I sort of see what you're trying to get at, but I think you're making some fairly strong ontological commitments regarding physical properties. If we take a ste

I sort of see what you're trying to get at, but I think you're making some fairly strong ontological commitments regarding physical properties. If we take a step back and try not to assume any ontologies, a "property" of a system can be functionally defined as a measure that can be reliably observed and recorded in a well-defined experiment. For example, someone's Memory Span [0] is a property of their brain at a given point in time. There are replicable studies measuring the relationship between memory span and other properties like age or speech rate. Sometimes it's possible to encode the relationships between these properties using mathematical equations that are falsifiable via experiment. But this isn't what makes something physics. Physics is simply the process of applying this approach to matter, energy and force. I mean, I admit that experimental psychology isn't physics. And we don't yet know the mechanisms well enough to have a model that reduces to fundamental interactions. But it's not far off the way that mathematics is (successfully) used to measure and predict phenomena in other scientific fields such as biology. [0] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Memory_span https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Memory_span