3 ms·
I don't think Hamas wants to be citizens of Israel, the western-style democracy. Its charter (even the softened 2017 version) unambiguously rejects recognition
by haberman 2y ago
I don't think Hamas wants to be citizens of Israel, the western-style democracy. Its charter (even the softened 2017 version) unambiguously rejects recognition of Israel: "There shall be no recognition of the legitimacy of the Zionist entity."
Hamas wants an Arab Islamic state to rule Palestine from the river to the sea. It doesn't want equal rights and seats in the Knesset, it wants Arab Muslims to govern the land under Islamic law. This is all spelled out explicitly in their charter.
- racional 2y agoI don't think Hamas wants to be citizens of Israel, the western-style democracy. Acknowledged. [The 2017 charter] unambiguously rejects recognition of Israel: "There shall be no recognition of the legitimacy of the Zionist entity." By itself this statement certainly sounds unambiguous. But it comes into clear conflict with the language that immediately follows: However, without compromising its rejection of the Zionist entity and without relinquishing any Palestinian rights, Hamas considers the establishment of a fully sovereign and independent Palestinian state, with Jerusalem as its capital along the lines of the 4th of June 1967, with the return of the refugees and the displaced to their homes from which they were expelled, to be a formula of national consensus. Taken together -- I would not call this an "unambiguous" formulation of their position. There's obviously a very clear surface-level conflict between the two passages. Holistically -- the most reasonable paraphrase seems to be: "Hamas rejects the moral legitimacy of the Zionist state. However as a practical matter, it will support the 2SS (along June 4 1967 borders) if this is determined the be the national consensus (among Palestinians), and provided the Right of Return is also granted." The fact that it mentions "borders" is extremely significant, in that this means at least de facto, if not de jure recognition of the State of Israel.
- haberman 2y agoI agree that the 2017 charter hints at acceptance of 1967 borders, and that its formulation is ambiguous in this sense (my "unambiguous" comment was in the context of analyzing whether Hamas would want to be citizens of Israel -- I think their rejection of this idea is unambiguous). I think your reading is consistent with what the document says. On its face, the document hints at accepting a two-state solution under the 1967 borders. The most charitable interpretation would be that Hamas is willing to consider a two state solution an ultimate settlement of the conflict, with the two states living side-by-side in peace and harmony indefinitely. However, another possible interpretation is that Hamas is willing to accept 1967 borders in order to secure statehood, but after securing it (including lifting of the blockade, etc) it primarily intends to use its state as a base to attack Israel with more vigor and resources until Israel is destroyed. "As a practical matter" could easily be read as "as a short-term solution." When I observe Hamas's behavior, the second interpretation seems far more likely to me. Even as the document was announced, they said "We shall not waive an inch of the Palestinian home soil, no matter what the recent pressures are and no matter how long the occupation." The formulation of the document seems designed to legitimize future attacks on Israel once the two states are established. And Hamas shows little interest in developing Gaza as a permanent home for any of its people, as you would expect if they truly see it as a core part of their future state, preferring instead to preserve refugee status for as many people as possible.
- racional 2y agoI think we're on the same basic page about Hamas. They could very well have ulterior motives, and could just be going along with a 2SS process in order to buy time for future offensive strategies. My only point is that it's important to come to an objective view of what the language of the document says, on its own terms (even if we suspect it's all on the surface and their real intentions may be entirely different). And even if the language is only surface-level -- it at least opens a door to some kind of a pathway towards a solution based on negotiation and international law, without outside observers and verified inspections of their offensive capabilities, verified elections and national referenda at regular intervals, and so forth. Which is the only viable route out of the current state of the conflict, in my view.
- haberman 2y agoI appreciate your point of view. I'd be happy to see a "internationalist" future that involves a two-state solution along with verified inspections of militarization, UN governance of Jerusalem, etc. Unfortunately I don't see a Palestinian state accepting international limitations on its offensive militarization. I imagine they would consider that an unacceptable limit on their sovereignty. I also think the "right of return" is an unfortunate stumbling block that will prevent this kind of settlement. Palestinians want to turn the clock back to a time before their allies launched a war to destroy Israel, and a time before the Mizrahi were expelled from the Arab world. Practically speaking, it's asking Israel to accept an unspecified number of people who are likely to be hostile to its existence. It's hard to imagine how this doesn't lead to a sharp increase in the amount of terror attacks inside Israel. I want to believe that you are right, and that recognizing/encouraging small steps towards agreement from both sides will ultimately lead to a lasting peace. But my fear is that it is just a ruse to gain advantage, and that accepting it at face value will lead the West to give concessions that will ultimately aid future wars that seek to destroy Israel.
- racional 2y agoThanks; I appreciate yours as well. I certainly don't pretend to know all the answers here.