I agree that the argument that there must be no free will because everything already happened is a circular argument. It simply equates determinism with the ant

I agree that the argument that there must be no free will because everything already happened is a circular argument. It simply equates determinism with the antithesis of free will, without proving why that should be the case, or even giving us a model of free will. But after eliminating that mental trap, what what is your model of how deterministic free will works? I think that unless we have one, we're still in a circular argument - it's the opposite circular argument to the one we had before, but still in circular form. That is, just like insisting determinism must eliminate free will is begging the question, simply insisting that determinism does not eliminate free will is also insufficient. We also need a theory of free will that is compatible with determinism. In another subthread to OP's question, I detail my idea of a protected computational substructure as the best version of free will a determinist can expect, and suggest that's enough to explain the survival benefits of what we call free will. If you are in need of a model I propose that one. But I am also curious about your thoughts, especially if you have a very different model in mind! What kind of model do you have in mind?