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Multiple studies have found statistical patterns that can be modeled through mathematical functions. It's not mathematical in a precision and mechanical sense,

Multiple studies have found statistical patterns that can be modeled through mathematical functions. It's not mathematical in a precision and mechanical sense, but the standard deviation of practical observations from the modeled curve is low enough to make it a good predictor and guide for spaced repetition and to optimize time spent to retention ratio.

mjburgess 2y ago
The laws of physics refer to real properties the world has (eg., mass, charge, etc.). Largely, when you use statistics, you're modelling epiphenomena: bundles of randomly arranged properties that aggregate to an apparent quantity that doesnt correspond to anything in the world (eg., compare "mass" with "salad"). The problem with much psychology (and anything ending in -metrics) is that mainstream research in it, for ~century, has been treating the former and latter as equivalent. There is no property of animals called, "forgetting", and anything we model with stats is, at best, an epiphenomenon. It's important not let the x-metrics disciplines get away with their pseudo-scientific propaganda on this. Populations of individuals have, on average, rates of memory (etc.) performance across time which can be approximately quantities. It is highly unlikely this corresponds to any physical property.
- n4r9 2y ago
  By that argument, are the "Gas Laws" [0] not considered laws of physics? They are an aggregated by-product of more fundamental inter-molecule interactions. Perhaps you'd class them as Chemistry rather than Physics? [0] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gas_laws https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gas_laws
  - mjburgess 2y ago
    Statistical mechanics follows more closely from real properties of individual particles. The ensemble effects, via enough randomization, can be quantified from indviidual to macro properties. Temperature isnt, in this sense, an epiphenomnon.
    - n4r9 2y ago
      In what sense are you using the word "epiphenomena", then? Wikipedia provides several definitions across various domains [0] none of which appear to match the way you're using it. It even states that "charge and current are 'epiphenomena'" according to Maxwell. Your description > aggregate to an apparent quantity that doesnt correspond to anything in the world is unclear. What do you mean by "the world"? You go on to say > There is no property of animals called, "forgetting" It feels possible to me that a sufficiently complex model of the brain can observe an individual and determine that they are in a state of "forgetting". Not with current technology, of course, but I don't see what rules it out in principle. Likewise, I don't see why it's impossible for mental states to be reduced (with sufficient computational power) to the states and interactions of the brain's constituent atoms. [0] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Epiphenomenon https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Epiphenomenon
      - mjburgess 2y ago
        Say there are formula whose terms correspond to individual causal properties of a system, whereby action on one of these terms necessarily brings about a determinate response in another, eg., f=kQq/r^2... if I increase one of the charges, necessarily, the force increases. There is a sense in which a highly specific explanation of "electrostatic force" includes "charge", so that deabstracting this formula would yield a logically necessary structure. Then there are formula on the other end, "teen mazagine regressions", where the terms are superstitious aggregates (eg., star signs, number of times you've kissed, etc.). And formula/models/etc. inbetween, where terms like 'temperature' correspond to a property that no part has, but there is a "nearly determinsitic" relationship between them, such that necessarily for any given set of measures (x, y,t) you have a temperature.. but that you cannot, in practice, actually set {(x, y, t)} so you have a "stochastic-causal relationship". My claim is that almost all pscyho-social science is of the teen magazine variety: running linear regressions on surveys and then falsely attributing reality the apparent property given by the correlation coefficient. This is just outright pseudoscience and why much of this stuff is unreporducible nonesense. There is nothing even like "temperature" to our mental faculties, which if explained with a scientific theory, would comprise a vast number of specific causal properties. To say we "forget something" is to describe a combination of 100s of processes each of which have different ecological expressions. Likewise, "IQ" is exactly the same sort of psuedoscience: a linear regression through survey responses of an entire population and then a fraudulent pseudoscientific project of taking this correlation coefficient and turning it into a singular mental faculty. 110% BS
- wavemode 2y ago
  Populations of particles have, on average, rates of decay which we call a "half life". Though the speed at which a single particle decays is entirely random and impossible to predict from any known principle or physical property, studying these aggregate rates empirically is still useful for science. You're splitting hairs (quite aggressively) over what is essentially semantics. And the worst part is, you're wrong about the semantics. I'd advise you to remember the adage that, all models are wrong (whether we're talking about physics or psychology). But some models are -useful-.
  - mjburgess 2y ago
    Not at all. Individual particles have half-lives, they can be each measured to decay. Their having this property follows from QM, it doesnt not follow from population statistics. We only know that population measures correspond to individual properties because of a highly robust independent theory. In general, almost no ensemble statistics of non-trivial non-experimental phemenomna will work this way. This assumption is called, in statistics, the ecological fallacy. Applying this assumption that a statistics of surface data of complex systems is like physics is pseudoscience. It's funny, indeed, that you use statistics of particles whose behaviour here is absurdly simple. It is this very assumption which is pseudoscience when applied in general. My semantics are entirely correct.
    - wavemode 2y ago
      > Individual particles have half-lives, they can be each measured to decay. Just like how individual people have memory, and their ability to recall things can be measured. > Their having this property follows from QM, it doesnt not follow from population statistics. Nope. It's entirely impossible to determine the half life of a substance by observing a single particle, nor can the value be derived mathematically from QM or any other theory. The time it will take for a single particle to decay is random and unpredictable, and the half life can only be determined by looking at population statistics. Even still, the half life is a real physical property, and it does tell us the percent likelihood for a single particle to decay over a given span of time. And if we (for example) wanted to design an experiment or a mechanism, and we were dealing with an unstable substance, we absolutely could use the half life of that substance to decide the optimal parameters of that experiment (e.g. we can use the half life to assume that a certain approximate amount of radiation will be emitted from the substance over a given period of time). So I really don't see what is so strange or pseudoscientific about saying that, if we know experimentally that people tend to remember things better under certain conditions, then let's apply those conditions in a classroom in an attempt to have the students retain more information. Your argument is basically that particles are simple and people are not. But that's both irrelevant and subjective.
tgv 2y ago
> Multiple studies have found statistical patterns that can be modeled through mathematical functions. For conditions that don't generalize. If it would be a "mathematical law", spaced repetition would not work, because the retention time would be that of the last presentation. So, we've got some exception. Interference, reinforcement and generalization are another known influences. Psychology doesn't have a good model of how memory works, whereas there are fairly detailed approximations to model the behavior of e.g. gases. So it isn't mathematics, and it doesn't approach the standards of physics. And that's also part of what's wrong with cogsci. It has held physics too long as the standard to emulate.
- rmbyrro 2y ago
  If you study modern physics, you'll be surprised by how much uncertainty there is. Thankfully, uncertainty is not an obstacle for acquiring useful knowledge. Not in physics, not in cognitive science. I understand your skepticism, but you're missing out on a LOT of very useful advancements in our understanding of the brain and mind, despite all uncertainty that still remains.

mjburgess 2y ago

The laws of physics refer to real properties the world has (eg., mass, charge, etc.). Largely, when you use statistics, you're modelling epiphenomena: bundles of randomly arranged properties that aggregate to an apparent quantity that doesnt correspond to anything in the world (eg., compare "mass" with "salad"). The problem with much psychology (and anything ending in -metrics) is that mainstream research in it, for ~century, has been treating the former and latter as equivalent. There is no property of animals called, "forgetting", and anything we model with stats is, at best, an epiphenomenon. It's important not let the x-metrics disciplines get away with their pseudo-scientific propaganda on this. Populations of individuals have, on average, rates of memory (etc.) performance across time which can be approximately quantities. It is highly unlikely this corresponds to any physical property.

n4r9 2y ago
By that argument, are the "Gas Laws" [0] not considered laws of physics? They are an aggregated by-product of more fundamental inter-molecule interactions. Perhaps you'd class them as Chemistry rather than Physics? [0] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gas_laws https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gas_laws
- mjburgess 2y ago
  Statistical mechanics follows more closely from real properties of individual particles. The ensemble effects, via enough randomization, can be quantified from indviidual to macro properties. Temperature isnt, in this sense, an epiphenomnon.
  - n4r9 2y ago
    In what sense are you using the word "epiphenomena", then? Wikipedia provides several definitions across various domains [0] none of which appear to match the way you're using it. It even states that "charge and current are 'epiphenomena'" according to Maxwell. Your description > aggregate to an apparent quantity that doesnt correspond to anything in the world is unclear. What do you mean by "the world"? You go on to say > There is no property of animals called, "forgetting" It feels possible to me that a sufficiently complex model of the brain can observe an individual and determine that they are in a state of "forgetting". Not with current technology, of course, but I don't see what rules it out in principle. Likewise, I don't see why it's impossible for mental states to be reduced (with sufficient computational power) to the states and interactions of the brain's constituent atoms. [0] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Epiphenomenon https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Epiphenomenon
    - mjburgess 2y ago
      Say there are formula whose terms correspond to individual causal properties of a system, whereby action on one of these terms necessarily brings about a determinate response in another, eg., f=kQq/r^2... if I increase one of the charges, necessarily, the force increases. There is a sense in which a highly specific explanation of "electrostatic force" includes "charge", so that deabstracting this formula would yield a logically necessary structure. Then there are formula on the other end, "teen mazagine regressions", where the terms are superstitious aggregates (eg., star signs, number of times you've kissed, etc.). And formula/models/etc. inbetween, where terms like 'temperature' correspond to a property that no part has, but there is a "nearly determinsitic" relationship between them, such that necessarily for any given set of measures (x, y,t) you have a temperature.. but that you cannot, in practice, actually set {(x, y, t)} so you have a "stochastic-causal relationship". My claim is that almost all pscyho-social science is of the teen magazine variety: running linear regressions on surveys and then falsely attributing reality the apparent property given by the correlation coefficient. This is just outright pseudoscience and why much of this stuff is unreporducible nonesense. There is nothing even like "temperature" to our mental faculties, which if explained with a scientific theory, would comprise a vast number of specific causal properties. To say we "forget something" is to describe a combination of 100s of processes each of which have different ecological expressions. Likewise, "IQ" is exactly the same sort of psuedoscience: a linear regression through survey responses of an entire population and then a fraudulent pseudoscientific project of taking this correlation coefficient and turning it into a singular mental faculty. 110% BS
wavemode 2y ago
Populations of particles have, on average, rates of decay which we call a "half life". Though the speed at which a single particle decays is entirely random and impossible to predict from any known principle or physical property, studying these aggregate rates empirically is still useful for science. You're splitting hairs (quite aggressively) over what is essentially semantics. And the worst part is, you're wrong about the semantics. I'd advise you to remember the adage that, all models are wrong (whether we're talking about physics or psychology). But some models are -useful-.
- mjburgess 2y ago
  Not at all. Individual particles have half-lives, they can be each measured to decay. Their having this property follows from QM, it doesnt not follow from population statistics. We only know that population measures correspond to individual properties because of a highly robust independent theory. In general, almost no ensemble statistics of non-trivial non-experimental phemenomna will work this way. This assumption is called, in statistics, the ecological fallacy. Applying this assumption that a statistics of surface data of complex systems is like physics is pseudoscience. It's funny, indeed, that you use statistics of particles whose behaviour here is absurdly simple. It is this very assumption which is pseudoscience when applied in general. My semantics are entirely correct.
  - wavemode 2y ago
    > Individual particles have half-lives, they can be each measured to decay. Just like how individual people have memory, and their ability to recall things can be measured. > Their having this property follows from QM, it doesnt not follow from population statistics. Nope. It's entirely impossible to determine the half life of a substance by observing a single particle, nor can the value be derived mathematically from QM or any other theory. The time it will take for a single particle to decay is random and unpredictable, and the half life can only be determined by looking at population statistics. Even still, the half life is a real physical property, and it does tell us the percent likelihood for a single particle to decay over a given span of time. And if we (for example) wanted to design an experiment or a mechanism, and we were dealing with an unstable substance, we absolutely could use the half life of that substance to decide the optimal parameters of that experiment (e.g. we can use the half life to assume that a certain approximate amount of radiation will be emitted from the substance over a given period of time). So I really don't see what is so strange or pseudoscientific about saying that, if we know experimentally that people tend to remember things better under certain conditions, then let's apply those conditions in a classroom in an attempt to have the students retain more information. Your argument is basically that particles are simple and people are not. But that's both irrelevant and subjective.

tgv 2y ago

> Multiple studies have found statistical patterns that can be modeled through mathematical functions. For conditions that don't generalize. If it would be a "mathematical law", spaced repetition would not work, because the retention time would be that of the last presentation. So, we've got some exception. Interference, reinforcement and generalization are another known influences. Psychology doesn't have a good model of how memory works, whereas there are fairly detailed approximations to model the behavior of e.g. gases. So it isn't mathematics, and it doesn't approach the standards of physics. And that's also part of what's wrong with cogsci. It has held physics too long as the standard to emulate.

rmbyrro 2y ago
If you study modern physics, you'll be surprised by how much uncertainty there is. Thankfully, uncertainty is not an obstacle for acquiring useful knowledge. Not in physics, not in cognitive science. I understand your skepticism, but you're missing out on a LOT of very useful advancements in our understanding of the brain and mind, despite all uncertainty that still remains.