5 ms·
> Primary evidence in the case against OLE-style compound documents .. is Word macro viruses. The old security model assumed that the "system administrator" a
by pjc50 3y ago
> Primary evidence in the case against OLE-style compound documents
.. is Word macro viruses.
The old security model assumed that the "system administrator" and "apps" could be trusted, it was just the users which had to be segregated. The modern world has that the other way round: "system administrator" doesn't scale, apps absolutely cannot be trusted not to violate your privacy, and most devices are single-user. Protecting user data in a component system from hostile components is .. conceptually impossible?
- fidotron 3y agoI think that is a good enough point to be worth trying to counter it. The modern app environment (especially mobile) leans heavily on app scoped permissions, and sometimes even app session level permissions. Has anyone tried a component system that attempts component instance level permissions? (And maybe time gated ones at that).
- mike_hearn 3y agoThe web again. iframes have limited permissions and both host and child page are sandboxed from each other to some extent.
- rvense 3y agoNot sure I see how it's different to protecting it from hostile applications? We'd be sandboxing components somehow rather than apps.
- tsujamin 3y agoTo be fair, OLE and malicious office macros aren't actually related except that they use a common file format sometimes. Rest of the point is solid though.