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Have you ever, in your whole career, worked with a team that wrote their own crypto and got it right in version 1? Because I haven't. As far as I know, I got t
by cperciva 18y ago
Have you ever, in your whole career, worked with a team that wrote their own crypto and got it right in version 1? Because I haven't.
As far as I know, I got the crypto right in tarsnap. If I didn't, please let me know. :-)
- tptacek 18y agoI don't think you really answered my question, Colin; I think that's a cop-out answer. =)
- cperciva 18y agoMaybe I misunderstood your question. I thought that "as far as I know, I got the crypto right in [product where I wrote my own crypto protocols]" was a pretty clear answer to "have you ever written your own crypto and gotten it right?"
- tptacek 18y agoI was asking if you'd ever worked with a team of (other, I implied unsuccessfully) developers who got a cryptosystem right on the first try.
- cperciva 18y agoOk, that explains it. I didn't catch the fact that you were excluding the degenerate case of a one-person team. :-)
- tptacek 18y agoI also assumed you'd like your own stuff. But, now that we understand each other: was that an answer to my original question?
- cperciva 18y agoI believe I got the crypto right in version 1 of tarsnap, but I wasn't working as part of a (non-degenerate) team. I've never done crypto with a team -- so my answer to your (clarified) question must be a vacuous "no".
- tptacek 18y agoBut you've worked against a couple teams now that got it wrong (Amazon, OpenSSL). Do you agree that the evidence supports my argument?
- cperciva 18y agoNot really, no. Amazon screwed up on a well-known widely-understood rule; there aren't 40 different sides of the road involved with "hash collisions are bad". Similarly, the one cryptographic complaint I have about OpenSSL (as opposed to non-cryptographic security bugs) is their lack of attention to side channels, and the same applies here -- we KNOW that side channels are bad. The fact that the OpenSSL developers haven't made any systematic attempt to prevent them doesn't mean that cryptography is hard; it just means that the OpenSSL developers are careless.
- brl 18y agoThat's an interesting criticism of OpenSSL. Do you know of a general purpose cryptographic library that has done a better job than OpenSSL at hardening against side-channel attacks? By default, OpenSSL has: RSA blinding, constant time montgomery multiplication, careful review and correction of the conditional branches which were attacked in that amazing series of branch prediction papers. Doesn't seem to me that OpenSSL developers are careless and indifferent about side-channel attacks.
- cperciva 18y agoDo you know of a general purpose cryptographic library that has done a better job than OpenSSL at hardening against side-channel attacks? No, I don't know of any better cryptographic library. (This is why I said a few days ago that writing a better cryptographic library was something I'd like to do if I was rich.) Doesn't seem to me that OpenSSL developers are careless and indifferent about side-channel attacks. They're playing whack-a-mole. There are over a thousand conditional branches in the large integer arithmetic code alone. The fact that nobody has pointed out how to exploit them yet doesn't mean that they're not exploitable.