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And there would be clear grounds to do so, if the state courts rule that it's not necessary to clearly identify, prove, and (most importantly) allow a defense a
by leereeves 2y ago
And there would be clear grounds to do so, if the state courts rule that it's not necessary to clearly identify, prove, and (most importantly) allow a defense against, the alleged second crime that is an essential element of these charges (without which the charges are only misdemeanors).
That is obviously a violation of due process, punishing someone for an uncharged and unproven second crime.
But that's what was done in this case, under the DA's by all accounts "novel legal theory".
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Edit: I'm "posting too fast" so I'll respond here. You pointed out that the statute doesn't require proof of the second crime. I agree, it does not.
And that's precisely why the SC could declare it unconstitutional - it punishes an alleged second crime (by elevating the first crime to a felony with more serious penalties) without providing for due process in the prosecution of that second crime.
And I just read about a second reason the SC could overturn the case:
"The Supreme Court has long held, under a doctrine known as the “rule of lenity,” that “fair warning should be given to the world, in language that the common world will understand, of what the law intends to do if a certain line is passed.” Thus, when the meaning of a criminal statute is unclear, the Constitution sometimes requires that statute to be read narrowly because an unclear criminal law did not give potential defendants “fair warning” that their conduct was illegal."
"if the current slate of justices decide that they must have the final word on whether Bragg may prosecute Trump, they could easily invoke the rule of lenity to justify asserting the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction over the case."
https://www.vox.com/politics/2023/4/4/23648390/trump-indictment-supreme-court-stormy-daniels-manhattan-alvin-bragg https://www.vox.com/politics/2023/4/4/23648390/trump-indictm...
- maxerickson 2y ago"and when his intent to defraud includes an intent to commit another crime" That doesn't really seem to require that the second crime is charged, or demand some certain level of proof (it just says "intent to commit another crime"). I guess I agree that if you wanted to make sure the felony stuck you'd charge the second crime in an attempt to establish that intent, but the statute doesn't really spell that out.
- shadowgovt 2y agoAnd in general, "The defendant had intent to commit another crime" is, in this context, a finding of fact that is in the jury's court. Successful commission of the crime is not required. Nor is it required that the jury all agree on what other crime was attempted. If the prosecution makes the case that the defendant tried to commit 12 other crimes and each member of the jury thinks intent on a different crime was proven beyond a reasonable doubt, they are well within their conscience to convict.
- leereeves 2y agoIt's strange how you're both listing the ways this statute denies the accused due process as if that made the law valid. As if merely saying that this law doesn't require due process makes it so. To me, those are all the reasons this law is unconstitutional. New York shouldn't be able to simply write a law that ignores due process in the prosecution of some other alleged crime. Put aside your feelings about Trump and ask yourself if that's a situation you'd like to find yourself in: accused of a laundry list of crimes and convicted even if the jury doesn't agree on which one you committed.
- shadowgovt 2y agoThe jury all agree he committed a crime while attempting to commit another crime. They don't have to agree on what what crime, precisely, he was attempting to commit. Due process doesn't really enter into it because he wasn't accused of successfully accomplishing the other crime, merely of attempting one. This is, to give an analogy, in the same space as OJ Simpson being found guilty of wrongful death and innocent of murder, for committing the same actions, and the fact that he could be tried for both not being a case of double jeopardy.
- leereeves 2y ago> This is, to give an analogy, in the same space as OJ Simpson being found guilty of wrongful death and innocent of murder, for committing the same actions, and the fact that he could be tried for both not being a case of double jeopardy. OJ wasn't "found guilty of wrongful death". He was found liable, because that was a civil case, not a criminal one. That difference is also why double jeopardy didn't apply. I can't really discuss due process with someone who doesn't know the difference between civil and criminal law.
- maxerickson 2y agoIn response to your edit (learn to post...): So the jury is qualified to adjudicate the charged crime, but they aren't qualified to adjudicate intent of another crime? Or is your argument that they must additionally and explicitly declare that adjudication? Or is it that another jury has to do it ahead of time?
- leereeves 2y agoThe jury can hardly adjudicate another crime if that crime isn't specified. And they can't do so fairly if the defendant isn't allowed to present a defense for the charges of the second crime. And they haven't adjudicated a second crime if they don't agree unanimously about what specific crime was committed. It's a mystery to me why the prosecution, which has mentioned a state crime they claim applies, didn't charge him with that crime. That would have provided due process and made the conviction far more convincing. Were they afraid they couldn't actually prove that crime?