6 ms·

"consciousness" is often an alias for soul with a scientific flavor. That's why "machines cannot be conscious" despite the fact that humans obey to the same phy

by joak 2y ago

"consciousness" is often an alias for soul with a scientific flavor. That's why "machines cannot be conscious" despite the fact that humans obey to the same physical rules. Once you define consciousness it might be easy to implement. If I use the definition "perception of our own thoughts" it's already implemented with ps or activity monitor. The mystery is how this is done biologically and how evolution had led to it. But the implementation with computers is trivial.

a_cardboard_box 2y ago
> humans obey to the same physical rules. We do not know how the universe works on a fundamental level. We don't know if the universe can be simulated by a Turing machine. I think it's clear it can't. 1) I have subjective experience (there is something that it is like to be me). 2) My subjective experience is outside of what math can describe (perhaps math can describe the degree to which I experience each qualia, but that is different from experiencing the qualia themselves). 3) I am able to take this experience and write that I know that there is something beyond mathematical rules that exists. 4) My behaviour (what words I write) is influenced by the existence of something non-mathematical. 5) My behaviour can't be described as a mathematical function of the past.
- PopePompus 2y ago
  You can certainly write "I know that there is something beyond mathematical rules that exists." That doesn't make it true.
  - a_cardboard_box 2y ago
    If there are only mathematical rules, then there isn't something that it's like to be me. I know that is false by experiencing the thing that it's like to be me. Perhaps there isn't anything that it's like to be you, in which case I have no hope of convincing you, because the underlying concept behind my words is ineffable.
    - bawolff 2y ago
      I think the counter-argument would go - there are all sorts of unintuitive mathematical rules. What if it just seems like there is something ineffable about experiencing life but its just an illusion? Mind you, i dont think either side of the debate has much in way of evidence, so it ends up coming down to just what feels "right" which is pretty unsatisfactory.
  - mistermann 2y ago
    True, but True is a subclass of Real, and what is Real drives causality, and is only partially constrained by Truth.
- taneq 2y ago
  1) I'm slightly disappointed in myself that it's taken this long for me to really fully appreciate what a meaningless word salad 'there is something that it is like to be X' really is. And yet, this is the accepted 'definition' of subjective experience. 2) Prove it. 3) The fact that you're able to write this doesn't make it true. 4) Is it? What? Again, prove it. 5) What else is it a function of, then?
  - a_cardboard_box 2y ago
    Your criticism is all correct, in the sense that I haven't pinned down what I mean well enough to avoid it. Unfortunately, I mean by "subjective experience" is ineffable. And the reason it's ineffable is also ineffable. It's something you can only understand if you have it and introspect on it. So you're entirely correct that this sequence of words isn't a valid definition, because there isn't one. 5) It may be a function of the past, just not one that can be given a mathematical definition. I should have said "defined" rather than "described".
    - saltcured 2y ago
      I think you're getting bogged down in a very popular philosophical quagmire, which I feel is not a very useful place to linger. But, I can share a few landmarks I remember from past slogs. At a rhetorical level: Don't fixate on what math can or cannot describe. In the past, it could not describe states of matter, though they certainly existed. Now, we can describe and simulate such states pretty well. But describing, detecting, or simulating does not mean recreating. I don't think any of us currently "know" whether consciousness will be better described, detected, or simulated in the future. At an introspective level: When pondering the "experience of being me", don't forget to question the identity concept "me" as much as the experience part... Consider altered states of consciousness through drugs, disease, or brain injury. It can really expand your view here to empathize with someone who suffers one or more of these issues, where you can consider their illusory identity and experience.
- dwaltrip 2y ago
  What’s your reasoning for: “My subjective experience is outside of what math can describe”? If there was a perfect identical copy of you, down to the quantum level, would they have nearly the exact same subjective experience or not? If not, why? (Of course, they couldn’t be in the exact same location as you, which means the experience can’t be perfectly identical).
  - a_cardboard_box 2y ago
    My subjective experience is simply in a different category from math. I can't really explain it because subjective experience is ineffable. Asking to describe it mathematically is like asking to write a poem that tastes salty. You can try using salty ink, but the flavor isn't coming from the poem. > If there was a perfect identical copy of you, down to the quantum level, would they have nearly the exact same subjective experience or not? The copy would likely have similar experience and behaviour. So you could say that my behaviour is a mathematical function of the past in the sense that every input maps to a unique output. But it doesn't mean that which inputs map to which outputs can be fully described by math. Maybe I should say "defined" instead of "described". In any formal system, only countably many functions can be defined, but there are an uncountable number of possible behaviour functions. I think the universe's behaviour must lie in this uncountable space for any computable formal system.
- bawolff 2y ago
  > (perhaps math can describe the degree to which I experience each qualia, but that is different from experiencing the qualia themselves) Isn't that everything though? Math can describe a stop sign. It can say it is a red octagon or whatever. That doesn't mean it is the stop sign. Math does not have independent existence in the world (sorry platonists), its just a really formal language for describing the patterns we see. > 5) My behaviour can't be described as a mathematical function of the past. Neither can particles (if you mean exactly)

by joak 2y ago

a_cardboard_box 2y ago

> humans obey to the same physical rules. We do not know how the universe works on a fundamental level. We don't know if the universe can be simulated by a Turing machine. I think it's clear it can't. 1) I have subjective experience (there is something that it is like to be me). 2) My subjective experience is outside of what math can describe (perhaps math can describe the degree to which I experience each qualia, but that is different from experiencing the qualia themselves). 3) I am able to take this experience and write that I know that there is something beyond mathematical rules that exists. 4) My behaviour (what words I write) is influenced by the existence of something non-mathematical. 5) My behaviour can't be described as a mathematical function of the past.

PopePompus 2y ago
You can certainly write "I know that there is something beyond mathematical rules that exists." That doesn't make it true.
- a_cardboard_box 2y ago
  If there are only mathematical rules, then there isn't something that it's like to be me. I know that is false by experiencing the thing that it's like to be me. Perhaps there isn't anything that it's like to be you, in which case I have no hope of convincing you, because the underlying concept behind my words is ineffable.
  - bawolff 2y ago
    I think the counter-argument would go - there are all sorts of unintuitive mathematical rules. What if it just seems like there is something ineffable about experiencing life but its just an illusion? Mind you, i dont think either side of the debate has much in way of evidence, so it ends up coming down to just what feels "right" which is pretty unsatisfactory.
- mistermann 2y ago
  True, but True is a subclass of Real, and what is Real drives causality, and is only partially constrained by Truth.
taneq 2y ago
1) I'm slightly disappointed in myself that it's taken this long for me to really fully appreciate what a meaningless word salad 'there is something that it is like to be X' really is. And yet, this is the accepted 'definition' of subjective experience. 2) Prove it. 3) The fact that you're able to write this doesn't make it true. 4) Is it? What? Again, prove it. 5) What else is it a function of, then?
- a_cardboard_box 2y ago
  Your criticism is all correct, in the sense that I haven't pinned down what I mean well enough to avoid it. Unfortunately, I mean by "subjective experience" is ineffable. And the reason it's ineffable is also ineffable. It's something you can only understand if you have it and introspect on it. So you're entirely correct that this sequence of words isn't a valid definition, because there isn't one. 5) It may be a function of the past, just not one that can be given a mathematical definition. I should have said "defined" rather than "described".
  - saltcured 2y ago
    I think you're getting bogged down in a very popular philosophical quagmire, which I feel is not a very useful place to linger. But, I can share a few landmarks I remember from past slogs. At a rhetorical level: Don't fixate on what math can or cannot describe. In the past, it could not describe states of matter, though they certainly existed. Now, we can describe and simulate such states pretty well. But describing, detecting, or simulating does not mean recreating. I don't think any of us currently "know" whether consciousness will be better described, detected, or simulated in the future. At an introspective level: When pondering the "experience of being me", don't forget to question the identity concept "me" as much as the experience part... Consider altered states of consciousness through drugs, disease, or brain injury. It can really expand your view here to empathize with someone who suffers one or more of these issues, where you can consider their illusory identity and experience.
dwaltrip 2y ago
What’s your reasoning for: “My subjective experience is outside of what math can describe”? If there was a perfect identical copy of you, down to the quantum level, would they have nearly the exact same subjective experience or not? If not, why? (Of course, they couldn’t be in the exact same location as you, which means the experience can’t be perfectly identical).
- a_cardboard_box 2y ago
  My subjective experience is simply in a different category from math. I can't really explain it because subjective experience is ineffable. Asking to describe it mathematically is like asking to write a poem that tastes salty. You can try using salty ink, but the flavor isn't coming from the poem. > If there was a perfect identical copy of you, down to the quantum level, would they have nearly the exact same subjective experience or not? The copy would likely have similar experience and behaviour. So you could say that my behaviour is a mathematical function of the past in the sense that every input maps to a unique output. But it doesn't mean that which inputs map to which outputs can be fully described by math. Maybe I should say "defined" instead of "described". In any formal system, only countably many functions can be defined, but there are an uncountable number of possible behaviour functions. I think the universe's behaviour must lie in this uncountable space for any computable formal system.
bawolff 2y ago
> (perhaps math can describe the degree to which I experience each qualia, but that is different from experiencing the qualia themselves) Isn't that everything though? Math can describe a stop sign. It can say it is a red octagon or whatever. That doesn't mean it is the stop sign. Math does not have independent existence in the world (sorry platonists), its just a really formal language for describing the patterns we see. > 5) My behaviour can't be described as a mathematical function of the past. Neither can particles (if you mean exactly)