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For Ransomware, Backups need to be offline, not necessarily offsite. I.e. there needs to be no possibility of the hackers corrupting or deleting the backups too

For Ransomware, Backups need to be offline, not necessarily offsite. I.e. there needs to be no possibility of the hackers corrupting or deleting the backups too. If your data is in the cloud, it's probably good to have an offline backup onsite - sometimes cloud providers delete your account: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=40304666 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=40304666

EvanAnderson 2y ago
> Backups need to be offline... ...and tested on independent infrastructure. I worked with a financial Customer in the late 90s who, quarterly, sent a backup to an independent party for restore of the data into a freshly created application environment. They verified the backup with reproduction of key reports and random spot checks of data. It was impressive.
- banish-m4 2y ago
  That's proper backup verification. At a minimum, restore to nearline temp storage. Ideally, backup and verify against hot storage SAN or FS volume snapshots. For absolutely business-critical data, I would consider using multiple backup approaches and/or vendors. Shout out to Tarsnap as vital here that every commercial enterprise should use for essential customer, contract, and accounting data.