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Thanks for the engagement (whether you had a choice or not ;)! The main issue is that we approach the topic with a different set of axioms. E.g. your limitatio

Thanks for the engagement (whether you had a choice or not ;)! The main issue is that we approach the topic with a different set of axioms. E.g. your limitation of requiring a proof involving (a-c) is analogous to asking someone to build a steel bridge with three colors of legos. Free will and consciousness are tautologically joined, so any attempt to create a framework to disprove/prove one or the other will have to be all encompassing. It has the same issue though that you have to decide that you are conscious to begin using reason, even though no one can prove it scientifically. If your starting point is that no one is actually conscious, it’s impossible to disprove, and it’s obviously wrong (and any attempt to prove it’s not obviously wrong would knee-cap itself since it’s impossible ‘to logic’ without a reasoning engine).

vidarh 2y ago
> The main issue is that we approach the topic with a different set of axioms. E.g. your limitation of requiring a proof involving (a-c) is analogous to asking someone to build a steel bridge with three colors of legos. Well, yes. The alternative is for you to give me a definition of free will that allows for it within the constraints of cause-effect and randomness. Without such a definition, the option we are left with is inherently "breaking free" of that, and then we need another category of effect. I don't believe either is possible, but we specifically do not have evidence that such other category of "will-effect" transition is possible, no observed mechanism, no observation of such a category, nor a hypothesis that provides even the starts of a coherent definition of what it would even mean. So yes, the point is that the problem appear obviously impossible to resolve in favour of free will without either new logic or a definition of free will I don't think possibly can meet expectations. > Free will and consciousness are tautologically joined, so any attempt to create a framework to disprove/prove one or the other will have to be all encompassing. Only partially, in the positive case. Consciousness would seem to need to exist for free will to exist, but in the event free will does not, there's no reason to presume that affects the possibility of consciousness. > It has the same issue though that you have to decide that you are conscious to begin using reason, even though no one can prove it scientifically. It does not have the same issue. Whether you have free will or not, there's no reason why that need to affect your life at all. Clearly we think we make choices. Whether we make those choices or not, we act as if we do. As it is, we already have solid evidence that our conscious "decision" often is not causally linked to the actual "choice", so we can't rely on our introspection to even give us an accurate description of what "choices" we make, or why, and we know from e.g. split brain experiments that the brain can easily be made to rationalise how it "chose" things it never did. Accordingly, whether the mechanism actually controlling actions exercise free will or not, we'd expect our consciousness to experience it the same way.
- mensetmanusman 2y ago
  This could go on for many hundreds of pages, but I thought I would share: “Well, yes. The alternative is for you to give me a definition of free will that allows for it within the constraints of cause-effect and randomness.” https://youtu.be/itLIM38k2r0?si=1wTeSVdX28UlB2jf https://youtu.be/itLIM38k2r0?si=1wTeSVdX28UlB2jf This interview with Nobel prize winning mathematical physicist Roger Penrose describes a framework where quantum mechanical time hopping during a measurement removes this cause-and-effect concern you have. E.g. The nature of reality of time and matter fields is even more complicated than we understand, and our macros scale understanding of cause and effects might be too limiting when considering constraints of consciousness.

vidarh 2y ago

> The main issue is that we approach the topic with a different set of axioms. E.g. your limitation of requiring a proof involving (a-c) is analogous to asking someone to build a steel bridge with three colors of legos. Well, yes. The alternative is for you to give me a definition of free will that allows for it within the constraints of cause-effect and randomness. Without such a definition, the option we are left with is inherently "breaking free" of that, and then we need another category of effect. I don't believe either is possible, but we specifically do not have evidence that such other category of "will-effect" transition is possible, no observed mechanism, no observation of such a category, nor a hypothesis that provides even the starts of a coherent definition of what it would even mean. So yes, the point is that the problem appear obviously impossible to resolve in favour of free will without either new logic or a definition of free will I don't think possibly can meet expectations. > Free will and consciousness are tautologically joined, so any attempt to create a framework to disprove/prove one or the other will have to be all encompassing. Only partially, in the positive case. Consciousness would seem to need to exist for free will to exist, but in the event free will does not, there's no reason to presume that affects the possibility of consciousness. > It has the same issue though that you have to decide that you are conscious to begin using reason, even though no one can prove it scientifically. It does not have the same issue. Whether you have free will or not, there's no reason why that need to affect your life at all. Clearly we think we make choices. Whether we make those choices or not, we act as if we do. As it is, we already have solid evidence that our conscious "decision" often is not causally linked to the actual "choice", so we can't rely on our introspection to even give us an accurate description of what "choices" we make, or why, and we know from e.g. split brain experiments that the brain can easily be made to rationalise how it "chose" things it never did. Accordingly, whether the mechanism actually controlling actions exercise free will or not, we'd expect our consciousness to experience it the same way.

mensetmanusman 2y ago
This could go on for many hundreds of pages, but I thought I would share: “Well, yes. The alternative is for you to give me a definition of free will that allows for it within the constraints of cause-effect and randomness.” https://youtu.be/itLIM38k2r0?si=1wTeSVdX28UlB2jf https://youtu.be/itLIM38k2r0?si=1wTeSVdX28UlB2jf This interview with Nobel prize winning mathematical physicist Roger Penrose describes a framework where quantum mechanical time hopping during a measurement removes this cause-and-effect concern you have. E.g. The nature of reality of time and matter fields is even more complicated than we understand, and our macros scale understanding of cause and effects might be too limiting when considering constraints of consciousness.