6 ms·
it was 62% per year for 33 years.
by chollida1 2y ago
it was 62% per year for 33 years.
- tombert 2y agoThat is insane. Like, completely insane, shouldn't-be-possible insane. I guess the theoretical limit to how much money you could make in the market is "the sum of all volatility", but I wonder how realistically possible it would be to even dream of beating 62% yearly.
- chronic640201 2y agoMathematics can only take you so far. At the end of the day, people run the exchanges. Not math. The returns of modern HFT market makers are even higher. With their unfair “business” advantages such as PFOF, privileged dark pool and block trade access, and military internet infrastructure. Think 60%+, per year, at least. Over 10-20 years, of course.
- tombert 2y agoThat doesn't surprise me; doesn't Citadel keep the entire bid-ask spread for every transaction they facilitate? Presumably between that and arbitrage opportunities that pop up from option contracts alone, I have no doubt that market makers clean up pretty well. They wouldn't hire me either!
- eru 2y agoCitadel has plenty of competition, eg from Jane Street. The markets for market making are some of the most efficient markets on the planet.
- eru 2y ago> The returns of modern HFT market makers are even higher. The returns of a child's lemonade stand are even higher... Market makers and lemonade stands are mostly about paying for labour (and ideas etc, but let's call that 'labour', too). Capital requirements are rather low. So taking all the profit and attributing it to capital returns tends to give you weird numbers.
- chronic640201 2y ago> So taking all the profit and attributing it to capital returns tends to give you weird numbers. Why does it matter? Returns are returns. Money in, money out. After all, people compare HYSA bank interest with TreasuryDirect bond returns with equity ETFs like VTI and QQQ. Each with vastly different capital mechanics.
- eru 2y agoYes, but there any old schmuck can put some dollars in and get the same return. Good luck trying that with one of those very profitable market makers and funds: they don't want your capital; or at least they don't want it at the same price (= returns) that we are quoting here. Which suggests that those returns aren't attributable to that capital at all (even though for tax reasons they might structured it so that legally these are counted as capital returns, but that just obscures the underlying economic reality). This is very similar to observing that a particular company pays a lot of money for some very simple job; but then we notice that the job is only available for the son of the CEO. We can conclude that the extra pay isn't really for that simple job. Or when we notice that a government contractor officially charges 5000 dollars for a hammer. Unless you and me could rock up and steal market share by offering to sell hammers for 4000 dollars, it's very likely that the 5000 dollars aren't really for the hammer at all; but just some accounting shenanigans.
- TeaBrain 2y agoTheir returns worked out to something like an average of 39% per year after fees, which is the figure I've heard cited. This may be what they were thinking of. Renaissance was/is known for having higher fees than likely the entirety of their competition, which they can get away with since their returns still outstrip the rest after the higher fees.
- mgfist 2y agoThe fund is closed off to outsiders, so the fees are don't matter in the same way they do for most funds. In the podcast episode on Rentec done by Acquired, the hosts speculated that rentec kept the high fees as a way to ensure they have enough to handsomely pay less tenured employees who don't yet have much money in the fund.
- kzzzznot 2y agoThat’s a great episode and covers a lot in depth. Would recommend Acquired in general - appeals to me as interested in tech, business and finance
- TeaBrain 2y agoI'd heard that the Medallion fund was closed off, so I wasn't really sure of the reasoning behind that continuing fee structure, but that line of speculation does make some sense.