3 ms·

There’s always a risk calculus that seems cold to an outside observer. The issue with Boeing and the MAX is that they sort of used the designation of the plane

There’s always a risk calculus that seems cold to an outside observer. The issue with Boeing and the MAX is that they sort of used the designation of the plane to for lack of a better term, avoid some of the risk calculations. With the early issues, a pretty cut and dry type training program would have likely prevented catastrophic incidents. They shaved pennys and set many dollars (and hundreds of people) on fire. If you run a company where low probability, high impact risks drive the operations of your products, setting trust on fire is going to have a real impact on your bottom line. You go from a trusted, admired company to target of memes about assassinated whistleblowers.

everforward 2y ago
My very amateur understanding is that the MAX would have been dead on arrival if it required recertification. It was a marginal bump in fuel efficiency that still lagged behind Aerobus, so their only real marketing strategy was not having to recertify. Basically either it didn’t require recertification or it wasn’t worth making. I suspect somewhere along the line they realized that wasn’t practical and they either shipped a shoddy project and maybe burned a pile of money or they gave up and definitely burned a smaller but still sizable pile of money. Probably also some worry that if they didn’t have a competitive smaller plane, they’d lose market share and there’d be even less interest in their next plane.
- idontpost 2y ago
  [dead]
- salawat 2y ago
  ...Actually it doesn't matter how relatively uncompetitive it would have been in the face of Airbus. Their (Airbus's) waitlist is so bloody long, you'd still have looked longingly at Boeing anyway. Despite that, they made a coscious decision to deceive airlines, pilots, and their regulators. All to "maximize shareholder value". That's what's criminal.
- Spooky23 2y ago
  Exactly. End of the day, poor governance from product inception to execution to operation.

everforward 2y ago

My very amateur understanding is that the MAX would have been dead on arrival if it required recertification. It was a marginal bump in fuel efficiency that still lagged behind Aerobus, so their only real marketing strategy was not having to recertify. Basically either it didn’t require recertification or it wasn’t worth making. I suspect somewhere along the line they realized that wasn’t practical and they either shipped a shoddy project and maybe burned a pile of money or they gave up and definitely burned a smaller but still sizable pile of money. Probably also some worry that if they didn’t have a competitive smaller plane, they’d lose market share and there’d be even less interest in their next plane.

idontpost 2y ago
[dead]
salawat 2y ago
...Actually it doesn't matter how relatively uncompetitive it would have been in the face of Airbus. Their (Airbus's) waitlist is so bloody long, you'd still have looked longingly at Boeing anyway. Despite that, they made a coscious decision to deceive airlines, pilots, and their regulators. All to "maximize shareholder value". That's what's criminal.
Spooky23 2y ago
Exactly. End of the day, poor governance from product inception to execution to operation.