5 ms·

I think they should do like Mullvad claims and keep zero logs. You cannot share what you do not have.

srockets 2y ago
This does not stop the host from being compelled to wiretap future communications. Just don't try to make encrypted email happen. It can't, and we don't need it to be. We have better solutions for encrypted communications, for those that need it.
- noname120 2y ago
  It's harder and requires more red tape.
GGO 2y ago
you can be required to keep logs - they need to design a system that cannot collect logs - You cannot share what you cannot have.
- binary132 2y ago
  I’d be more interested in a system that can prove to me that it’s not collecting logs. Hard, but not impossible.
  - dheera 2y ago
    As long as we are talking about classical communication (and not quantum) it is impossible to prove that it isn't collecting at least ciphertext logs.
    - lordofgibbons 2y ago
      Not really. Tor, I2P, and Monero manage this just fine. Building on these technologies should allow one to have privacy and anonymity without any exotic quantum technology.
      - EraYaN 2y ago
        Well they don't actually, Tor especially has enormous amounts of government nodes so they can trace and log exactly what and who. And all of those still rely on the IP network which always will allow logging without you ever knowing, it's just math really, the proof of not-logged is just impossible.
        beardog 2y ago
        Interesting, do you have a source? All fully p2p networks are vulnerable to sybil attacks to some extent, but specifically a source that Tor actively has enough "government nodes" to de-anonymize everything.
      - dheera 2y ago
        These technologies give privacy and anonymity under normal conditions, but they do not prevent anyone from logging ciphertexts. If someone has logged ciphertext, and the government subponies someone to divulge their private key and subponies whoever has the ciphertext, those ciphertexts as good as plain text.
        binary132 2y ago
        I mean, I don’t think anyone really expects that encrypted messages are necessarily secure in context of stolen private keys. I assume that a lot of encrypted traffic is either recorded at the ISP/backbone level or at least can be on demand.
    - binary132 2y ago
      Consider a certified tamper-resistant operating system which cryptographically certifies the versions of software it operates, and prohibits uncertified processes from running. The certificate of authenticity verifying the software is made available to the clients which connect to the remote application. This cert specifies all of the program transforms which were required in order to produce the compiled software, and they specify the capabilities required for the transform. It is certainly a very hard and complex problem but I wouldn’t necessarily go as far as “impossible”. Maybe you know something I don’t know, though.
      - dheera 2y ago
        > Consider a certified tamper-resistant operating system which cryptographically certifies the versions of software it operates, and prohibits uncertified processes from running. If I own the hardware, I can decide how the software is executed, including containerizing your certification processes to make them feel warm and fuzzy and happy but in reality they are running inside a simulation. If push comes to shove I could theoretically manufacture my own RAM sticks that copy everything and your OS wouldn't even know, but there's a 99% chance I could successfully pull it off at the kernel virtualization level.
kaliqt 2y ago
I mean it's clear, the governments of the world are colluding to ensure that all companies and users must incriminate themselves by collecting logs. They're trying to do the same with cryptography.
yieldcrv 2y ago
gullible vpn fans believe anything or at least their favorite youtuber with the paid ads and zero domain knowledge of network topology serious question I have is whether “internet reseller” is a compelling service. because that's all that VPNs are, and I dont mind paying to use them for that purpose.
- noodlesUK 2y ago
  I would say that Mullvad seems to be the exception - they know their stuff. You can even pay with cash for even more anonymity.
TheCoelacanth 2y ago
How would a recovery email feature be possible without them knowing what your recovery email is?
- fbdab103 2y ago
  If you are super duper serious about securing yourself, recovery email is non-viable. Every piece of data is a potential vector towards exposure. Which comes directly into the problem of security vs convenience.
  - TheCoelacanth 2y ago
    Of course, but you can't blame Proton that you chose to prioritize convenience over security. If you don't want Proton to know who you are, don't use that feature.

This does not stop the host from being compelled to wiretap future communications. Just don't try to make encrypted email happen. It can't, and we don't need it to be. We have better solutions for encrypted communications, for those that need it.

noname120 2y ago
It's harder and requires more red tape.

GGO 2y ago

you can be required to keep logs - they need to design a system that cannot collect logs - You cannot share what you cannot have.

binary132 2y ago
I’d be more interested in a system that can prove to me that it’s not collecting logs. Hard, but not impossible.
- dheera 2y ago
  As long as we are talking about classical communication (and not quantum) it is impossible to prove that it isn't collecting at least ciphertext logs.
  - lordofgibbons 2y ago
    Not really. Tor, I2P, and Monero manage this just fine. Building on these technologies should allow one to have privacy and anonymity without any exotic quantum technology.
    - EraYaN 2y ago
      Well they don't actually, Tor especially has enormous amounts of government nodes so they can trace and log exactly what and who. And all of those still rely on the IP network which always will allow logging without you ever knowing, it's just math really, the proof of not-logged is just impossible.
      - beardog 2y ago
        Interesting, do you have a source? All fully p2p networks are vulnerable to sybil attacks to some extent, but specifically a source that Tor actively has enough "government nodes" to de-anonymize everything.
    - dheera 2y ago
      These technologies give privacy and anonymity under normal conditions, but they do not prevent anyone from logging ciphertexts. If someone has logged ciphertext, and the government subponies someone to divulge their private key and subponies whoever has the ciphertext, those ciphertexts as good as plain text.
      - binary132 2y ago
        I mean, I don’t think anyone really expects that encrypted messages are necessarily secure in context of stolen private keys. I assume that a lot of encrypted traffic is either recorded at the ISP/backbone level or at least can be on demand.
  - binary132 2y ago
    Consider a certified tamper-resistant operating system which cryptographically certifies the versions of software it operates, and prohibits uncertified processes from running. The certificate of authenticity verifying the software is made available to the clients which connect to the remote application. This cert specifies all of the program transforms which were required in order to produce the compiled software, and they specify the capabilities required for the transform. It is certainly a very hard and complex problem but I wouldn’t necessarily go as far as “impossible”. Maybe you know something I don’t know, though.
    - dheera 2y ago
      > Consider a certified tamper-resistant operating system which cryptographically certifies the versions of software it operates, and prohibits uncertified processes from running. If I own the hardware, I can decide how the software is executed, including containerizing your certification processes to make them feel warm and fuzzy and happy but in reality they are running inside a simulation. If push comes to shove I could theoretically manufacture my own RAM sticks that copy everything and your OS wouldn't even know, but there's a 99% chance I could successfully pull it off at the kernel virtualization level.

kaliqt 2y ago

I mean it's clear, the governments of the world are colluding to ensure that all companies and users must incriminate themselves by collecting logs. They're trying to do the same with cryptography.

yieldcrv 2y ago

gullible vpn fans believe anything or at least their favorite youtuber with the paid ads and zero domain knowledge of network topology serious question I have is whether “internet reseller” is a compelling service. because that's all that VPNs are, and I dont mind paying to use them for that purpose.

noodlesUK 2y ago
I would say that Mullvad seems to be the exception - they know their stuff. You can even pay with cash for even more anonymity.

TheCoelacanth 2y ago

How would a recovery email feature be possible without them knowing what your recovery email is?

fbdab103 2y ago
If you are super duper serious about securing yourself, recovery email is non-viable. Every piece of data is a potential vector towards exposure. Which comes directly into the problem of security vs convenience.
- TheCoelacanth 2y ago
  Of course, but you can't blame Proton that you chose to prioritize convenience over security. If you don't want Proton to know who you are, don't use that feature.