Furthermore, lying is (almost?) invariably performed in order to put one or more persons' minds into states which differ from those that the lie-teller supposes

Furthermore, lying is (almost?) invariably performed in order to put one or more persons' minds into states which differ from those that the lie-teller supposes they would be in if they had spoken the truth. This view supposes that the lie-teller has a theory of mind with regard to those other people, but does this mean that a 'lying' AI must also have a theory of mind? I don't think so, as I can readily imagine that AIs (and people, for that matter) could learn the utility of saying certain things as opposed to the alternatives, without regard to their effect on the state of mind of other people, and without regard to which of the candidate statements would be truthful. In a sense, it would be like 'cheating' at a game on account of not knowing all the rules.