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> Which itself is not know to be bugfree. Not totally correct, from: https://sel4.systems/Info/FAQ/proof.html https://sel4.systems/Info/FAQ/proof.html Th
by naasking 2y ago
> Which itself is not know to be bugfree.
Not totally correct, from:
https://sel4.systems/Info/FAQ/proof.html https://sel4.systems/Info/FAQ/proof.html
The binary code of the ARM and RISCV64 versions of the seL4 microkernel correctly implement the behaviour described in its abstract specification and nothing more. Furthermore, the specification and the seL4 binary satisfy the classic security properties called *integrity* and *confidentiality*.
[...]
Previously, in 2009, we had only proved functional correctness between the C code of the kernel and its specification. Now we have additionally shown binary correctness, that is, the compiler and linker need not be trusted, and we have shown that the specification indeed implies strong security properties as intended.
So the specification has indeed been proven to be free of certain security bugs.
- daghamm 2y agoIt is always X meets Y under the assumption Z. But what if Y is incomlete or Z is invalid? Note that nowhere in that they claim X is secure.
- naasking 2y ago"Secure" is ambiguous, so of course they wouldn't claim X, whatever that is, is "secure". For instance, a microkernel does not provide cryptographic confidentiality, but some readers include such properties under the umbrella of "secure", so using that term would be dumb. When talking about proofs you describe the specific properties proven in a way that leaves no ambiguity.