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Im not sure how you assign probability to finding truths of this manner. Again in the grand scheme of things, few hundred years is not very long. I think itd be

Im not sure how you assign probability to finding truths of this manner. Again in the grand scheme of things, few hundred years is not very long. I think itd be foolish to believe the world as we see it will be parallel as we see it in a million or even a thousand years from now. Do fundmenetal truths fall on some kind of probability distribution? Its as if we were discussing NP class problems, and we had previously found a method to solve polynomial problems to great success and we said "the odds of this being solveable within this framework is very high" Second, what you consider to be "materialist" is entirely subjective which can and has been amended. We readily accept force/energy and now randomness as part of material science. Why are these things not seen as mystic and immaterial forces of life? No matter deep you go, you have to accept some fundamental, unknown truths. And if one cannot explain onserved phenomena, it is only logical to have to add onto a model. The important part of science is whether we have measureable, meaningful theories that can make accurate predictions, not whether or not our fundamental blocks are "material" or not. Lastly, what distinction do you make between experience and perception exactly? Im not saying they are the same, but it would be helpful to know how you're meaning these terms. My take is that whatever you consider "true" reality is out of bounds. By all prgramatic approaches we can only discover what is true to our minds. Whatever test you conduct, we can only verify the results within the framework of our mind. The only "universal" (in quotes as one can imagine the existence of some other perceptron that works entirely differently) what we all agree to be verfiable.

naasking 2y ago
> Im not sure how you assign probability to finding truths of this manner. Again in the grand scheme of things, few hundred years is not very We're not talking a few hundred years, we're talking a few thousand at least. Human specialness rarely survives serious inquiry. There are no divine kings or priests, humans are not created in God's image, we're just another animal, and other animals have similar cognitive functions as we do. All of these and more were believed at one time or another, but have no factual basis. > Second, what you consider to be "materialist" is entirely subjective which can and has been amended. We readily accept force/energy and now randomness as part of material science. Materialism hasn't really changed, it's always and continues to be the position that all that we perceive is made of some common, physical substance governed by natural laws. That our understanding of how this works evolves doesn't change anything. > And if one cannot explain onserved phenomena, it is only logical to have to add onto a model. The suggestion that we cannot explain observed phenomena is exactly the point in contention. Neuroscience has barely gotten started, and the cracks in mystical properties of consciousness are practically chasms already. There is simply no basis for claiming that we need to extend our ontology to account for the mind. > Lastly, what distinction do you make between experience and perception exactly? Machine perception is a thing, machine experience is not. We too are machines with some extra capabilities, and one of them must produce the belief of experience as a side-effect. The conclusion is based on an illusion though, it's only perception and information processing in the end.

naasking 2y ago

> Im not sure how you assign probability to finding truths of this manner. Again in the grand scheme of things, few hundred years is not very We're not talking a few hundred years, we're talking a few thousand at least. Human specialness rarely survives serious inquiry. There are no divine kings or priests, humans are not created in God's image, we're just another animal, and other animals have similar cognitive functions as we do. All of these and more were believed at one time or another, but have no factual basis. > Second, what you consider to be "materialist" is entirely subjective which can and has been amended. We readily accept force/energy and now randomness as part of material science. Materialism hasn't really changed, it's always and continues to be the position that all that we perceive is made of some common, physical substance governed by natural laws. That our understanding of how this works evolves doesn't change anything. > And if one cannot explain onserved phenomena, it is only logical to have to add onto a model. The suggestion that we cannot explain observed phenomena is exactly the point in contention. Neuroscience has barely gotten started, and the cracks in mystical properties of consciousness are practically chasms already. There is simply no basis for claiming that we need to extend our ontology to account for the mind. > Lastly, what distinction do you make between experience and perception exactly? Machine perception is a thing, machine experience is not. We too are machines with some extra capabilities, and one of them must produce the belief of experience as a side-effect. The conclusion is based on an illusion though, it's only perception and information processing in the end.