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You consider total ransomware payments the "cost of ransomware"? And the revenue of the cybersecurity industry the "cost of cybercrime"? You seem competent, m

You consider total ransomware payments the "cost of ransomware"? And the revenue of the cybersecurity industry the "cost of cybercrime"? You seem competent, me I don't know much about practical cybersecurity. But the combined cost of companies or medical facilities being infected by ransomware surely is not covered by the total ransom payments, right? Sorry if I'n grossly misunderstanding your take, but I struggle to make sense of it. I see however your point about surveillance. And also, affected companies and institutions + the software companies, consultants etc they work with should carry a certain responsibility in some cases. For example, a social engineering breach with one employee who had normal privileges shouldn't allow to easily propagate over the whole network etc

clwg 2y ago
The true cost of any of this is very hard to quantify. There are reputational costs (though you generally want to buy the dip after a hack), national security concerns, intellectual property theft, etc. So, it is a weak argument in that regard, but that's only because there's not a lot of good data to even form a solid opinion on. Sorry if my comment seemed a bit ambiguous. Personally, I have seen during incident response many organizations drop seven figures on EDR, IDS/IPS, and a bunch of widgets while ignoring or refusing to do simple things like network segmentation and configuration/patch management, and it's because they've been sold silver bullets by their vendors, so I also hold a bit of contempt for the industry as well.
- moritzwarhier 2y ago
  Yeah, I was also thinking about hospitals and other crucial infrastructure where ransomware attacks have even cost lives. I got your point though, that's why I edited in the paragraph about accountability. Thanks for your insights.
- K0balt 2y ago
  >network segmentation This gives me flashbacks. I worked in hospital IT for a few years, and the main IT office was constantly trying to fold the (unpatchable, running a mix of OS2, win95, win98, MSdos, and proprietary OSs in -2007) medical devices into the main, internet accessible network. I had to spend countless hours in meetings to keep them segregated. At times, I actually had to just pull fiber jumpers out of the switch. They’d eventually have a fit because they couldn’t see the medical devices with their threat scanning software. They could have just hooked up a laptop to the medical device network and said “yep, every single ip address on there is vulnerable” and sent a strongly worded letter to each manufacturer demanding a patch, which will never be released. Since the devices are FDA certified medical devices, you can’t just patch them without manufacturer endorsement of the software change…so any device more than a few years old is usually vulnerable. 3 months after I left they had a major ransomware event. Weird. Who could have imagined?

clwg 2y ago

The true cost of any of this is very hard to quantify. There are reputational costs (though you generally want to buy the dip after a hack), national security concerns, intellectual property theft, etc. So, it is a weak argument in that regard, but that's only because there's not a lot of good data to even form a solid opinion on. Sorry if my comment seemed a bit ambiguous. Personally, I have seen during incident response many organizations drop seven figures on EDR, IDS/IPS, and a bunch of widgets while ignoring or refusing to do simple things like network segmentation and configuration/patch management, and it's because they've been sold silver bullets by their vendors, so I also hold a bit of contempt for the industry as well.

moritzwarhier 2y ago
Yeah, I was also thinking about hospitals and other crucial infrastructure where ransomware attacks have even cost lives. I got your point though, that's why I edited in the paragraph about accountability. Thanks for your insights.
K0balt 2y ago
>network segmentation This gives me flashbacks. I worked in hospital IT for a few years, and the main IT office was constantly trying to fold the (unpatchable, running a mix of OS2, win95, win98, MSdos, and proprietary OSs in -2007) medical devices into the main, internet accessible network. I had to spend countless hours in meetings to keep them segregated. At times, I actually had to just pull fiber jumpers out of the switch. They’d eventually have a fit because they couldn’t see the medical devices with their threat scanning software. They could have just hooked up a laptop to the medical device network and said “yep, every single ip address on there is vulnerable” and sent a strongly worded letter to each manufacturer demanding a patch, which will never be released. Since the devices are FDA certified medical devices, you can’t just patch them without manufacturer endorsement of the software change…so any device more than a few years old is usually vulnerable. 3 months after I left they had a major ransomware event. Weird. Who could have imagined?