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> In that case, the company had licensed the rights from the rights owner You keep bringing up the Midler case in other comments, but Ford had licensed the ri

> In that case, the company had licensed the rights from the rights owner You keep bringing up the Midler case in other comments, but Ford had licensed the rights for the songs from the rights owner as well. What's different here? If the Sinatra case isn't relevant to all of this because the song was licensed, I don't see how the Midler case stays relevant. https://opencasebook.org/casebooks/3008-property-in-the-age-of-artificial-intelligence/resources/2.3.1-midler-v-ford-motor-co/ https://opencasebook.org/casebooks/3008-property-in-the-age-... > Young & Rubicam had a license from the copyright holder to use the song. I did not say there were no parallels. I said there were multiple parallels in the Sinatra case: The usage of the song's melody, the 'boot' in the product name, lyrics tying the two together. The only parallel we have here is Altman referring to a movie about a female-voiced AI assistant when releasing a female-voiced AI assistant. I think any reasonable person would agree there are far fewer direct parallels in the OpenAI/ScarJo kerfuffle than the Goodyear/Sinatra one.

qarl 2y ago
> but Ford had licensed the rights for the songs That's a fair point - thank you for bringing it to my attention. I disagree with your count on parallels, however. By licensing the rights to the song, the song's melody and lyrics were not at issue, leaving only the boot. Is the boot equivalent to the fact that both characters are revolutionary, flirtatious voice-only female artificial intelligences? I don't think it's anywhere close, but I accept that you'll likely disagree. REGARDLESS, I'm having a seriously hard time understanding how the closing statement in Midler-v-Ford isn't directly relevant to this case: "We need not and do not go so far as to hold that every imitation of a voice to advertise merchandise is actionable. We hold only that when a distinctive voice of a professional singer is widely known and is deliberately imitated in order to sell a product, the sellers have appropriated what is not theirs and have committed a tort in California." It seems very clear that ScarJo's voice was deliberately imitated in order to sell a product.
- tangentstar 2y ago
  [flagged]
  - slater 2y ago
    She... is? https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Scarlett_Johansson_discography https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Scarlett_Johansson_discography

qarl 2y ago

> but Ford had licensed the rights for the songs That's a fair point - thank you for bringing it to my attention. I disagree with your count on parallels, however. By licensing the rights to the song, the song's melody and lyrics were not at issue, leaving only the boot. Is the boot equivalent to the fact that both characters are revolutionary, flirtatious voice-only female artificial intelligences? I don't think it's anywhere close, but I accept that you'll likely disagree. REGARDLESS, I'm having a seriously hard time understanding how the closing statement in Midler-v-Ford isn't directly relevant to this case: "We need not and do not go so far as to hold that every imitation of a voice to advertise merchandise is actionable. We hold only that when a distinctive voice of a professional singer is widely known and is deliberately imitated in order to sell a product, the sellers have appropriated what is not theirs and have committed a tort in California." It seems very clear that ScarJo's voice was deliberately imitated in order to sell a product.

tangentstar 2y ago
[flagged]
- slater 2y ago
  She... is? https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Scarlett_Johansson_discography https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Scarlett_Johansson_discography