10 ms·
I will read it some time.
I still do not know what makes a theory “better” if it will never be provably correct, is most likely drastically wrong, and comparat
I will read it some time.
I still do not know what makes a theory “better” if it will never be provably correct, is most likely drastically wrong, and comparatively brings us little value. A theory that would instead focus on ourselves, whatever that might look like, seems like potentially a much “better” option, but because the path is poorly trodden the scientific community would defend its own dignity by laughing at those who venture there. Anyway, I’m not awake enough to argue well at this point.
> Philosophy is not a science at all.
If you want to go there then sure, in some ways it is not. It is what natural sciences branched off of. Generally speaking, it is superior to sciences in that they are informed by it. Not sure if it’s splitting hairs in context of our discussion.
> Neither is math
Oxford dictionary starts with “it is a science…”, why do you say it is not?
> The so-called "social sciences" are commonly set apart in a different category
A different category from natural sciences. You’re seeing it now!
> it is the distinction between areas of intellectual inquiry that employ the scientific method vs those that don't.
Let’s talk about scientific method.
Scientific method is a key instrument of natural sciences, but it cannot make a statement about “underlying reality”, say materialism or physicalism vs. idealism. It can just make testable observations and predictions; the exact underlying territory can never be produced using scientific method—there can only be speculative takes on it, produced by our fallible human minds, informed by applying scientific method in particular ways guided by our fallible human minds.
A position that molecules is what causes us to flourish or not, meanwhile, is textbook physicalism. It is a particular philosophical view that is not within the scope of natural sciences to prove or disprove. The article you linked to actually supports this argument. See myth #2.
It does not make natural sciences deficient, but it highlights what they offer and what they by design don’t. Philosophical positions such as monistic idealism or monistic materialism have both equal capability to be true, and unfortunately both are (as of now) beyond what scientific method can prove or falsify.
> It is what natural sciences branched off of.
Yes, that's true. But it wasn't science before the branching, and what is left over after the branching is not science either.
> Oxford dictionary starts with “it is a science…”, why do you say it is not?
Math is a tool used by science, but it is not in and of itself a science (with a few exceptions). The reason is that this discussion is taking place within the context of a specific definition of science that requires experimental data to verify or refute hypotheses. Math generally doesn't fit that definition.
> Scientific method ... cannot make a statement about “underlying reality” ...
Yes, all that is true.
> A position that molecules is what causes us to flourish or not, meanwhile, is textbook physicalism.
No, it's a testable hypothesis with a lot of supporting evidence.
> what is left over after the branching is not science either
Yes. I’d say philosophy is not science in the same sense music is not drumming.
> this discussion is taking place within the context of a specific definition of science that requires experimental data to verify or refute hypotheses
Did we agree to that specific definition? If so, my bad, but I don’t recall that. Also, what are some other definitions available?
In any case, there are natural sciences, and there are other kinds of sciences that are not less important, and potentially more so depending on one’s values.
> No, it's a testable hypothesis with a lot of supporting evidence.
Not as far as I know.
There are plenty of so-called “proofs” that include things like cutting or stimulating parts of the brain seemingly causing changes in mind-state, but they obviously miss the part where the very cutting or the stimulating is caused by mind-state in the first place—i.e., they all presuppose materialism without even realizing it.
What is a way to definitively prove or falsify idealism or materialism that is available to us, without presupposing either idealism or materialism in the first place?
What is one piece of hard evidence that actually works as evidence to prove materialism without presupposing materialism?
> Philosophy is not science in the same sense art is not music
No, that is not at all the same thing. There was not a field of human intellectual endeavor called "art" which begat music. A much better analogy is that philosophy is not science in the same sense that alchemy is not chemistry, or astrology is not astronomy, or banging on a hollow log with a stick is not playing the violin.
> Did we agree to that specific definition?
This discussion is taking place in a thread whose topic is a blog post which defends that specific definition. So no, we didn't explicitly agree to it, but it's a reasonable assumption, a generally understood part of the HN social contract.
> What is one piece of hard evidence that actually works as evidence to prove materialism
Materialism is not the testable hypothesis. The testable hypothesis is "molecules is what causes us to flourish." And I should have said "falsifiable" not testable. The way you falsify it would be to demonstrate some aspect of human flourishing that cannot be explained as the actions of molecules.
> A much better analogy is that philosophy is not science in the same sense that alchemy is not chemistry, or astrology is not astronomy
Not at all. Astrology is irrelevant, whereas philosophy is quite relevant in the sense that it is an integral part of scientific activity and takes place despite certain people forgetting that they do it even while doing it.
> or banging on a hollow log with a stick is not playing the violin
Yes, I actually edited my comment to provide a better analogy: philosophy is not science in the same sense music is not drumming.
> Materialism is not the testable hypothesis. The testable hypothesis is "molecules is what causes us to flourish."
These follow from one another. If you claim that molecules are the cause of some phenomena taking place in your mind, which flourishing, self-actualisation, happiness, suffering, etc. all are, then you implicitly claim materialism.
For anyone who claims that mind-state is the cause, you can claim that it is in fact the consequence (or an illusion, as some do), and it will be your word against theirs.
That’s where it stops being a scientific experiment and becomes a higher-level philosophical argument where testability is, unfortunately, out of our reach, but we can still judge theories by their elegance and logical soundness.
> The way you falsify it would be to demonstrate some aspect of human flourishing that cannot be explained as the actions of molecules
As above, if you claim that there is some aspect of flourishing that cannot be explained as “actions of molecules” (I would be hard-pressed to ascribe any agency to molecules, personally) you would likely be implicitly adopting monistic idealism (or some sort of dualism, which I personally find dubious due to even more drastic lack of elegance than in monistic materialism), and that is not testable since to anyone who claims that mind-state is the consequence you can very simply point out how it can be the cause—and since neither way can be proven or disproven, it is once again a higher-level philosophical argument.
That argument is more fundamental and more important, actually, than predicting some molecular activity or the like; and before you object, using the fact that scientific method is as of now limited and unable to provide evidence either way can’t serve as a justification for calling the question itself unimportant if we were to have this discussion with any rigour and truth-seeking determination (as opposed to mere desire to socially signal or appear “right”).