5 ms·
This is a very poor advice at deniable encryption. The structure of the ciphertext is visible to the reader - when you get your decryption you know that it is o
by oleganza 2y ago
This is a very poor advice at deniable encryption. The structure of the ciphertext is visible to the reader - when you get your decryption you know that it is one of many.
I presume the true deniable decryption would work in a way that fully hides the presence of the alternate contents. Note, however, that most encryption schemes are specifically designed to be non-deniable, so you'd be caught by simply using organically grown crypto before even decrypting anything.
For those interested in paranoia, I suggest looking into steganography and forward-secrecy schemes with transient secrets.
- ayende 2y agoWhat do you mean, structure? The output here is indistinguishable from random data Note stenography will not actually help if your data is searched for. Obscurity isn't a protection method The idea is that you can't tell how many encrypted items you have in the output without the secret key This will not hide that the data is encrypted, sure, but will allow you to reveal the innocent pieces only if required