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"Isolation" isn't an on topic response. The only rational take is to believe nations when they say that they will use them, not when they won't. Capability is

"Isolation" isn't an on topic response. The only rational take is to believe nations when they say that they will use them, not when they won't. Capability is the only measurement. Active threats are its decoration. We live in a disinformation environment, and military tactics are at the core of it by definition. Russia should give up and withdraw. But it's frankly ridiculous to assert that "Russia has no way to win" is a relevant statement, as Russia winning is not the relevant metric. Who says that they think that winning is their only option? They may be satisfied with the West losing, should they not see a path to winning for themselves. That's the game theory that needs to be articulated before anyone agrees to be lectured by someone dismissive of such threats. Imagine thinking that "Russia has no way to win" is a statement of reassurance in light of such a threat. Or that telepathic proclamations about their motivations and strategies are, as other people are engaging in here. What people want is for leadership not to play fast and loose with such possibilities.

RetroTechie 2y ago
> The only rational take is to believe nations when they say that they will use them, not when they won't. If that were so, any country making a nuclear threat (backed by capability) would get their wish granted. It doesn't work that way. Threats are assessed, weighed & countered. Bluffs are called. And miscalculations happen (for one: I'd wager Putin wouldn't have attacked Ukraine had he known in advance how things panned out so far). It's my hope that if Putin ever 'pushes the nuke button', some general or missile silo commander(s) will just say "No. Enough! We're not having this". Idle hope perhaps? More hoping - that things won't come to that. As for the non-nuclear part: it's really EU+US vs. Russia now, with Ukraine doing the dirty work. Whether Russia can 'win' depends entirely on how united / determined EU countries & the US are. In other words: politics & economics. Who wants more to win this war? Morale among Russian troops seems low. Any change in that on the horizon?
- mrangle 2y ago
  >If that were so, any country making a nuclear threat (backed by capability) would get their wish granted. Why? I said that capability is the metric. Followed by threats. Neither absolutely defines response. The primary takeaway is to NOT believe capable countries who say that they are against using them (China). When a capable nation makes the threat, only an irresponsible lunatic wouldn't take it seriously. However, a decision can be made from that starting point. In this instance, the "Russia can't win" take on why they won't engage in such an option isn't good theory in my opinion. As the invasion of Ukraine was a desperate counter-move. I believe that you are dead wrong in assuming that Russia didn't understand the probable response and outcome until now. I also think that you aren't considering the variable of even other options available to them and China. But also, that no one can credibly predict a limit to the specific desperation of arguably the most capable nuclear power in the World. Especially in the midst of an active military campaign.
TheLoafOfBread 2y ago
Using nuclear weapons to win a regional conflict is turning those weapons from strategic deterrent to a tactical tool. The moment when any nation will use them in tactical way, say bye bye to non-proliferation treaty, every regional power will want to have at least tactical nukes. Countries like Japan, South Korea, Poland or Germany will want to have those tactical tools too. So sure, Russia can use nuclear weapons to push the conflict into Russian victory, but in the long run it will make multipolar world, which Russia and China crave so much a multipolar nightmare where nukes can fly at them from any bigger state.
- mrangle 2y ago
  But the discussion is whether or not Russia is bluffing, which is a decision that will be reflected in Western tactics. The discussion is not merely to come up with the scenarios that Russia is likely considering. Possible scenarios are simplistic and obvious. Predicting future action requires consideration of motivation, willingness to be reckless, spite, religious eschatology that may serve as a driving force, the real possibility of domestic double agents, unknown high level domestic sociopaths, unknown variables, and in our case unknown classified information. Implied in the discussion is what is being risked given any wrong conclusion. Which, for the sake of this discussion and perhaps in reality, should be assumed to be destruction. My point is that it is stupid, that is too high risk, to the point of suspicious for powerful people to dismiss Russia's threat as unlikely. With the caveat that the exception would be if unknowable classified information speaks to Russia being technologically incapable of being successful.

RetroTechie 2y ago

> The only rational take is to believe nations when they say that they will use them, not when they won't. If that were so, any country making a nuclear threat (backed by capability) would get their wish granted. It doesn't work that way. Threats are assessed, weighed & countered. Bluffs are called. And miscalculations happen (for one: I'd wager Putin wouldn't have attacked Ukraine had he known in advance how things panned out so far). It's my hope that if Putin ever 'pushes the nuke button', some general or missile silo commander(s) will just say "No. Enough! We're not having this". Idle hope perhaps? More hoping - that things won't come to that. As for the non-nuclear part: it's really EU+US vs. Russia now, with Ukraine doing the dirty work. Whether Russia can 'win' depends entirely on how united / determined EU countries & the US are. In other words: politics & economics. Who wants more to win this war? Morale among Russian troops seems low. Any change in that on the horizon?

mrangle 2y ago
>If that were so, any country making a nuclear threat (backed by capability) would get their wish granted. Why? I said that capability is the metric. Followed by threats. Neither absolutely defines response. The primary takeaway is to NOT believe capable countries who say that they are against using them (China). When a capable nation makes the threat, only an irresponsible lunatic wouldn't take it seriously. However, a decision can be made from that starting point. In this instance, the "Russia can't win" take on why they won't engage in such an option isn't good theory in my opinion. As the invasion of Ukraine was a desperate counter-move. I believe that you are dead wrong in assuming that Russia didn't understand the probable response and outcome until now. I also think that you aren't considering the variable of even other options available to them and China. But also, that no one can credibly predict a limit to the specific desperation of arguably the most capable nuclear power in the World. Especially in the midst of an active military campaign.

TheLoafOfBread 2y ago

Using nuclear weapons to win a regional conflict is turning those weapons from strategic deterrent to a tactical tool. The moment when any nation will use them in tactical way, say bye bye to non-proliferation treaty, every regional power will want to have at least tactical nukes. Countries like Japan, South Korea, Poland or Germany will want to have those tactical tools too. So sure, Russia can use nuclear weapons to push the conflict into Russian victory, but in the long run it will make multipolar world, which Russia and China crave so much a multipolar nightmare where nukes can fly at them from any bigger state.

mrangle 2y ago
But the discussion is whether or not Russia is bluffing, which is a decision that will be reflected in Western tactics. The discussion is not merely to come up with the scenarios that Russia is likely considering. Possible scenarios are simplistic and obvious. Predicting future action requires consideration of motivation, willingness to be reckless, spite, religious eschatology that may serve as a driving force, the real possibility of domestic double agents, unknown high level domestic sociopaths, unknown variables, and in our case unknown classified information. Implied in the discussion is what is being risked given any wrong conclusion. Which, for the sake of this discussion and perhaps in reality, should be assumed to be destruction. My point is that it is stupid, that is too high risk, to the point of suspicious for powerful people to dismiss Russia's threat as unlikely. With the caveat that the exception would be if unknowable classified information speaks to Russia being technologically incapable of being successful.