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> I see now that we're using the word "illusion" in different ways and talking past each other. At its core, illusionism is the general position that our quali

> I see now that we're using the word "illusion" in different ways and talking past each other. At its core, illusionism is the general position that our qualitative experience is not what it appears to be. That could mean it might just be something else that's incompatible with materialism, but most philosophers take the stricter position that materialism holds, and thus subjective experience doesn't really exist. > I will just point out that if a scientific theory denies the existence of a thing that obviously exists Life obviously exists, and people simply couldn't fathom how living matter could emerge from non-living matter, and so proposed vitalism. It died with progressive elaboration of the mechanics of living cells, thus vindicating materialism. I think exactly this same process is currently happening with consciousness, and neuroscience is currently exploring these kinds of models: A conceptual framework for consciousness, https://pnas.org/doi/10.1073/pnas.2116933119 https://pnas.org/doi/10.1073/pnas.2116933119 Finally, I would be very hesitant to claim that something does or does not exist simply because you perceive it or don't perceive it. I could put an object in your blindspot and you'd swear up and down that nothing was there. Our perceptions are inherently flawed, but still useful in evolutionary terms, and the same would apply to our perceptions of qualitative experience. Dennett formed his position after studying neuroscience extensively, so I urge everyone to take it more seriously.

roarcher 3y ago
Ah, so we weren't talking past each other. You actually do argue that the existence of qualia is an illusion. I would argue that qualia are in fact the only thing we can be certain does exist. I won't though, because now that you've brought us back into thought-terminating cliche territory, there's little point. > Dennett formed his position after studying neuroscience extensively, so I urge everyone to take it more seriously. I prefer reason over credentialism, personally. All the advanced degrees and study in the world can't make a logically incoherent position correct. The other problem with arguments from authority is that one can always find people with equal or greater credentials who take the opposing view. One of Dennett's better known opponents, for example: > [1] In 1993, Chalmers received his PhD in philosophy and cognitive science from Indiana University Bloomington under Douglas Hofstadter, writing a doctoral thesis entitled Toward a Theory of Consciousness. He was a postdoctoral fellow in the Philosophy-Neuroscience-Psychology program directed by Andy Clark at Washington University in St. Louis from 1993 to 1995. I assume this means you will give equal weight to his point of view. Otherwise we will be forced to acknowledge that you agree with Dennett not because he's well studied, but because he agrees with you. [1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/David_Chalmers https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/David_Chalmers
- naasking 3y ago
  > I would argue that qualia are in fact the only thing we can be certain does exist. I won't though, because now that you've brought us back into thought-terminating cliche territory, there's little point. As I said, there's nothing thought-terminating about eliminative materialism, and I provided a link demonstrating active work in neuroscience to account for consciousness based on that premise. If it were thought-terminating, why are people developing more thoughts based on it? The only thoughts that are terminated are the attribution of mystical and non-scientific properties to consciousness, which is exactly what you'd expect from actual science. > I assume this means you will give equal weight to his point of view. I have but ultimately didn't find his position persuasive. What I wouldn't do is dismiss his entire position as a thought-terminating cliche though, or assume a deep thinker like Dennett didn't consider an objection as trivial as all of our knowledge being built from qualitative experience. You started this thread by stating that you've never understood the argument behind eliminative materialism, and with the way you've described it so far, I suggest it's because you haven't given it a serious effort.
  - roarcher 3y ago
    I read your link. To borrow your phrase, I didn't find it persuasive. The paper promises in several places to address the issue of qualia, but never quite gets around to it. Instead it plays the standard linguistic trick that I hear so often: The things we perceive are illusory (though the paper shies away from using that specific word), therefore qualia are an illusion. Once again, this conflates the content of qualia with the existence of qualia. I find it bizarre that so much energy is devoted to arguing that the content of consciousness is inaccurate, when I've never met a single person who thinks otherwise. Even children understand that their minds can conjure up things that don't exist, and can easily be made to understand that even their day-to-day perceptions are inaccurate. But the vigor with which this argument is pushed makes sense when you realize that the actual goal is to use the ambiguity of the claim "qualia aren't real" (which may refer to either content or existence) to appear to have proven that qualia do not exist while only having to do the work of proving that they are not accurate. Frankly, I find these conversations immensely frustrating for this exact reason. I go back and forth with someone on the only real issue, which is the existence of qualia. They talk in circles and use this semantic sleight of hand to claim that qualia don't even exist and therefore require no explanation, even as they experience them at that exact moment. When I insist on the issue, they claim that I need to try harder to understand their position, even as they actively avoid honestly engaging with my own. Occasionally I am gullible enough to think "you know, maybe there really is something I just don't get" and I cave in and read their proposed literature, only to be met with the same linguistic trickery. This is why I use the phrase "thought-terminating cliche". This entire line of argument doesn't even attempt to answer the real question. It makes a big show out of beating a different but similar-sounding question to death, then quickly dodges around the real one while you're dazzled and hopes you don't notice. And this "explanation" is always bookended with a smug "consciousness is just an illusion (you non-materialist simpleton)". I expect no less going forward, so this conversation has outlived its productivity. Feel free to have the last word if you like.

roarcher 3y ago

Ah, so we weren't talking past each other. You actually do argue that the existence of qualia is an illusion. I would argue that qualia are in fact the only thing we can be certain does exist. I won't though, because now that you've brought us back into thought-terminating cliche territory, there's little point. > Dennett formed his position after studying neuroscience extensively, so I urge everyone to take it more seriously. I prefer reason over credentialism, personally. All the advanced degrees and study in the world can't make a logically incoherent position correct. The other problem with arguments from authority is that one can always find people with equal or greater credentials who take the opposing view. One of Dennett's better known opponents, for example: > [1] In 1993, Chalmers received his PhD in philosophy and cognitive science from Indiana University Bloomington under Douglas Hofstadter, writing a doctoral thesis entitled Toward a Theory of Consciousness. He was a postdoctoral fellow in the Philosophy-Neuroscience-Psychology program directed by Andy Clark at Washington University in St. Louis from 1993 to 1995. I assume this means you will give equal weight to his point of view. Otherwise we will be forced to acknowledge that you agree with Dennett not because he's well studied, but because he agrees with you. [1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/David_Chalmers https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/David_Chalmers

naasking 3y ago
> I would argue that qualia are in fact the only thing we can be certain does exist. I won't though, because now that you've brought us back into thought-terminating cliche territory, there's little point. As I said, there's nothing thought-terminating about eliminative materialism, and I provided a link demonstrating active work in neuroscience to account for consciousness based on that premise. If it were thought-terminating, why are people developing more thoughts based on it? The only thoughts that are terminated are the attribution of mystical and non-scientific properties to consciousness, which is exactly what you'd expect from actual science. > I assume this means you will give equal weight to his point of view. I have but ultimately didn't find his position persuasive. What I wouldn't do is dismiss his entire position as a thought-terminating cliche though, or assume a deep thinker like Dennett didn't consider an objection as trivial as all of our knowledge being built from qualitative experience. You started this thread by stating that you've never understood the argument behind eliminative materialism, and with the way you've described it so far, I suggest it's because you haven't given it a serious effort.
- roarcher 3y ago
  I read your link. To borrow your phrase, I didn't find it persuasive. The paper promises in several places to address the issue of qualia, but never quite gets around to it. Instead it plays the standard linguistic trick that I hear so often: The things we perceive are illusory (though the paper shies away from using that specific word), therefore qualia are an illusion. Once again, this conflates the content of qualia with the existence of qualia. I find it bizarre that so much energy is devoted to arguing that the content of consciousness is inaccurate, when I've never met a single person who thinks otherwise. Even children understand that their minds can conjure up things that don't exist, and can easily be made to understand that even their day-to-day perceptions are inaccurate. But the vigor with which this argument is pushed makes sense when you realize that the actual goal is to use the ambiguity of the claim "qualia aren't real" (which may refer to either content or existence) to appear to have proven that qualia do not exist while only having to do the work of proving that they are not accurate. Frankly, I find these conversations immensely frustrating for this exact reason. I go back and forth with someone on the only real issue, which is the existence of qualia. They talk in circles and use this semantic sleight of hand to claim that qualia don't even exist and therefore require no explanation, even as they experience them at that exact moment. When I insist on the issue, they claim that I need to try harder to understand their position, even as they actively avoid honestly engaging with my own. Occasionally I am gullible enough to think "you know, maybe there really is something I just don't get" and I cave in and read their proposed literature, only to be met with the same linguistic trickery. This is why I use the phrase "thought-terminating cliche". This entire line of argument doesn't even attempt to answer the real question. It makes a big show out of beating a different but similar-sounding question to death, then quickly dodges around the real one while you're dazzled and hopes you don't notice. And this "explanation" is always bookended with a smug "consciousness is just an illusion (you non-materialist simpleton)". I expect no less going forward, so this conversation has outlived its productivity. Feel free to have the last word if you like.