This point got me thinking: > In general, there is perhaps a meaning-nonsense continuum that sentences can be placed along. Some philosophers and linguists di

This point got me thinking: > In general, there is perhaps a meaning-nonsense continuum that sentences can be placed along. Some philosophers and linguists did say there is a difference between grammatically valid and nonsensical sentences. Chomsky's example was "Green ideas sleep furiously." But I think the sentence just seems nonsensical because it presupposes that ideas can be green, and presuppositions are invariant under negation. Which means "Green ideas do not sleep furiously" still presupposes that ideas can be green. Since the presupposition is false (presupposition failure), the sentence itself is neither true nor false, just like a meaningless sentence with ill-formed grammar. But sentences with presupposition failure can be meaningful. E.g. "Mr Smith put his children to bed early", true or false? Neither, Mr Smith doesn't have children. In case of grammatical "nonsensical" sentences without presupposition failure the issue seems to be that they are necessarily false. E.g. "Ideas are green" or "Gravity learns about regret". But that's not much different from saying "Bachelors are married", which is necessarily false, or "Bachelors are unmarried", which is necessarily true. They don't seem particularly nonsensical. I think the case of semi-nonsensical sentences like "Vibrations become chances" can be explained with their ambiguity, where it isn't clear whether there is some metaphorical interpretation of the sentence which could be true.