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> this can be explained the other way around I suppose. So? Why do you think that matters? > reducing everything to I/O behaviour is also a philosophical po

by lisper 2y ago

> this can be explained the other way around I suppose. So? Why do you think that matters? > reducing everything to I/O behaviour is also a philosophical position, I believe it’s called behaviourism I'm not "reducing everything to I/O behavior", I'm just saying that you have no evidence for the existence of consciousness in entities other than yourself other than their I/O behavior. > the point of putting a slow person You have completely misunderstood the point of the Chinese room. The speed at which the person operates is completely irrelevant to the argument, it is only relevant to my counter-argument. The whole point of my counter-argument is that the original argument is invalid because it ignores the speed at which a human can execute the rules. The speed matters. It's not the only thing that matters, but it's one of the things, and the fact that Searle ignores it enough to invalidate his argument. > There is no conclusive evidence either way There is for me. Consciousness is something I directly experience. Maybe it's different for you, but I'd be really surprised. But (and this is where I predict we will diverge) I believe that this experience is an illusion, just as my experience of motion when looking at Moving Snakes is an illusion. > If you claim consciousness does not exist I do not claim that it does not exist, I claim that it is an illusion. Illusions exist, they are just not what they naively appear to be. > we may have to magically conjure out of nothing much fewer entities and arbitrary rules What entities and arbitrary rules need to be "conjured out of nothing" to support Dennett's thesis? In fact, it's the exact opposite: presupposing the objective existence of something for which there is no evidence, and quite a bit of evidence that our perception of it is an illusion, that seems more like "conjuring something out of nothing" to me.

strogonoff 2y ago
> I suppose. So? Why do you think that matters? Why do you think it matters? If you didn’t think so, presumably you would not yourself be arguing for a particular explanation (e.g., neurons causing consciousness). I can pick between a few reasons why it matters to me. One of them is probably similar to why you or I would think that believing or not believing in a deity matters. > you have no evidence for the existence of consciousness in entities other than yourself other than their I/O behavior. I don’t need that evidence if I assume consciousness exists in the first place. You need it if you believe it arises from some configuration of entities in external reality. > The whole point of my counter-argument is that the original argument is invalid because it ignores the speed at which a human can execute the rules Why does the speed matter? > I do not claim that it does not exist, I claim that it is an illusion. Illusions exist, they are just not what they naively appear to be. Would it be fair to say that time-space is an illusion? It seems that “it is not what it naively appears to be” is a true statement about it, doesn’t it? > presupposing the objective existence of something for which there is no evidence The evidence of consciousness is empirically supplied every moment of your existence, though. Empirical evidence of anything else by definition requires consciousness, too.
- lisper 2y ago
  > I don’t need that evidence if I assume consciousness exists in the first place. I think you're missing the point here. Let me repeat, with some added emphasis: you have no evidence for the existence of consciousness in entities other than yourself other than their I/O behavior. It's not that you have no evidence. You do. But that evidence takes the form of I/O behavior, which can be completely accounted for by physics. Yes, you can assume that consciousness is a real thing independent of physics, but you can also assume invisible pink unicorns. Neither is necessary to explain the data. The only thing that is problematic is your subjective sensation of consciousness, which kinda sorta feels like it should not be possible if physics is all there is. That's the problem that Dennett solved. > Would it be fair to say that time-space is an illusion? Yes. See: https://flownet.com/ron/QM.pdf https://flownet.com/ron/QM.pdf or https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dEaecUuEqfc https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dEaecUuEqfc (Bet you didn't see that coming, did you? :-) > The evidence of consciousness is empirically supplied every moment of your existence, though. Yes, I don't deny that. And I don't deny that accounting for it is a Very Hard Problem. The fact that Dennett was able to solve it is one of the many things that made him noteworthy.
  - strogonoff 2y ago
    > you can assume that consciousness is a real thing independent of physics To make that claim is to engage in Cartesian dualism, don’t you see it? I find Cartesian dualism not a particularly elegant theory (even less so than monistic materialism). If you believe you are arguing with a Cartesian dualist, then we are talking past each other. (This is, I guess, an illustration of why I find complete lack of philosophical rigour so frustrating when arguing with monistic materialists.)
    - lisper 2y ago
      I have no idea who I'm arguing with here. And I have no idea what distinguishes a "monistic materialist" from a non-monistic materialist. AFAIK, there is dualism and there is materialism, and that is an exhaustive partition of the philosophical idea space regarding consciousness. I also know that you think it's necessary to assume that consciousness exists rather than inferring its existence from (physical) observation, which makes you sound like a dualist to me. (I also find it rather frustrating that you complain about a lack of philosophical rigor while at the same time being so cagey about your actual position.) But please set me straight: what is your actual position?

by lisper 2y ago

strogonoff 2y ago

> I suppose. So? Why do you think that matters? Why do you think it matters? If you didn’t think so, presumably you would not yourself be arguing for a particular explanation (e.g., neurons causing consciousness). I can pick between a few reasons why it matters to me. One of them is probably similar to why you or I would think that believing or not believing in a deity matters. > you have no evidence for the existence of consciousness in entities other than yourself other than their I/O behavior. I don’t need that evidence if I assume consciousness exists in the first place. You need it if you believe it arises from some configuration of entities in external reality. > The whole point of my counter-argument is that the original argument is invalid because it ignores the speed at which a human can execute the rules Why does the speed matter? > I do not claim that it does not exist, I claim that it is an illusion. Illusions exist, they are just not what they naively appear to be. Would it be fair to say that time-space is an illusion? It seems that “it is not what it naively appears to be” is a true statement about it, doesn’t it? > presupposing the objective existence of something for which there is no evidence The evidence of consciousness is empirically supplied every moment of your existence, though. Empirical evidence of anything else by definition requires consciousness, too.

lisper 2y ago
> I don’t need that evidence if I assume consciousness exists in the first place. I think you're missing the point here. Let me repeat, with some added emphasis: you have no evidence for the existence of consciousness in entities other than yourself other than their I/O behavior. It's not that you have no evidence. You do. But that evidence takes the form of I/O behavior, which can be completely accounted for by physics. Yes, you can assume that consciousness is a real thing independent of physics, but you can also assume invisible pink unicorns. Neither is necessary to explain the data. The only thing that is problematic is your subjective sensation of consciousness, which kinda sorta feels like it should not be possible if physics is all there is. That's the problem that Dennett solved. > Would it be fair to say that time-space is an illusion? Yes. See: https://flownet.com/ron/QM.pdf https://flownet.com/ron/QM.pdf or https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dEaecUuEqfc https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dEaecUuEqfc (Bet you didn't see that coming, did you? :-) > The evidence of consciousness is empirically supplied every moment of your existence, though. Yes, I don't deny that. And I don't deny that accounting for it is a Very Hard Problem. The fact that Dennett was able to solve it is one of the many things that made him noteworthy.
- strogonoff 2y ago
  > you can assume that consciousness is a real thing independent of physics To make that claim is to engage in Cartesian dualism, don’t you see it? I find Cartesian dualism not a particularly elegant theory (even less so than monistic materialism). If you believe you are arguing with a Cartesian dualist, then we are talking past each other. (This is, I guess, an illustration of why I find complete lack of philosophical rigour so frustrating when arguing with monistic materialists.)
  - lisper 2y ago
    I have no idea who I'm arguing with here. And I have no idea what distinguishes a "monistic materialist" from a non-monistic materialist. AFAIK, there is dualism and there is materialism, and that is an exhaustive partition of the philosophical idea space regarding consciousness. I also know that you think it's necessary to assume that consciousness exists rather than inferring its existence from (physical) observation, which makes you sound like a dualist to me. (I also find it rather frustrating that you complain about a lack of philosophical rigor while at the same time being so cagey about your actual position.) But please set me straight: what is your actual position?