Is there ANY chance that this is a bit of a tempest in a teapot? I can envision a scenario where this "backdoor" is actually part of the designed-in security f

Is there ANY chance that this is a bit of a tempest in a teapot? I can envision a scenario where this "backdoor" is actually part of the designed-in security features of the chip designed to prevent an unauthorized party from reading out the FPGA "programming" as it were. As such, it's conceivable that there might be multiple keys or even a series of "transport" or "default" keys that are similar to those found on ISO smartcards. What we might be looking at is a "feature" as opposed to a "backdoor." In any case, this sort of thing only becomes a critical security breach if the application you're using the chip in depends on periodic (or boot-time) reprogramming of the FPGA. In either case, either the physical security or the trust chain of your firmware loads is broken. As we all know, key management and side channel attacks are the hardest part of implementing a secure crypto system, so is this really news?