation closes this vulnerability, for example through tools like Ultrablue [1] which provides a self-hosted method of verifying that the TCB has not been m
by p_l 2y ago
Attestation closes this vulnerability, for example through tools like Ultrablue [1] which provides a self-hosted method of verifying that the TCB has not been modified through external tool (in this case, your phone running Ultrablue)
[1] https://github.com/ANSSI-FR/ultrablue https://github.com/ANSSI-FR/ultrablue
- blueflow 2y agoThe TCB has not been modified - that's the point of that attack. Its just physically elsewhere. A high 24 dBi high gain antennae to close that gap costs 70 EUR and you would attest the device in the attackers hands, not the one in front of you.
- hedora 2y agoI think some of those hardware attestation thingies use clocks and tight latency jitter bounds to make replay attacks harder. If it takes more than "2 x time light takes to move 10 ft + deterministic delay from the other side", or less than the deterministic delay, then they refuse to unlock. Some cars even get this right these days. Most don't.