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Interesting find on the "default application loop," but it hardly debunks panpsychism. Panpsychism suggests that all matter has proto-conscious traits, not just

Interesting find on the "default application loop," but it hardly debunks panpsychism. Panpsychism suggests that all matter has proto-conscious traits, not just brain-like consciousness. The brain patterns we're identifying with fMRI are just how human consciousness manifests, based on our specific neural setups. This doesn't necessarily exclude other forms of consciousness inherent in different forms of matter, which might be beyond our current detection capabilities. Let's not conflate our present understanding of human consciousness with the broader, philosophical nature of consciousness itself.

tasty_freeze 2y ago
Panpsychism is as necessary to explain consciousness. Why can't it (and qualia) just be emergent behaviors? We might as well posit pancandleness in order to explain the candleness of candles. Without such a thing, why call a candle a candle? It would merely be just a temporary arrangement of molecules.
- anon291 2y ago
  Being a candle is different than the sensation that one is a candle. Indeed, yes, i think it's reasonable to posit, that, if such a sensation exists, then all things would feel it in some way, depending on how much of a candle you are.
  - tasty_freeze 2y ago
    My point is this: we put labels on things, but it doesn't mean there isn't some independent thing we can point to that causes it to be that thing. There is no candleness that imbues an object to make it a candle. Likewise, a feeling of red isn't due to some mysterious redness. It is just the label we put on a particular configuration of neural activation. No need to make it mysterious until someone shows that more is required to explain it.
    - anon291 2y ago
      > Likewise, a feeling of red isn't due to some mysterious redness. It is just the label we put on a particular configuration of neural activation. No need to make it mysterious until someone shows that more is required to explain it. Well... that's the problem no one can 'show' it, but we all know the feeling of 'redness'(mysterious or not, caused by neural activations alone or not) is still fundamentally different from the knowledge that red light is shining on another object. And that's the problem. I mean, maybe you don't experience this feeling and I'm truly talking to an automaton (hello!). But I can't honestly take these claims seriously when it's extremely obvious to me that the feeling of seeing red is fundamentally different from the pure information content that red light is shining on my face. It's a fundamental feeling of sensation that is simply inexplicable. Why does red feel anything at all. Why is there a conscious (whatever that even is) experience of red. Wouldn't the universe work fine if it's all just automata (however intelligent). Why is there a feeling of existence at all. Is that necessary for the universe. Why? Waving these questions away as 'not mysterious' is either due to laziness or a fundamental difference in experience (which would be fascinating on its own, but I have no idea how to approach methodologicaly).
glenstein 2y ago
>Panpsychism suggests that all matter has proto-conscious traits, not just brain-like consciousness. I think a cornerstone of panpsychism is that none of the concepts presently available to any physicalist explanation is sufficient or on the horizon, therefore it is necessary to entertain such ideas as a universe-spanning proto-consciousness. I find this position to be pre-emptive, not in the spirit of scientific open mindedness, not compatible with any research program that could prove or disprove it, and completely emptyhanded in any conversation that seeks to understand consciousness in functional or structural terms as well as completely emptyhanded in even beginning to explain the combination problem. Until it gets its act together and gets out of alpha-testing, I fault pansychism proponents for bringing a "teach the controversy" approach to a table of scientific investigation at which they are yet to have earned a seat.
- altruios 2y ago
  I mean, experiments should be able to test this? Maybe in the future someone will find a way to adapt the double slit experiment to test for 'choice' on a fundamental particle level. "Can a particle choose for itself?"
  - glenstein 2y ago
    That's a very creative potential experiment, and I do hope some such experiments can be proposed! However, my understanding of the double slit experiment is that the "observer" in the experiment means something more like measurer or measurability, which can be done by devices. And it shouldn't be construed as being deeply tied to consciousness in philosophically important sense.
    - altruios 2y ago
      My understanding was 'measuring is touching' with light, imparting energy into the delicate system, and no measurement can be done at that scale (thanks to the rules of light frequency/energy) that can both detect it and be weak enough to not bother the result. So when I say like the double slit needs to be adapted, it would need to account for such. It would need to test for 'choice' from a particle... somehow... Or... maybe randomness as a concept is flawed. Maybe randomness === '(some level of informed?) choice' from particles we are not privy too. not some 'hidden variable' but a dynamic ability to 'choose'? How would we prove random is random and not a choice/decision we can't see or understand?
nathan_compton 2y ago
My problem with panpsychism is that its scientifically vacuous. A brain is conscious in an obvious, observable way. An equivalent amount of sand is not. We need an account of why the brain behaves the way that it does, but panpsychism furnishes no such account and the content of that accounting would basically be neuroscience as we know it, including all the philosophical difficulties of why things feel like things at all (this, I feel, is also vacuous, but a different question). Thus panpsychism is of no help at all for explaining anything so what precisely is the point of believing it?
- glenstein 2y ago
  I also think that once you prod for explanations of combination, or why consciousness seems to be deeply associated with a specific kind of structural function and complexity rather than such things as size and mass, panyschist answers about where consciousness "shows up" just start to more closely approximate ordinary consciousness research we are already doing.

tasty_freeze 2y ago

Panpsychism is as necessary to explain consciousness. Why can't it (and qualia) just be emergent behaviors? We might as well posit pancandleness in order to explain the candleness of candles. Without such a thing, why call a candle a candle? It would merely be just a temporary arrangement of molecules.

anon291 2y ago
Being a candle is different than the sensation that one is a candle. Indeed, yes, i think it's reasonable to posit, that, if such a sensation exists, then all things would feel it in some way, depending on how much of a candle you are.
- tasty_freeze 2y ago
  My point is this: we put labels on things, but it doesn't mean there isn't some independent thing we can point to that causes it to be that thing. There is no candleness that imbues an object to make it a candle. Likewise, a feeling of red isn't due to some mysterious redness. It is just the label we put on a particular configuration of neural activation. No need to make it mysterious until someone shows that more is required to explain it.
  - anon291 2y ago
    > Likewise, a feeling of red isn't due to some mysterious redness. It is just the label we put on a particular configuration of neural activation. No need to make it mysterious until someone shows that more is required to explain it. Well... that's the problem no one can 'show' it, but we all know the feeling of 'redness'(mysterious or not, caused by neural activations alone or not) is still fundamentally different from the knowledge that red light is shining on another object. And that's the problem. I mean, maybe you don't experience this feeling and I'm truly talking to an automaton (hello!). But I can't honestly take these claims seriously when it's extremely obvious to me that the feeling of seeing red is fundamentally different from the pure information content that red light is shining on my face. It's a fundamental feeling of sensation that is simply inexplicable. Why does red feel anything at all. Why is there a conscious (whatever that even is) experience of red. Wouldn't the universe work fine if it's all just automata (however intelligent). Why is there a feeling of existence at all. Is that necessary for the universe. Why? Waving these questions away as 'not mysterious' is either due to laziness or a fundamental difference in experience (which would be fascinating on its own, but I have no idea how to approach methodologicaly).

glenstein 2y ago

>Panpsychism suggests that all matter has proto-conscious traits, not just brain-like consciousness. I think a cornerstone of panpsychism is that none of the concepts presently available to any physicalist explanation is sufficient or on the horizon, therefore it is necessary to entertain such ideas as a universe-spanning proto-consciousness. I find this position to be pre-emptive, not in the spirit of scientific open mindedness, not compatible with any research program that could prove or disprove it, and completely emptyhanded in any conversation that seeks to understand consciousness in functional or structural terms as well as completely emptyhanded in even beginning to explain the combination problem. Until it gets its act together and gets out of alpha-testing, I fault pansychism proponents for bringing a "teach the controversy" approach to a table of scientific investigation at which they are yet to have earned a seat.

altruios 2y ago
I mean, experiments should be able to test this? Maybe in the future someone will find a way to adapt the double slit experiment to test for 'choice' on a fundamental particle level. "Can a particle choose for itself?"
- glenstein 2y ago
  That's a very creative potential experiment, and I do hope some such experiments can be proposed! However, my understanding of the double slit experiment is that the "observer" in the experiment means something more like measurer or measurability, which can be done by devices. And it shouldn't be construed as being deeply tied to consciousness in philosophically important sense.
  - altruios 2y ago
    My understanding was 'measuring is touching' with light, imparting energy into the delicate system, and no measurement can be done at that scale (thanks to the rules of light frequency/energy) that can both detect it and be weak enough to not bother the result. So when I say like the double slit needs to be adapted, it would need to account for such. It would need to test for 'choice' from a particle... somehow... Or... maybe randomness as a concept is flawed. Maybe randomness === '(some level of informed?) choice' from particles we are not privy too. not some 'hidden variable' but a dynamic ability to 'choose'? How would we prove random is random and not a choice/decision we can't see or understand?

nathan_compton 2y ago

My problem with panpsychism is that its scientifically vacuous. A brain is conscious in an obvious, observable way. An equivalent amount of sand is not. We need an account of why the brain behaves the way that it does, but panpsychism furnishes no such account and the content of that accounting would basically be neuroscience as we know it, including all the philosophical difficulties of why things feel like things at all (this, I feel, is also vacuous, but a different question). Thus panpsychism is of no help at all for explaining anything so what precisely is the point of believing it?

glenstein 2y ago
I also think that once you prod for explanations of combination, or why consciousness seems to be deeply associated with a specific kind of structural function and complexity rather than such things as size and mass, panyschist answers about where consciousness "shows up" just start to more closely approximate ordinary consciousness research we are already doing.