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But how do you know another human is “conscious”? Certainly there is an intuitive sense to it that would be very difficult to put into words, but that is the cr

by lumb63 2y ago

But how do you know another human is “conscious”? Certainly there is an intuitive sense to it that would be very difficult to put into words, but that is the crux of the matter. Every other human, whose brain you have no ability to peer into, could be an unconscious yet sufficiently advanced computer, or a machine built to make the exact motions, words, decisions, etc., that you perceive, and you wouldn’t be able to tell the difference.

tsimionescu 2y ago
I think mnay people believe that consciousness is what consciousness does. That is, > Every other human, whose brain you have no ability to peer into, could be an unconscious yet sufficiently advanced computer, or a machine built to make the exact motions, words, decisions, etc., that you perceive, and you wouldn’t be able to tell the difference. Makes no sense, in this conception of consciousness, any more than you can fake intelligence. Basically consciousness might just be what we call the inner workings of the mind of a sufficiently advanced agent, one capable at least of meaningfully interacting with other agents around it. I'm not saying this is the correct theory, but it's a perfectly valid theory of consciousness, just like all the others.
- dkz999 2y ago
  I really like equating faking intelligence to consciousness. Its intuitive because we have all seen that, yet so complex its nearly futile to give meaningful predictive criteria for when an agent is 'being intelligent'. In addition to having meaningful interactions with others, i would add consciousness also requires meaningful interaction with its-self. What is 'meaninful' also comes down to language, which, personally, leads me back to the idea that consciousness is essentially a linguistic product/phenomenon. Duck-typed. And at the end of the day, if you enjoy spending time asking "is this thing really x" where x lies on a vector you can't even begin measure, I got this deal on a bridge you can get in on, real cheap...
- Scarblac 2y ago
  Bit it's useless,its circular. The definition must have something to do with the experience of qualia, that's the hard to explain part.
- PeterisP 2y ago
  I somewhat disagree, I feel that the prevailing position is that unlike intelligence (e.g. Legg&Hutter definitions) consciousness can not be easily assumed from mere behavior and relies on certain things happening (or not happening) inside the agent.
  - tsimionescu 2y ago
    This may be a common position among philosophers, or more specifically among philosophers who think concepts like "p-zombies" make any sense. But I think most people in general view any being whose behavior is human-like enough as having some form of consciousness. For most people, being conscious is proved by things like mourning dead companions, like caring for your babies and showing distress if they are missing/hurt, like being friendly and playful. That's why most people feel that certain animals they interact with more or have seen on TV are conscious (dogs, cats, elephants, whales, chimps and other primates), but that other animals are not (insects, rats, fish). Note that I am not saying that rats are objectively less conscious than dogs by these criteria, just that this is what many people base their beliefs on, and that it of course depends on their knowledge as well.
amenhotep 2y ago
You don't. But it's solipsism to think otherwise, and while solipsism is hard to argue against logically it's not a very interesting or useful way of navigating the world we experience. We can't prove other people aren't p-zombies but the value bet is definitely that, appearing like us in every other way, they also experience like us.
- majikaja 2y ago
  > We can't prove other people aren't p-zombies but the value bet is definitely that, appearing like us in every other way, they also experience like us. Logic doesn't need to be binary. There is no need for the answer to such a question to even be defined.
- deleted 2y ago
  [deleted]
- Scarblac 2y ago
  It doesn't need to be solipsism - for instance, maybe half of us are conscious. But if we can't even know that, if we don't even have a test to see whether some human or animal is conscious or not, how can we start trying to figure out what makes them conscious? It seems it's impossible to get to something falsifiable without such a test. Like, you say a rock isn't conscious. But what about a sponge? An amoeba? How can you answer that if you can only guess answer whether your neighbour is?
- Der_Einzige 2y ago
  Solipsism is incoherent because it's not radical skepticism. All of the critique of the external world also apply to belief in the primacy on internal experience. Any good solipsist should just accept the "evil demon" of descartes, embrace radical doubt, and say "I don't even know if I truly exist or not". "I don't know if I'm a P zombie, and I don't know if I'm a replicant or not, Deckard!"
  - vereis 2y ago
    well doesn't the argument suggest the only thing you can be certain of is I, or at least some 'experiencing agent' exist, otherwise there would be no subject to do the experiencing
AnimalMuppet 2y ago
We define ourselves to be conscious (even if we don't know exactly what that means). We assume that other humans are similar to ourselves, and we (at least sometimes) see mental activity in other humans that we recognize as being similar to our own. Therefore we conclude that other humans are conscious.

by lumb63 2y ago

tsimionescu 2y ago

I think mnay people believe that consciousness is what consciousness does. That is, > Every other human, whose brain you have no ability to peer into, could be an unconscious yet sufficiently advanced computer, or a machine built to make the exact motions, words, decisions, etc., that you perceive, and you wouldn’t be able to tell the difference. Makes no sense, in this conception of consciousness, any more than you can fake intelligence. Basically consciousness might just be what we call the inner workings of the mind of a sufficiently advanced agent, one capable at least of meaningfully interacting with other agents around it. I'm not saying this is the correct theory, but it's a perfectly valid theory of consciousness, just like all the others.

dkz999 2y ago
I really like equating faking intelligence to consciousness. Its intuitive because we have all seen that, yet so complex its nearly futile to give meaningful predictive criteria for when an agent is 'being intelligent'. In addition to having meaningful interactions with others, i would add consciousness also requires meaningful interaction with its-self. What is 'meaninful' also comes down to language, which, personally, leads me back to the idea that consciousness is essentially a linguistic product/phenomenon. Duck-typed. And at the end of the day, if you enjoy spending time asking "is this thing really x" where x lies on a vector you can't even begin measure, I got this deal on a bridge you can get in on, real cheap...
Scarblac 2y ago
Bit it's useless,its circular. The definition must have something to do with the experience of qualia, that's the hard to explain part.
PeterisP 2y ago
I somewhat disagree, I feel that the prevailing position is that unlike intelligence (e.g. Legg&Hutter definitions) consciousness can not be easily assumed from mere behavior and relies on certain things happening (or not happening) inside the agent.
- tsimionescu 2y ago
  This may be a common position among philosophers, or more specifically among philosophers who think concepts like "p-zombies" make any sense. But I think most people in general view any being whose behavior is human-like enough as having some form of consciousness. For most people, being conscious is proved by things like mourning dead companions, like caring for your babies and showing distress if they are missing/hurt, like being friendly and playful. That's why most people feel that certain animals they interact with more or have seen on TV are conscious (dogs, cats, elephants, whales, chimps and other primates), but that other animals are not (insects, rats, fish). Note that I am not saying that rats are objectively less conscious than dogs by these criteria, just that this is what many people base their beliefs on, and that it of course depends on their knowledge as well.

amenhotep 2y ago

You don't. But it's solipsism to think otherwise, and while solipsism is hard to argue against logically it's not a very interesting or useful way of navigating the world we experience. We can't prove other people aren't p-zombies but the value bet is definitely that, appearing like us in every other way, they also experience like us.

majikaja 2y ago
> We can't prove other people aren't p-zombies but the value bet is definitely that, appearing like us in every other way, they also experience like us. Logic doesn't need to be binary. There is no need for the answer to such a question to even be defined.
deleted 2y ago
[deleted]
Scarblac 2y ago
It doesn't need to be solipsism - for instance, maybe half of us are conscious. But if we can't even know that, if we don't even have a test to see whether some human or animal is conscious or not, how can we start trying to figure out what makes them conscious? It seems it's impossible to get to something falsifiable without such a test. Like, you say a rock isn't conscious. But what about a sponge? An amoeba? How can you answer that if you can only guess answer whether your neighbour is?
Der_Einzige 2y ago
Solipsism is incoherent because it's not radical skepticism. All of the critique of the external world also apply to belief in the primacy on internal experience. Any good solipsist should just accept the "evil demon" of descartes, embrace radical doubt, and say "I don't even know if I truly exist or not". "I don't know if I'm a P zombie, and I don't know if I'm a replicant or not, Deckard!"
- vereis 2y ago
  well doesn't the argument suggest the only thing you can be certain of is I, or at least some 'experiencing agent' exist, otherwise there would be no subject to do the experiencing

AnimalMuppet 2y ago

We define ourselves to be conscious (even if we don't know exactly what that means). We assume that other humans are similar to ourselves, and we (at least sometimes) see mental activity in other humans that we recognize as being similar to our own. Therefore we conclude that other humans are conscious.