The key point I want to emphasize is that the specifics of reactor design become secondary given the multitude of other risks involved. Consider the example of

The key point I want to emphasize is that the specifics of reactor design become secondary given the multitude of other risks involved. Consider the example of Fukushima, which, despite having a modern and robust reactor design, still succumbed to disaster. Similarly, the potential risks to a nuclear power plant located in a conflict zone, such as Ukraine. Human factors further complicate safety measures, as the potential for human error or intentional sabotage (e.g., a terrorist attack) remains a constant threat. Moreover, natural disasters are indifferent to the technology used; they can devastate any facility, especially with increasing likelihood in the context of climate change. The only rational approach is to acknowledge that incidents like Chernobyl and Fukushima are, in a sense, 'normal'. They fall within the middle of the probability spectrum, which explains why they have occurred. The critical question is whether we are prepared to accept these kinds of accidents as a normal part of nuclear energy production. Much like car crashes, which no one wants, they happen despite all safety measures and are, statistically speaking, normal occurrences.