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Yes, it isn't just voodoo, "properly" labelled file types can carry dangers that "improperly" labelled ones do not. For example, if someone wants you to open a
by jerf 2y ago
Yes, it isn't just voodoo, "properly" labelled file types can carry dangers that "improperly" labelled ones do not. For example, if someone wants you to open a Word document with a bad macro, getting you to open it may be no big deal, but getting someone to "OK, first save it, then navigate to it with Explorer, then change Explorer to 'Show Extensions', then rename it to this, then open it" is likely to either set off some alarm bells, or simply be impossible for the technically-unsophisticated target.
Even if it is the same bytes nominally behind the "improper" and "proper" metadata labels the security profile of the two bits of content can still be very different.
Also, obviously, you'll always be able to get things "through" a filter like this. But the value of raising the bar of the exploit is still quite substantial; the "conversion funnel" for such exploits has a very sharp dropoff at every step, including even the first (most such attempts at an exploit even if delivered would not be unpacked by the target user).
Systems can generally block encrypted archives, though I suspect that many admins end up leaving that "off". I'm not sure it's a huge vector in the real world. My impression is that at the moment the most dangerous emails are the social attacks. Though the technical attacks are still non-trivial, still hit people, and technical folks can underestimate the need for non-technical folks to be protected from them.
- godelski 2y ago> obviously, you'll always be able to get things "through" a filter like this. But the value of raising the bar of the exploit is still quite substantial I just want to stress this part. So many people I talk to will just dismiss things because something isn't bullet proof. Like there's a binary option. But in reality there's a continuum. I'm the annoying person that tries to get my friends to use Signal, but then say if you won't install, that WhatsApp is my next preference. People on Signal forums will say that you shouldn't have the ability to delete or nuke conversations (now you can delete some, but only if <3hrs old) BECAUSE you can't guarantee the message content wasn't copied. Which is just fucking insane. It's not incorrect, but you have to think of things probabilistically and security is about creating speedbumps, not bullet proof vests. It is standard practice in many industry settings to remotely wipe a device (and then operate under the assumption that the data was leaked) because if you don't, adversaries have infinite time to copy that data rather than finite. In most things, there are no perfect solutions. We have to think probabilistically and the tradeoffs for different environments (which are dynamic). Trying to make perfect solutions are not only unachievable, but even if they were they wouldn't last for long.
- avar 2y agoI hate those "features" because they blur the line of user control. You sent me a message, you shouldn't be able to decide to reach into my device and delete it. It's okey if there's a feature where I can automatically and by default cooperate with your "deletion requests", but it should be possible to disable it.
- godelski 2y agoI've always advocated that it be performed with consent. Both parties must consent. But I'd also advocate for a default on, since that is the position of higher security/privacy.
- KAMSPioneer 2y ago> security is about creating speedbumps, not bullet proof vests I actually believe that bulletproof vests are a good security analogue as well: they are typically only rated for certain cartridges/projectiles, only guaranteed to stop a certain number of projectiles, won't protect you from broken ribs or soft tissue damage, and most importantly, they're still, you know...a vest. Does nothing to stop you getting shot elsewhere. The "threat model" of a vest specifically excludes certain threats and I still would _greatly_ prefer to be wearing one in a war zone.
- godelski 2y agolol yeah, I think this is fair. But I was going with how people think these vests work, not how they actually work. Because your analogy is spot on.
- Terr_ 2y ago'Course, if the email filter keeps blocking legitimate content enough that recipients are accustomed to changing extensions to get around it, then it'll all backfire.