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The restriction has, I think, never been ideological, or really about avoiding angering Putin in the way often publicly discussed, but part of a broader strateg
by dragonwriter 2y ago
The restriction has, I think, never been ideological, or really about avoiding angering Putin in the way often publicly discussed, but part of a broader strategy of continuously ratcheting up pressure while leaving room for further escalation, with the idea that the if you ratchet up pressure too fast compared to internal Russian exhaustion and regime change, you eliminate room for further escalation short of nuclear war when it might be most productive, whereas if you don’t escalate at all now, you both risk Ukraine losing catastrophically and fail to produce the strain that can lead to collapse of Russian desire to continue the war.
With Ukraine already doing deep strikes into Russia with domestically produced weapons and certain NATO members already floating potential deployments of their troops to Ukraine, its not surprising that this step of escalation would be taken now.
And, yes, that strategy is a cold calculation, that sacrifices, in the immediate term, Ukrainian lives. The US/NATO trying to blunt conventional aggression by a major nuclear superpower without triggering a nuclear exchange is delicate; and the costs for calculating wrong on either side of the optimum are unthinkably high.
- JumpCrisscross 2y ago> if you ratchet up pressure too fast compared to internal Russian exhaustion and regime change, you eliminate room for further escalation short of nuclear war How would you differentiate leaving chips on the table from falling for Putin's tough talk? A swift, firm response early on could have given Putin room to propagandise a retreat. That's much harder to do after he's thrown hundreds of thousands of Russians into the meat grinder.
- dragonwriter 2y ago> How would you differentiate leaving chips on the table from falling for Putin’s tough talk? You’d differentiate them by whether escalation keeps happening. If it was just fear of Putin, there wouldn't be continuous escalation in the areas previously seen as concerns. > A swift, firm response early on could have given Putin room to propagandise a retreat. As someone whose position well before the 2022 invasion was that Ukraine should get expedited NATO membership with a (probably time-limited) exception added to the territorial application of Article 5 commitments for then-currently Russian-occupied parts of the country, I don’t disagree, but I will acknowledge that the people making policy decisions on this also, as well as probably being just plain better at this area than I am, also have vastly better intelligence on both the material and the human factors involved, and while its not clear just how wide the policy space is between the catastrophic failure zones on either side, it’s pretty clear those exist. My instinct is that the Administration has been less aggressive than ideal, but I’d sure be sweating bullets about whether I was going to accidentally trigger a major direct superpower conflict if I was, without further information or support, suddenly magically made the decider of policy in this area.
- mopsi 2y ago> I will acknowledge that the people making policy decisions on this also, as well as probably being just plain better at this area than I am Maybe. Maybe not. This reminded me of Jake Sullivan's essay in November/December 2023 issue of the Foreign Affairs. His essay went to print on October 2nd, less than a week before Hamas killed 1200 Israelis. In the essay, Sullivan writes what a success the Middle Eastern de-escalation policy has been, how the region is more peaceful than it has been in decades, and how successful they have been in discouraging further Iranian aggression. It was such an embarrasing essay that Foreign Affairs scrubbed key paragraphs from the online version. And this is only one of many spectacular failures. While he has very impressive credentials, his public track record from Syria to Myanmar, Afghanistan, Ukraine, Israel and Iran makes him indistinguishable from a total idiot. History knows many such overeducated idiots, Robert McNamara comes to mind immediately.
- blitzar 2y agoMost if not all of these roles (in the western sphere at least) are political appointees selected from a pool of politicians or those adjacent to power. Certainly their baseline of experience and knowledge is higher than the average man in the street, however, as a political appointee everthing is filtered through the lens of national proaganda and partisan politics. The end result is indistinguishable from a total idiot. There are some seasoned (life long professional) diplomats out there who are very knowledgeable, however, you wont hear from them in the media this side of their retirement.
- Log_out_ 2y agoIts rationalizing inaction, look at what happened in syria. To declare red lines and not stand with your words, make them worthless.