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It is a stretch to call the MAXes a new product, even though it turned out to require more extensive work than envisioned, but the bit about actively hiding the
by mannykannot 2y ago
It is a stretch to call the MAXes a new product, even though it turned out to require more extensive work than envisioned, but the bit about actively hiding the differences is right on point.
- Retric 2y agoThere’s a bigger difference between the MAX family and other versions of the 737 than there is between all the different crossovers a car company pumps out. Boeing 737 MAX 7 is 138,699 lbs vs 737 800 @ 90,710lb vs 737 100 @ 61.994 lbs. Hell the new 737 MAX 10 is ~203,000 lb.
- mannykannot 2y agoThis is not the issue that is raising questions of criminal liability.
- Retric 2y agoIt’s definitely part of the issue. Boeing was trying to pretend scaling the aircraft again and again wasn’t significant due to regulations and physics eventually disagreed.
- mannykannot 2y agoRegardless of how one characterizes the magnitude of the changes, if the unanticipated difficulties had been handled openly, there would be no question of criminal liability. Furthermore (though it is also beside the point), physics has not ruled out the MAXes. In addition, the door-plug issue is tied in here on account of the 2021 deferred prosecution agreement, which also followed from Boeing's duplicity over the MAX issue.
- Retric 2y ago> Regardless of how one characterizes the magnitude of the changes, if the unanticipated difficulties had been handled openly, there would be no question of criminal liability You’re skipping over the first half of my statement. If the unexpected difficulties had been handled openly they would have needed to go through more regulatory hurdles. Physics didn’t put them into some kind of catch 22 situation the aircraft could have been safe, it just couldn’t be safe while playing games with regulators. That’s where criminal liability shows up.
- mannykannot 2y agoAs far as I can tell, I'm just skipping over the issues which may be true, but are beside the point, but then, it is not clear to me which statement's first half you think I am skipping over. The point I have been making all along is that, regardless of what led Boeing to the point of choosing to hide or misrepresent the situation, it is the choice to do so that turns this into a potentially criminal matter. With the same physical/technical problems but proper and timely disclosure of the issues during development, by far the most likely outcome would have been a delayed program delivering MAXes substantially similar (in both construction and operation) to the ones which are certified and flying today. After that, even in the unlikely event that the crashes had occurred, criminal prosecution would be unlikely, and certainly not on the basis of the facts for which it is currently being considered.
- Retric 2y ago> are besides the point Except they aren’t beside the point. > substantially similar (in both construction and operation) The physical aircraft would have been similar, but airlines would have spent 10’s of millions more on training which makes a real difference to them and thus sales. Boeing could have released the aircraft on exactly the same date while complying with the spirit of relevant relations though at higher costs, but the product would have been meaningfully worse from a sales perspective. Even today regulators have allowed Boeing and the airlines to treat the 737 MAX family as much more closely related to earlier 737’s than they actually are.
- dylan604 2y agoIs the size the biggest difference or the fact that the center of gravity is totally different? So much so, they created an "hidden" software program to counter the CoG difference so the pilots feel like it is in the same place they are used to?
- labcomputer 2y agoNo, CoG has approximately nothing to do with it. The problem with the Max is aerodynamics: Civil airplanes are designed with negative aerodynamic feedback, so the nose-down torque (“pitching moment”) increases as the AoA increases. But on the Max at very high AoA this feedback torque becomes somewhat smaller due to interaction of airflow around the engines and the wing. That by itself is not a problem because the nose-down torque still exists and airframe is still stable. There is a regulatory requirement that the amount of pilot’s control force required to maintain a given AoA must be a non-decreasing function of AoA[1]. Due to the Max’s aerodynamics, this requirement is not met. Boeing’s MCAS was a bandaid to make the plane meet regulations by applying nose-down trim while at high AoA. The trim results in a higher yoke force, so the plane meets the requirement. A better method would have been a “stick pusher” (which have been used as stall prevention devices for over 50 years, though not on the 737) or addition ventral fins (like on the Beech 1900). But either of those would have probably required recertification [1] The purpose of this is to reduce pilot-induced oscillations: see what happened with AA flight 587, where the lack of a similar requirement for rudder pedals and yaw led to PIO which ultimately resulted in the tail falling off an Airbus.
- labcomputer 2y ago> Boeing 737 MAX 7 is 138,699 lbs vs 737 800 @ 90,710lb vs 737 100 @ 61.994 lbs. Hell the new 737 MAX 10 is ~203,000 lb. No, you are confusing the empty weight of the 737-800 with the mass gross takeoff weight of the 737 max 7. The correct comparison of MGTW is 174,200 (-800) vs 177,000 (max 7). Similarly, the -100’s MGTW was 110,000, not 61,994. Also, the only source I can find for the max 10 is 197,900, not 203,000. Edit: so the plane grew by 80%, not 320%
- deleted 2y ago[deleted]