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On the other hand, I think it’d make total sense to implement an optional mode that blocks programs’ ability to read the clipboard until the user explicitly app

On the other hand, I think it’d make total sense to implement an optional mode that blocks programs’ ability to read the clipboard until the user explicitly approves them. I understand why some people might not want that (which is why I’d like it to be a setting), but it’s always felt a little weird that any program on desktop programs can grab the clipboard at will. Things like making the clipboard “intelligent” might help too. On macOS there’s a bit of this when copying passwords from the system password manager, where the clipboard is cleared either after paste or after some short period of time to reduce chances of grabby programs pulling it.

connicpu 2y ago
I feel like there's some other reasonable middle grounds too. If you don't want your clipboard to always be cleared, it seems sensible to e.g. only allow the currently active window to read the clipboard.
- vanviegen 2y ago
  Yeah, or show a popup with the name of the window that just grabbed your paste buffer.
roenxi 2y ago
It makes a huge amount of sense to control what programs can snoop on each other. There won't be a lot of people against the idea in principle. Eventually the Wayland ecosystem will be strictly better than X because at least there is some amount of control over that sort of thing. The problem that Wayland had is it took the stance of "just no!" and that means Wayland is now almost an adult (15 years, so a little time to go) and only just arrived at a place where a Wayland compositor is about as useable as an X11 based system (thanks Pipewire). Wayland has been a mess for so long I think even in Debian Bullseye swaywm didn't support Zoom (or any other program) screensharing. Which for 2022 was a remarkable gap in capability. I'm all aboard for the Wayland transition because it is a definite improvement, but Wayland's "security" debacle is a legendary case study in design gone wrong.
- rcxdude 2y ago
  It's not just security, there's a bit of an over-obsession with generalised future-proofing: useful optional proposed protocols have been shot down because they 'assume windows will be laid out on a screen with xy coordinates'. It's a recipe for committee bikeshedding to run rampant, especially with multiple very opinionated parties involved, any of which can torpedo even an 'accepted' extension by just not implementing it. It's a nightmare of fragmentation.
welterde 2y ago
The X11 primary selection buffer is an even better variant of that though. It allows single-shot copy&paste (meaning only one application can grab it) from the password manager to the target application and it tells the password manager the name of the application that grabbed it. I think it shouldn't be too hard to hack in a dialog to password managers to confirm if the destination is correct before replying to the data request. But even without that one at least notices that a malicious/wrong application grabbed the password.

connicpu 2y ago

I feel like there's some other reasonable middle grounds too. If you don't want your clipboard to always be cleared, it seems sensible to e.g. only allow the currently active window to read the clipboard.

vanviegen 2y ago
Yeah, or show a popup with the name of the window that just grabbed your paste buffer.

roenxi 2y ago

It makes a huge amount of sense to control what programs can snoop on each other. There won't be a lot of people against the idea in principle. Eventually the Wayland ecosystem will be strictly better than X because at least there is some amount of control over that sort of thing. The problem that Wayland had is it took the stance of "just no!" and that means Wayland is now almost an adult (15 years, so a little time to go) and only just arrived at a place where a Wayland compositor is about as useable as an X11 based system (thanks Pipewire). Wayland has been a mess for so long I think even in Debian Bullseye swaywm didn't support Zoom (or any other program) screensharing. Which for 2022 was a remarkable gap in capability. I'm all aboard for the Wayland transition because it is a definite improvement, but Wayland's "security" debacle is a legendary case study in design gone wrong.

rcxdude 2y ago
It's not just security, there's a bit of an over-obsession with generalised future-proofing: useful optional proposed protocols have been shot down because they 'assume windows will be laid out on a screen with xy coordinates'. It's a recipe for committee bikeshedding to run rampant, especially with multiple very opinionated parties involved, any of which can torpedo even an 'accepted' extension by just not implementing it. It's a nightmare of fragmentation.

welterde 2y ago

The X11 primary selection buffer is an even better variant of that though. It allows single-shot copy&paste (meaning only one application can grab it) from the password manager to the target application and it tells the password manager the name of the application that grabbed it. I think it shouldn't be too hard to hack in a dialog to password managers to confirm if the destination is correct before replying to the data request. But even without that one at least notices that a malicious/wrong application grabbed the password.