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I said "who or what" in anticipation of this exact tiresome semantic game. Use whichever word you prefer, it's irrelevant to my point. My point is that qualia

I said "who or what" in anticipation of this exact tiresome semantic game. Use whichever word you prefer, it's irrelevant to my point. My point is that qualia exist. You can call them an illusion, but we still "feel" them. Why are we able to feel anything, illusory or real? My ontology does not require "privileged subjects". I make no claims about where qualia may or may not exist outside of human minds. I merely acknowledge that they do exist in the human mind, the one place where they can be observed and self-reported. And I think the question of what produces them is worth investigating. Unfortunately any discussion is drowned out by the thought-terminating cliche, "it's an illusion". What exactly do you mean by an "illusion", anyway? Do you mean that I'm programmed by evolution to believe and behave as if I have internal experiences, but I actually don't? I would beg to differ, but I suppose by your reasoning, that's exactly what a befuddled meat robot such as myself would say.

naasking 2y ago
> it's irrelevant to my point. It's not though, the existence of true subjectivity is the central point of the hard problem of consciousness. Science consists of third party objective facts, and so accepting the existence of first person subjective facts is incompatible with materialist science. > And I think the question of what produces them is worth investigating. I agree, I don't think anybody disputes that. Illusionism doesn't preclude investigation into how the illusion is produced, it's just a framework for interpreting the results of experiments in a way that's compatible with materialism. > Do you mean that I'm programmed by evolution to believe and behave as if I have internal experiences, but I actually don't? Your perceptions of subjective qualitative experience are incompatible with materialist science, as I said. You then have two choices: choose to privilege your perceptions and claim that you have some direct access to some aspect of reality, or accept that your perceptions of subjectivity are not a direct perception of reality and thus illusory.
- roarcher 2y ago
  > or accept that your perceptions of subjectivity are not a direct perception of reality and thus illusory. I see now that we're using the word "illusion" in different ways and talking past each other. I agree that qualia are not a direct or accurate experience of reality. Dreams consist of qualia, but most people would not argue that what happens in their dreams must actually be happening. What is not illusory is the fact that subjective experience exists, and that's the sense in which I use the word. I and everyone else (I presume) experience qualia. The fact that the content of consciousness consists of illusions is undoubtedly correct and quite easy to demonstrate, but that is a different and unrelated matter. It is also unsurprising, since what we actually experience is presumably derived from the inner physical state of our brain, which is at best only a proxy for the reality of our surroundings. I do not believe that Dennett himself actually makes this distinction. He seems to sometimes ignore and sometimes outright deny the existence of qualia, which is an absolutely baffling position for any introspective conscious being to take. In regards to whether qualia are compatible with materialism, I will just point out that if a scientific theory denies the existence of a thing that obviously exists, then the problem is with the theory, not the thing. I can think of nothing more un-scientific than insisting on the theory just to spite reality for not conforming to our materialist ideals.
  - naasking 2y ago
    > I see now that we're using the word "illusion" in different ways and talking past each other. At its core, illusionism is the general position that our qualitative experience is not what it appears to be. That could mean it might just be something else that's incompatible with materialism, but most philosophers take the stricter position that materialism holds, and thus subjective experience doesn't really exist. > I will just point out that if a scientific theory denies the existence of a thing that obviously exists Life obviously exists, and people simply couldn't fathom how living matter could emerge from non-living matter, and so proposed vitalism. It died with progressive elaboration of the mechanics of living cells, thus vindicating materialism. I think exactly this same process is currently happening with consciousness, and neuroscience is currently exploring these kinds of models: A conceptual framework for consciousness, https://pnas.org/doi/10.1073/pnas.2116933119 https://pnas.org/doi/10.1073/pnas.2116933119 Finally, I would be very hesitant to claim that something does or does not exist simply because you perceive it or don't perceive it. I could put an object in your blindspot and you'd swear up and down that nothing was there. Our perceptions are inherently flawed, but still useful in evolutionary terms, and the same would apply to our perceptions of qualitative experience. Dennett formed his position after studying neuroscience extensively, so I urge everyone to take it more seriously.
    - roarcher 2y ago
      Ah, so we weren't talking past each other. You actually do argue that the existence of qualia is an illusion. I would argue that qualia are in fact the only thing we can be certain does exist. I won't though, because now that you've brought us back into thought-terminating cliche territory, there's little point. > Dennett formed his position after studying neuroscience extensively, so I urge everyone to take it more seriously. I prefer reason over credentialism, personally. All the advanced degrees and study in the world can't make a logically incoherent position correct. The other problem with arguments from authority is that one can always find people with equal or greater credentials who take the opposing view. One of Dennett's better known opponents, for example: > [1] In 1993, Chalmers received his PhD in philosophy and cognitive science from Indiana University Bloomington under Douglas Hofstadter, writing a doctoral thesis entitled Toward a Theory of Consciousness. He was a postdoctoral fellow in the Philosophy-Neuroscience-Psychology program directed by Andy Clark at Washington University in St. Louis from 1993 to 1995. I assume this means you will give equal weight to his point of view. Otherwise we will be forced to acknowledge that you agree with Dennett not because he's well studied, but because he agrees with you. [1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/David_Chalmers https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/David_Chalmers

naasking 2y ago

> it's irrelevant to my point. It's not though, the existence of true subjectivity is the central point of the hard problem of consciousness. Science consists of third party objective facts, and so accepting the existence of first person subjective facts is incompatible with materialist science. > And I think the question of what produces them is worth investigating. I agree, I don't think anybody disputes that. Illusionism doesn't preclude investigation into how the illusion is produced, it's just a framework for interpreting the results of experiments in a way that's compatible with materialism. > Do you mean that I'm programmed by evolution to believe and behave as if I have internal experiences, but I actually don't? Your perceptions of subjective qualitative experience are incompatible with materialist science, as I said. You then have two choices: choose to privilege your perceptions and claim that you have some direct access to some aspect of reality, or accept that your perceptions of subjectivity are not a direct perception of reality and thus illusory.

roarcher 2y ago
> or accept that your perceptions of subjectivity are not a direct perception of reality and thus illusory. I see now that we're using the word "illusion" in different ways and talking past each other. I agree that qualia are not a direct or accurate experience of reality. Dreams consist of qualia, but most people would not argue that what happens in their dreams must actually be happening. What is not illusory is the fact that subjective experience exists, and that's the sense in which I use the word. I and everyone else (I presume) experience qualia. The fact that the content of consciousness consists of illusions is undoubtedly correct and quite easy to demonstrate, but that is a different and unrelated matter. It is also unsurprising, since what we actually experience is presumably derived from the inner physical state of our brain, which is at best only a proxy for the reality of our surroundings. I do not believe that Dennett himself actually makes this distinction. He seems to sometimes ignore and sometimes outright deny the existence of qualia, which is an absolutely baffling position for any introspective conscious being to take. In regards to whether qualia are compatible with materialism, I will just point out that if a scientific theory denies the existence of a thing that obviously exists, then the problem is with the theory, not the thing. I can think of nothing more un-scientific than insisting on the theory just to spite reality for not conforming to our materialist ideals.
- naasking 2y ago
  > I see now that we're using the word "illusion" in different ways and talking past each other. At its core, illusionism is the general position that our qualitative experience is not what it appears to be. That could mean it might just be something else that's incompatible with materialism, but most philosophers take the stricter position that materialism holds, and thus subjective experience doesn't really exist. > I will just point out that if a scientific theory denies the existence of a thing that obviously exists Life obviously exists, and people simply couldn't fathom how living matter could emerge from non-living matter, and so proposed vitalism. It died with progressive elaboration of the mechanics of living cells, thus vindicating materialism. I think exactly this same process is currently happening with consciousness, and neuroscience is currently exploring these kinds of models: A conceptual framework for consciousness, https://pnas.org/doi/10.1073/pnas.2116933119 https://pnas.org/doi/10.1073/pnas.2116933119 Finally, I would be very hesitant to claim that something does or does not exist simply because you perceive it or don't perceive it. I could put an object in your blindspot and you'd swear up and down that nothing was there. Our perceptions are inherently flawed, but still useful in evolutionary terms, and the same would apply to our perceptions of qualitative experience. Dennett formed his position after studying neuroscience extensively, so I urge everyone to take it more seriously.
  - roarcher 2y ago
    Ah, so we weren't talking past each other. You actually do argue that the existence of qualia is an illusion. I would argue that qualia are in fact the only thing we can be certain does exist. I won't though, because now that you've brought us back into thought-terminating cliche territory, there's little point. > Dennett formed his position after studying neuroscience extensively, so I urge everyone to take it more seriously. I prefer reason over credentialism, personally. All the advanced degrees and study in the world can't make a logically incoherent position correct. The other problem with arguments from authority is that one can always find people with equal or greater credentials who take the opposing view. One of Dennett's better known opponents, for example: > [1] In 1993, Chalmers received his PhD in philosophy and cognitive science from Indiana University Bloomington under Douglas Hofstadter, writing a doctoral thesis entitled Toward a Theory of Consciousness. He was a postdoctoral fellow in the Philosophy-Neuroscience-Psychology program directed by Andy Clark at Washington University in St. Louis from 1993 to 1995. I assume this means you will give equal weight to his point of view. Otherwise we will be forced to acknowledge that you agree with Dennett not because he's well studied, but because he agrees with you. [1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/David_Chalmers https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/David_Chalmers