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> MS delivered a locally encrypted database with RAG, and that’s … as good as it gets for this feature set right now. I don't think that's true, at the very le

> MS delivered a locally encrypted database with RAG, and that’s … as good as it gets for this feature set right now. I don't think that's true, at the very least they could have separately encrypted the db with a locking timeout the way that password managers do. That alone would eliminate a number of people's concerns. Beyond that there are a ton of ways they could make the feature safer. They could have a setting where anytime the DB is unlocked the system uses Windows Hello periodically to confirm that the user that typed the password is still in front of the machine. They could proactively prompt the user to update rules or pause Recall in cases where recall is capturing snapshots the user might not want stored (and I question the overall utility of an AI that can't do that reasonably well for the common cases). But all those things would be active reminders to the user of how creepy and dangerous the feature is, so instead they have to pretend that they've thought of everything and that there's no reason to be concerned.

vessenes 2y ago
These are fair, but I'd argue that they're still largely security theatre, and, to your point, worsen the emotional experience a lot. As a product manager, I think it's a fair shake to be like "We expect that generally your Windows machine is secure, and we do a little extra here, no worries mate!" Not that I believe the priors embedded in that pitch; I don't. But, most customers do already, and it's probably a bad plan to make them doubt those priors. Anyway, you said it precisely at the end: don't remind the customers how creepy this is.