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I think most of the philosophers Dennett is engaging with aren't suggesting that the mind is magical or mystical, but simply that subjective phenomena (thoughts

I think most of the philosophers Dennett is engaging with aren't suggesting that the mind is magical or mystical, but simply that subjective phenomena (thoughts, perceptions, etc) cannot be fully explained in exclusively physical terms. To give a popular argument, you can imagine a scenario where somebody has completed a perfect and complete explanation of the physical processes of human color perception. Would this explanation grant a reader who had never seen color an understanding of what it is actually like to see the color red? The argument goes that if you can't explain something in purely physical terms, then that thing isn't purely physical in nature. Just because something isn't physical doesn't mean that it is mystical or magical; it is just a different kind of Stuff. The idea that only physical things exist is intuitively pretty compelling to me, but I've found arguments to the contrary to be much more convincing.

n4r9 2y ago
> Would this explanation grant a reader who had never seen color an understanding of what it is actually like to see the color red? Suppose that you were to manually fire neurons in this person's brain, so as to exactly simulate the brain's response to red-frequency photons hitting the retina. Would this give them such an understanding? I would guess that most people would say yes. So one can learn subjective experiences without needing the perception to actually occur. In some sense the subjective experience is physically encoded in the details of the neural intervention. The interesting question is where is the line on the spectrum between verbal explanations and direct neural intervention, at which such an understanding becomes impossible to impart?
- Quailman84 2y ago
  If I'm understanding your thought experiment correctly, you are saying that you could stimulate the right part of the brain to cause the person to have an experience of seeing the color red without actually perceiving something red. I think that it would be right to say that they would have gained a more complete understanding of what it is like to perceive the color red, but that's only because you have caused them to actually perceive the color red—that perception just didn't reflect reality. I think we could argue about the definition of "perception", but the important part is that you are making them experience redness firsthand. If you ask me, there is nothing short of direct firsthand experience that will allow you to understand what it is like to see the color red. Here's some further reading on that argument, if you're interested: https://iep.utm.edu/know-arg/ https://iep.utm.edu/know-arg/
  - n4r9 2y ago
    > you have caused them to actually perceive the color red Perhaps pedantic, but I'd argue there is no perception going on, since the senses are not involved. > the important part is that you are making them experience redness firsthand To me the important part is this: knowledge of the experience of redness can be transferred to a someone, without them going through the process of seeing redness, but purely by means of changes to their neural states. Framed this way, it is not so difficult to swallow that similar neural changes could also happen in response to reading or being told about seeing the colour red.
    - Quailman84 2y ago
      I don't think it's pedantic, semantics are absolutely necessary for talking about this kind of thing precisely. I use the word perception to describe certain mental phenomena that we take as usually occurring in response to stimuli: sights, smells, etc. I'm not certain I totally understand your definition, but it sounds like you use the term to describe a type of process where sensory organs and the brain interact with the rest of the physical world to create mental phenomena—the same phenomena that I would call a perception. So because there aren't actual objects interacting with the sensory organs, then direct neural stimulation of the brain isn't a perception under your definition. I can see where you are coming from with the idea that you could trigger those neural changes through some other process. It's an interesting idea, and I wonder if it could be true in practice somehow. Regardless, I'd still argue that you are manipulating the brain in one way or another to create a firsthand experience of seeing the color red. If you can explain redness fully in terms of physical systems and processes, then somebody having that firsthand experience for the first time shouldn't be thinking "oh, so that's what it is like to actually see red." If these are purely physical processes, then that knowledge should have come along with your complete knowledge of all of physics. You should also know what it is like to have experiences that your brain doesn't have the hardware for, like a bat's experience of echolocation. It seems like an unfairly high bar to clear; how could you understand an experience without having it firsthand? But if you are committed to believing that conscious experience is a physical thing, then I think you are also committed to believing that it can be fully described in physical terms. Physicalists do have arguments that try to explain how you could pass that bar in theory or dodge the commitment altogether, but personally I think those arguments are pretty weak.

n4r9 2y ago

> Would this explanation grant a reader who had never seen color an understanding of what it is actually like to see the color red? Suppose that you were to manually fire neurons in this person's brain, so as to exactly simulate the brain's response to red-frequency photons hitting the retina. Would this give them such an understanding? I would guess that most people would say yes. So one can learn subjective experiences without needing the perception to actually occur. In some sense the subjective experience is physically encoded in the details of the neural intervention. The interesting question is where is the line on the spectrum between verbal explanations and direct neural intervention, at which such an understanding becomes impossible to impart?

Quailman84 2y ago
If I'm understanding your thought experiment correctly, you are saying that you could stimulate the right part of the brain to cause the person to have an experience of seeing the color red without actually perceiving something red. I think that it would be right to say that they would have gained a more complete understanding of what it is like to perceive the color red, but that's only because you have caused them to actually perceive the color red—that perception just didn't reflect reality. I think we could argue about the definition of "perception", but the important part is that you are making them experience redness firsthand. If you ask me, there is nothing short of direct firsthand experience that will allow you to understand what it is like to see the color red. Here's some further reading on that argument, if you're interested: https://iep.utm.edu/know-arg/ https://iep.utm.edu/know-arg/
- n4r9 2y ago
  > you have caused them to actually perceive the color red Perhaps pedantic, but I'd argue there is no perception going on, since the senses are not involved. > the important part is that you are making them experience redness firsthand To me the important part is this: knowledge of the experience of redness can be transferred to a someone, without them going through the process of seeing redness, but purely by means of changes to their neural states. Framed this way, it is not so difficult to swallow that similar neural changes could also happen in response to reading or being told about seeing the colour red.
  - Quailman84 2y ago
    I don't think it's pedantic, semantics are absolutely necessary for talking about this kind of thing precisely. I use the word perception to describe certain mental phenomena that we take as usually occurring in response to stimuli: sights, smells, etc. I'm not certain I totally understand your definition, but it sounds like you use the term to describe a type of process where sensory organs and the brain interact with the rest of the physical world to create mental phenomena—the same phenomena that I would call a perception. So because there aren't actual objects interacting with the sensory organs, then direct neural stimulation of the brain isn't a perception under your definition. I can see where you are coming from with the idea that you could trigger those neural changes through some other process. It's an interesting idea, and I wonder if it could be true in practice somehow. Regardless, I'd still argue that you are manipulating the brain in one way or another to create a firsthand experience of seeing the color red. If you can explain redness fully in terms of physical systems and processes, then somebody having that firsthand experience for the first time shouldn't be thinking "oh, so that's what it is like to actually see red." If these are purely physical processes, then that knowledge should have come along with your complete knowledge of all of physics. You should also know what it is like to have experiences that your brain doesn't have the hardware for, like a bat's experience of echolocation. It seems like an unfairly high bar to clear; how could you understand an experience without having it firsthand? But if you are committed to believing that conscious experience is a physical thing, then I think you are also committed to believing that it can be fully described in physical terms. Physicalists do have arguments that try to explain how you could pass that bar in theory or dodge the commitment altogether, but personally I think those arguments are pretty weak.