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1. Some philosophers think many metaphysical debates meaningless. Consider the debate about ordinary objects such as chairs. These typically are the result of c

1. Some philosophers think many metaphysical debates meaningless. Consider the debate about ordinary objects such as chairs. These typically are the result of composing more fundamental entities (such as those of the Standard Model). Mereological nihilists say: there are no ordinary objects (such as chairs). Others disagree. /Relativists/ about metaphysics say that these disputes are merely verbal. There is no fact of the matter to discover and expound. Whether or not there is such a thing as a chair is simply a matter of convention. 2. I disagree. But I think one point is right. Relativists point out that it is often (or maybe even always) possible to translate statements between the languages promoted by different metaphysical schools. For example, nihilists translate ‘the chair is on the ground’ to ‘some particles arranged chairwise are such that the particles at the bottom touch the ground’ (or something similar). For this reason, they claim not much hinges on whether nihilists are actually right. 3. Despite my antirelativist metaphysical inclinations, I think it is possible to translate statements in the language given by the ‘same ontology that constitutes reality’ systematically into languages that reflect different metaphysical views. 4. Some of those erroneous metaphysical views may correspond to how we naturally tend to think about certain areas, or the needs of computation (e.g. in being better complexity-wise). For this reason I am sceptical about the (admittedly very interesting) technique advanced in this essay, since it seems to assume that no conflict between these demands will arise. 5. A final worry is that metaphysics does not really speak with one voice. Many philosophers are quite sympathetic to the sort of picture outlined at the start of the essay, but e.g. mereological nihilism is surprisingly popular! If resolving these questions definitively is too much even for philosophers, those applying their conclusions will have some trouble too.

TuringTest 2y ago
> Relativists about metaphysics say that these disputes are merely verbal. There is no fact of the matter to discover and expound. As a relativist myself, I'd say that this description misrepresents Relativism, out of a misunderstanding. It's not that there are no facts to discover, but that whatever you discover is a mental construct that is mediated by how you think about it. This "nihilism" is popular because it's rationally sound. "Whether or not there is such a thing as a chair is simply a matter of convention", true, but that's because _being_ is not an essential property of the universe that you can get to know, but a metaphysical concept that you think about; as such, the facts you get to assert about it are dependent on how you define the concept. As different schools of philosophy have their own ways to think about the concept, they'll arrive at different conclusions about its characteristics. In the end, all philosophical enquiry is a mental exercise that produces knowledge in the minds of us fellow humans, and it's mediated by the capabilities and limitations of our brains. In the same way, all rational discourse takes the form of discovering new facts that are derived from some stated axioms and following defined rules of interference. There are no metaphysical axioms and rules of interference existing outside our brains, so rational thought necessarily depends on the shape of -and the consequences implied by- the particular principles you chose to use. Choose different ones, and the shape of your reasoning will vary (even though, as you said, it is often possible to translate between different initial perspectives).
- eynsham 2y ago
  > this description misrepresents Relativism The position I have outlined is fairly standard and commonplace; that it is different from the view you call ‘relativism’ does not mean that I have misrepresented you, since I did not in fact intend to characterise your specific view. > It’s not that there are no facts to discover, but that whatever you discover is a mental construct that is mediated by how you think about it. If the ‘mediation’ in question is sufficiently strong, whatever is discovered is not, on the usual reading of ‘fact’, really going to consist in facts. > This ‘nihilism’ is not standardly called nihilism. Those standardly called metaphysical nihilists in the literature tend not to be relativists; in insisting on their position in the debate, they usually think that the debate is meaningful. In the later section of your comment, the sort of mind-dependence to which you advert is unclear. One reading is that you think that the process of intellectual enquiry as we perform it is mind-dependent because it takes place in our minds; this much I think is quite plausible. Another reading is that you think that any criteria of success (e.g., correctness) will also be mind-dependent, which is fairly close to Berkeley’s idealism, in that, if Berkeleyan idealism is denied, there will presumably be mind-independent facts (up to translation schemata) that we can get right or wrong. I do not intend to debate whether Berkeleyan idealism is true, but it is certainly different from what is typically taken to be metaphysical relativism in the metametaphysical literature.

TuringTest 2y ago

> Relativists about metaphysics say that these disputes are merely verbal. There is no fact of the matter to discover and expound. As a relativist myself, I'd say that this description misrepresents Relativism, out of a misunderstanding. It's not that there are no facts to discover, but that whatever you discover is a mental construct that is mediated by how you think about it. This "nihilism" is popular because it's rationally sound. "Whether or not there is such a thing as a chair is simply a matter of convention", true, but that's because _being_ is not an essential property of the universe that you can get to know, but a metaphysical concept that you think about; as such, the facts you get to assert about it are dependent on how you define the concept. As different schools of philosophy have their own ways to think about the concept, they'll arrive at different conclusions about its characteristics. In the end, all philosophical enquiry is a mental exercise that produces knowledge in the minds of us fellow humans, and it's mediated by the capabilities and limitations of our brains. In the same way, all rational discourse takes the form of discovering new facts that are derived from some stated axioms and following defined rules of interference. There are no metaphysical axioms and rules of interference existing outside our brains, so rational thought necessarily depends on the shape of -and the consequences implied by- the particular principles you chose to use. Choose different ones, and the shape of your reasoning will vary (even though, as you said, it is often possible to translate between different initial perspectives).

eynsham 2y ago
> this description misrepresents Relativism The position I have outlined is fairly standard and commonplace; that it is different from the view you call ‘relativism’ does not mean that I have misrepresented you, since I did not in fact intend to characterise your specific view. > It’s not that there are no facts to discover, but that whatever you discover is a mental construct that is mediated by how you think about it. If the ‘mediation’ in question is sufficiently strong, whatever is discovered is not, on the usual reading of ‘fact’, really going to consist in facts. > This ‘nihilism’ is not standardly called nihilism. Those standardly called metaphysical nihilists in the literature tend not to be relativists; in insisting on their position in the debate, they usually think that the debate is meaningful. In the later section of your comment, the sort of mind-dependence to which you advert is unclear. One reading is that you think that the process of intellectual enquiry as we perform it is mind-dependent because it takes place in our minds; this much I think is quite plausible. Another reading is that you think that any criteria of success (e.g., correctness) will also be mind-dependent, which is fairly close to Berkeley’s idealism, in that, if Berkeleyan idealism is denied, there will presumably be mind-independent facts (up to translation schemata) that we can get right or wrong. I do not intend to debate whether Berkeleyan idealism is true, but it is certainly different from what is typically taken to be metaphysical relativism in the metametaphysical literature.