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But what Krugman is highlighting here -- and Nicholas Taleb has done in more detail previously -- is that fortunes have been made pursuing strategies that are n
by gojomo 18y ago
But what Krugman is highlighting here -- and Nicholas Taleb has done in more detail previously -- is that fortunes have been made pursuing strategies that are net losers for investors and society.
All you have to do is make sure the giant losses occur just 1 year out of N. It doesn't matter that the one year's losses wipe out the other N-1 year gains; you've already collected your fees and quite possibly retired, and there's no claw-back of your cut.
A reasonable aim of financial technology is to ameliorate the risks that could obscure or destroy truly productive activities. But the same tools can easily be used to do the opposite, construct net-wealth-destroying strategies which enrich only money managers.
To cook up such a strategy purposefully is a crime, and the classic ponzi scheme is the blatant extreme case. But many other strategies based on collecting fees during the upswing of an unsustainable bubble, while being insulated from the downswing, are close cousins of the full ponzi. That the loot is laundered through ostensibly legitimate investments (like mortgage securities this time around) is a convenient consensus cover story; it helps even the perpetrators believe they are providing valuable investment services rather than just a scam.
This view doesn't indict all investment activity/funds as being similar to ponzi schemes. But an awful lot of this most recent financial-services boom appears to have been like a ponzi skim.
(Despite the truth I see in this column, I would not trust Krugman's suggested solutions, which are likely to be heavy on new regulation. Ultimately capital has to learn to protect itself, with novel compensation schemes that disincentivize the 'year N explosion' pseudo-ponzi strategies.)
- pg 18y agofortunes have been made pursuing strategies that are net losers for investors and society That seems unavoidable. It's the same in most industries. You have to pay top baseball players high salaries, even though there's no guarantee they'll do well after you hire them. To cook up such a strategy purposefully is a crime Is it, actually?
- gojomo 18y agoThere are no guarantees, of course. Sometimes chance breaks the relationship between results and rewards. And, sometimes crime pays. But the degree matters. If looting and destruction is occasionally rewarded, it can be a manageable expense. If it dominates the industry, even if not via conscious malice, we've got problems. What if every high-paid 'top baseball player' for 10 seasons running was a bust? Then something in scouting or compensation would have to change, a lot. Is it [a crime], actually? Yes. A manager who promises investors the possibility of positive return, but knows he has purposefully designed things so that the investors are guaranteed to ultimately lose, while the manager gains, has at the very least engaged in criminal fraud. So to pull off net-losing strategies within the law, a manager should deceive himself as well as his investors. Fortunately for this class of managers, a whole industry of external rationalizations was spawned by the potential profits.
- zupatol 18y agoThere would be something very wrong if every baseball team managed to lose every match. But the value of baseball comes from entertaining, not from winning, so I'd rather put it this way: There would be something very wrong if you would suddenly realize that every game you saw in the last ten years had unconsciously bored you to death.
- captainobvious 18y agoTake something like day trading, where a company is out of all positions at/after the close each day. Every transaction they engage in is zero-sum. No wealth is being created, but tons of people are wasting time on it (destroying potential wealth). I don't think the case of day trading is covered by the baseball player analogy.