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> or accept that your perceptions of subjectivity are not a direct perception of reality and thus illusory. I see now that we're using the word "illusion" in

> or accept that your perceptions of subjectivity are not a direct perception of reality and thus illusory. I see now that we're using the word "illusion" in different ways and talking past each other. I agree that qualia are not a direct or accurate experience of reality. Dreams consist of qualia, but most people would not argue that what happens in their dreams must actually be happening. What is not illusory is the fact that subjective experience exists, and that's the sense in which I use the word. I and everyone else (I presume) experience qualia. The fact that the content of consciousness consists of illusions is undoubtedly correct and quite easy to demonstrate, but that is a different and unrelated matter. It is also unsurprising, since what we actually experience is presumably derived from the inner physical state of our brain, which is at best only a proxy for the reality of our surroundings. I do not believe that Dennett himself actually makes this distinction. He seems to sometimes ignore and sometimes outright deny the existence of qualia, which is an absolutely baffling position for any introspective conscious being to take. In regards to whether qualia are compatible with materialism, I will just point out that if a scientific theory denies the existence of a thing that obviously exists, then the problem is with the theory, not the thing. I can think of nothing more un-scientific than insisting on the theory just to spite reality for not conforming to our materialist ideals.

naasking 2y ago
> I see now that we're using the word "illusion" in different ways and talking past each other. At its core, illusionism is the general position that our qualitative experience is not what it appears to be. That could mean it might just be something else that's incompatible with materialism, but most philosophers take the stricter position that materialism holds, and thus subjective experience doesn't really exist. > I will just point out that if a scientific theory denies the existence of a thing that obviously exists Life obviously exists, and people simply couldn't fathom how living matter could emerge from non-living matter, and so proposed vitalism. It died with progressive elaboration of the mechanics of living cells, thus vindicating materialism. I think exactly this same process is currently happening with consciousness, and neuroscience is currently exploring these kinds of models: A conceptual framework for consciousness, https://pnas.org/doi/10.1073/pnas.2116933119 https://pnas.org/doi/10.1073/pnas.2116933119 Finally, I would be very hesitant to claim that something does or does not exist simply because you perceive it or don't perceive it. I could put an object in your blindspot and you'd swear up and down that nothing was there. Our perceptions are inherently flawed, but still useful in evolutionary terms, and the same would apply to our perceptions of qualitative experience. Dennett formed his position after studying neuroscience extensively, so I urge everyone to take it more seriously.
- roarcher 2y ago
  Ah, so we weren't talking past each other. You actually do argue that the existence of qualia is an illusion. I would argue that qualia are in fact the only thing we can be certain does exist. I won't though, because now that you've brought us back into thought-terminating cliche territory, there's little point. > Dennett formed his position after studying neuroscience extensively, so I urge everyone to take it more seriously. I prefer reason over credentialism, personally. All the advanced degrees and study in the world can't make a logically incoherent position correct. The other problem with arguments from authority is that one can always find people with equal or greater credentials who take the opposing view. One of Dennett's better known opponents, for example: > [1] In 1993, Chalmers received his PhD in philosophy and cognitive science from Indiana University Bloomington under Douglas Hofstadter, writing a doctoral thesis entitled Toward a Theory of Consciousness. He was a postdoctoral fellow in the Philosophy-Neuroscience-Psychology program directed by Andy Clark at Washington University in St. Louis from 1993 to 1995. I assume this means you will give equal weight to his point of view. Otherwise we will be forced to acknowledge that you agree with Dennett not because he's well studied, but because he agrees with you. [1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/David_Chalmers https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/David_Chalmers
  - naasking 2y ago
    > I would argue that qualia are in fact the only thing we can be certain does exist. I won't though, because now that you've brought us back into thought-terminating cliche territory, there's little point. As I said, there's nothing thought-terminating about eliminative materialism, and I provided a link demonstrating active work in neuroscience to account for consciousness based on that premise. If it were thought-terminating, why are people developing more thoughts based on it? The only thoughts that are terminated are the attribution of mystical and non-scientific properties to consciousness, which is exactly what you'd expect from actual science. > I assume this means you will give equal weight to his point of view. I have but ultimately didn't find his position persuasive. What I wouldn't do is dismiss his entire position as a thought-terminating cliche though, or assume a deep thinker like Dennett didn't consider an objection as trivial as all of our knowledge being built from qualitative experience. You started this thread by stating that you've never understood the argument behind eliminative materialism, and with the way you've described it so far, I suggest it's because you haven't given it a serious effort.

naasking 2y ago

> I see now that we're using the word "illusion" in different ways and talking past each other. At its core, illusionism is the general position that our qualitative experience is not what it appears to be. That could mean it might just be something else that's incompatible with materialism, but most philosophers take the stricter position that materialism holds, and thus subjective experience doesn't really exist. > I will just point out that if a scientific theory denies the existence of a thing that obviously exists Life obviously exists, and people simply couldn't fathom how living matter could emerge from non-living matter, and so proposed vitalism. It died with progressive elaboration of the mechanics of living cells, thus vindicating materialism. I think exactly this same process is currently happening with consciousness, and neuroscience is currently exploring these kinds of models: A conceptual framework for consciousness, https://pnas.org/doi/10.1073/pnas.2116933119 https://pnas.org/doi/10.1073/pnas.2116933119 Finally, I would be very hesitant to claim that something does or does not exist simply because you perceive it or don't perceive it. I could put an object in your blindspot and you'd swear up and down that nothing was there. Our perceptions are inherently flawed, but still useful in evolutionary terms, and the same would apply to our perceptions of qualitative experience. Dennett formed his position after studying neuroscience extensively, so I urge everyone to take it more seriously.

roarcher 2y ago
Ah, so we weren't talking past each other. You actually do argue that the existence of qualia is an illusion. I would argue that qualia are in fact the only thing we can be certain does exist. I won't though, because now that you've brought us back into thought-terminating cliche territory, there's little point. > Dennett formed his position after studying neuroscience extensively, so I urge everyone to take it more seriously. I prefer reason over credentialism, personally. All the advanced degrees and study in the world can't make a logically incoherent position correct. The other problem with arguments from authority is that one can always find people with equal or greater credentials who take the opposing view. One of Dennett's better known opponents, for example: > [1] In 1993, Chalmers received his PhD in philosophy and cognitive science from Indiana University Bloomington under Douglas Hofstadter, writing a doctoral thesis entitled Toward a Theory of Consciousness. He was a postdoctoral fellow in the Philosophy-Neuroscience-Psychology program directed by Andy Clark at Washington University in St. Louis from 1993 to 1995. I assume this means you will give equal weight to his point of view. Otherwise we will be forced to acknowledge that you agree with Dennett not because he's well studied, but because he agrees with you. [1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/David_Chalmers https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/David_Chalmers
- naasking 2y ago
  > I would argue that qualia are in fact the only thing we can be certain does exist. I won't though, because now that you've brought us back into thought-terminating cliche territory, there's little point. As I said, there's nothing thought-terminating about eliminative materialism, and I provided a link demonstrating active work in neuroscience to account for consciousness based on that premise. If it were thought-terminating, why are people developing more thoughts based on it? The only thoughts that are terminated are the attribution of mystical and non-scientific properties to consciousness, which is exactly what you'd expect from actual science. > I assume this means you will give equal weight to his point of view. I have but ultimately didn't find his position persuasive. What I wouldn't do is dismiss his entire position as a thought-terminating cliche though, or assume a deep thinker like Dennett didn't consider an objection as trivial as all of our knowledge being built from qualitative experience. You started this thread by stating that you've never understood the argument behind eliminative materialism, and with the way you've described it so far, I suggest it's because you haven't given it a serious effort.