> The argument that any non-materialist position (panpsychism, substance dualism, monadism, etc.) must "believe in ghosts" is comically reductive. "Ghost in th

> The argument that any non-materialist position (panpsychism, substance dualism, monadism, etc.) must "believe in ghosts" is comically reductive. "Ghost in the machine" is from Ryle. It's quite apropos here. > You're playing a semantic game here; but in any case, understanding is a function of intelligence, so (working backwards), you're actually shooting yourself in the foot, anyway. I honestly don't know what point you're trying to make. To recap, you said that: 1. You don't believe in this AGI nonsense. 2. Searle elaborated on why AGI is nonsense in the 80s. And I am clarifying for you that: 1. Searle did not elaborate on why AGI is nonsense in the 80s. He doesn't claim that AGI is nonsense at all. 2. His arguments are specific to the methods that were called AI, and a bunch of technical and philosophical claims about those methods and about the human mind, at the time he was writing. Ditto for Dreyfus. What you can get Searle to commit to is the idea that human-like AGI can't be a program executed on computers as we think of them today. He's an ultra-materialist, like Ryle, and thinks the physical reality of brains is essential to the minds they produce. To make a mind, you need to make a brain. (In other words, he thinks "Lena" is nonsense: https://qntm.org/mmacevedo https://qntm.org/mmacevedo.) So he would say that ChatGPT is no closer to being human-like AGI than ELIZA was, since it's no closer to having something like a human brain, and if all you meant by "the whole AGI nonsense" is that ChatGPT isn't a step toward human-like AGI, then he'd agree. But he wouldn't say that human-like AGI itself is nonsense, precisely because he doesn't believe in ghosts.